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Islam and Politics in East Africa

The Sufi Order in Tanzania

August H. Nimtz Jr.

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August H. Nimtz, Jr.

Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota

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The University of Minnesota
is an equal-opportunity
educator and employer.

To my parents
and
Maxine,
who saw this
from the beginning

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Preface

This book is about Islam and politics in twentieth-century East Africa. More specifically, my purpose is to explain why an Islamic institution, the *tariqa,* (also known as the Muslim brotherhood, or *sufi* order), can be important in political change. Unlike most studies on the political role of the tariqa,[1] this book stresses explanation rather than mere description. To this end, the study is exploratory in that it formulates hypotheses.

The book is based on three assumptions. First, the political importance of Islam and, more particularly, the tariqa can best be explained by an analysis of the social cleavages of the society in which it is located. By cleavages, I mean the long-lasting societal divisions that pit groups against one another, especially those divisions based on ascriptive criteria. The second assumption is that in order to explain the political role of a particular Muslim institution, in this case the sufi order, it is necessary to look at the way in which social cleavages are reflected in the religious sphere as well as in the broader society. Last, although "institutional" or "historical" factors such as social cleavages may be necessary conditions in explaining political behavior, they are not sufficient unless the interests of the individuals who make up the groups in the cleavages are taken into account.

Following these assumptions, I employ a conceptual framework that combines on the one hand a theoretical perspective on conflict groups and social change—Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of group conflict—and on the other a microanalytic model of interest groups—Robert Salisbury's exchange theory of interest groups. I use both models as heuristic tools, and, therefore, I do not test them in the technical sense. It may be useful to point out those aspects of both models relevant to my framework.

Conflict groups in Dahrendorf's model arise as a result of the "differential distribution of authority" in a social system, the fact that some group or individual possesses authority while others are excluded from it. The possessors are the "dominants" and the nonpossessors are the "subjects." Thus, any social system contains two role groups with opposing interests—interest groups—one desiring to maintain the distribution of authority and the other having an interest in its redistribution. Furthermore, "the theory of group conflict involves no statement about the empirical variety of interest groups."[2] Its concern is only that such groups engage in conflict as a result of the differential distribution of authority.

The existence of interest groups is likely to lead to conflict as the groups—or conflict groups—strive to promote their interests. Among the most important factors affecting the conflict is the social structure. The three aspects of social structure that are essential to the theory are stratification and cleavages, social mobility, and the degree to which cleavages and other inequalities are superimposed. Finally, the nature of conflict results in certain kinds of structural changes for the social system.

Salisbury's exchange theory is employed because it provides a more detailed perspective on the conditions that give rise to conflict or interest groups by focusing on individual interests. The basic framework of this theory has been succinctly described: "Entrepreneurs/organizers invest capital to create a set of benefits which they offer to a market of potential customers at a price. If, and as long as, enough customers buy, i.e., join, to make a viable organization, the group is in business. If the benefits fail, or are inadequate to warrant the cost of membership, or the leaders get inadequate return, the group collapses." Insofar as the exchange is very profitable for the entrepreneur/organizer, then "he may spend some of his 'profits' in public activity."[3] This may entail lobbying in the public sector on behalf of the interests of the membership or simply on the basis of the entrepreneur/organizer's own interests.

The theoretical link between the two models is provided by

Dahrendorf's explanation of why "a market of potential customers" may exist for certain benefits, a consideration with which Salisbury does not concern himself. In the joining of these two theories, it should be realized that there is an important difference between them. In Dahrendorf's scheme, a conflict group is organzied expressly for the purpose of furthering the interests of the dominant or subject group; in Salisbury's model, an interest group that engages in conflict need not necessarily have been organized for that purpose. This difference in Salisbury's model does not, however, contradict the basic assumptions in Dahrendorf's perspective, and as my study reveals, this characteristic of the exchange theory is useful in looking at the sufi brotherhood.

One of the advantages in employing Salisbury's model is that it provides a theory of group leadership. On its own, the theory of group conflict tends to be deterministic and does not adequately explain how an interest group furthers its interests. A theory of leadership provides an explanation for this process.

The key variables in this study based on Dahrendorf's perspective are the *differential distribution of authority* between *dominants* and *subjects* (or the *rulers* and the *ruled*), *cleavages,* and the *superimposition* of cleavages. Based on Salisbury's exchange model are the important concepts of the *entrepreneur/organizer* and the *benefits* that he or she creates. Three kinds of benefits are distinguished in this study: *religious, material,* and *solidary*. Understanding *cost* of benefits is key in understanding the *exchange* between the organizer and the members. The way in which these variables are employed becomes clear in the relevant chapters.

Conflict theory has been used before to analyze the political role of religion. Donald Smith, for example, in his analysis on how religion draws people into active participation in the political process, argues that conflict—"central" to his "understanding of the nature of politics"—involving socioreligious structures, religious communities, et cetera, has long been a major factor.[4] *Islam and Politics in East Africa* is unique in that it integrates a conflict perspective with a theory that focuses on individual interests and that, in turn, enhances the explanatory power of both.

The unit of analysis is Muslim East Africa—mainly, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. Because it contains the overwhelming number of East Africa's Muslims and almost all of the brotherhoods, Tanzania is the primary focus of this study. The employment of exchange theory requires a more detailed view of the political process. It means shifting the level of analysis from the group (macro) level—

at the territorial, regional, and local levels – to the individual (micro) level. Bagamoyo, Tanzania, the historical coastal town north of Dar es Salaam, is particularly suited for a closer analysis. It is a major Islamic center in East Africa. Over 90 percent of its ethnically heterogeneous population adheres to the orthodox, or Sunni Muslim, faith. More important, prominent Muslim leaders from various locales in Tanzania, whom I interviewed in a preliminary survey, mentioned Bagamoyo more often than any other community for having strong and influential brotherhoods. Also, they ranked it first in tariqa leaders who had held important political positions. Last, their evaluations correlated highly with the views of knowledgeable Western scholars whom I interviewed.

The employment of the theory of group conflict for this inquiry means in fact an examination of the brotherhood's role in what Dahrendorf calls "structural change." In addition, given that Dahrendorf's framework is a process theory, the analysis must have a historical or diachromic dimension. Therefore, the temporal unit of analysis in this study is from the period that immediately preceded the appearance of brotherhoods in East Africa (the last two decades of the nineteenth century, or the end of the precolonial era) to the period of structural changes that occurred following independence until 1973.

The first part of this book focuses on the history and the social structure of the East African Sunni community as a whole. Chapter 1 provides the relevant historical background. Chapter 2 describes the structure of authority in the Sunni community and how ethnicity and class are reflected among the religious authorities. Chapter 3 describes the major cleavages in East African Muslim society. (I argue there that these divisions can be reduced to one fundamental cleavage—whites versus blacks.)

Part 1 provides the social setting for analyzing the tariqa, the subject of part 2. Chapter 4 delineates the various orders and how they helped Islam to expand. By looking at their role in Islam's growth, we understand how the brotherhoods became mass organizations. Chapter 5 describes the involvement of brotherhoods in countrywide and local politics. The data are presented and discussed in the framework of cleavage analysis and, thus, follow from the preceding chapters. Parts 1 and 2 therefore, are concerned with the sociopolitical role of tariqas at the countrywide and local levels in terms of the conflict model of the conceptual scheme.

Part 3—chapters 6 through 9—focuses on the tariqa in Bagamoyo. Chapter 6 presents the details on cleavages in Bagamoyo in the

secular and religious spheres and their convergence—similar to what chapters 2 and 3 do for Muslim East Africa in general. Chapter 7 analyzes the tariqa in terms of the exchange-benefit model. Chapters 8 and 9 describe politics first in the Sunni community and then during the nationalist struggle. The role of the tariqa and its leadership in Bagamoyo is described in both settings.

The last part—chapter 10—analyzes the data from the first three parts. Descriptive propositions relevant to the political role of brotherhoods throughout East Africa are formulated. The Bagamoyo data are analyzed in terms of the conflict and exchange-benefit models from which a number of hypotheses are made. With these findings, analysis is made of the political role of brotherhoods elsewhere in Tanzania. I suggest that this role is best explained by the fundamental cleavage in Muslim East African society and the internal dynamics of the tariqas.

A NOTE ON ARABIC AND SWAHILI WORDS

What may appear in the book to be inconsistencies in the spelling of Arabic and Swahili words reflects, in fact, the inconsistencies in usage among East African Muslims. This is due in part to the lack of a universally recognized system of transliterating Arabic into Roman script and the fact that most Swahili words are derived from Arabic. This is especially true of names. In one context a name may have an Arabic spelling (i.e., all vowels and consonants are indicated, such as 'Abd Allāh or 'Alī) while in another it may have a Swahili spelling (Abdullah or Abdallah or Ali). Generally, I have tried to use the most common spelling of an individual's name. In cases where there is no common usage, I have adopted a very limited transliteration system. I have dispensed with diacritics designating long vowels and most consonants. However, in the case of the consonant "'ain", I am employing the apostrophe (') to distinguish it.

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Much has been written and stated during the recent period on the political import of Islam—much of it, unfortunately, is ill-informed. I trust that this study, within its own limitations, may shed some light on this most timely subject—*in sha Allah.*

New York City
1980 AHN

PART I
Islam in East Africa

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CHAPTER 1

The History of Islam in East Africa

THE INTRODUCTION OF ISLAM

One version of the oldest African source on East African history, the Kilwa Chronicle, relates that a group of Arabs left the Arabian peninsula in the middle of the eighth century and settled in southern Somalia.[1] Though they were probably not the first Arabs to settle on the East African coast, they had for centuries traded with various coastal peoples. These were the first immigrants who came to Africa as adherents of Islam. Thus, these settlers, the supporters of the heterodox great grandson of the Prophet Muhammad (or the people of Zayd, as they were known) were allegedly the first Muslims in East Africa.

Two centuries later, again according to the same version of the Kilwa Chronicle, seven sons of the sultan of Shiraz in Persia (six brothers and their father in seven ships, according to another version) sailed from the Persian Gulf area to the southern Somalian littoral, where they founded a number of places from which migrants left for East Africa.[2] It is also clear that these early migrants constituted only one of a number of migrant waves from the Persian Gulf that continued to arrive on the East African coast well into the nineteenth century.

The tenth-century immigrants who settled on the Benadir coast of

southern Somalia played a critical role in the subsequent history of Islam in East Africa. Unlike Arab Muslims who had traveled to other parts of Africa, these settlers were almost all males. As a result, there was frequent intermarriage with the local Bantu-speaking African women in the various settlements. Thus, after a few generations, these Arab-Persian Muslims began to resemble Africans. Furthermore, a lingua franca—Swahili—emerged, a language whose structure is like Bantu's and whose vocabulary is principally of Arab origin. The outcome of these contacts was the creation of a new culture—one that was decidedly Arab-Persian in orientation but one with a strong Bantu component.[3] Along with the Swahili language the other central institution of this new culture was orthodox, or *Sunni,* Islam. Thus, in southern Somalia, the cradle of what became known as the Shirazi people, Islam was able to gain a foothold for the first time in East Africa.

Near the end of the twelfth century, the Shirazi began to migrate southward and establish settlements along the coast at various places. The most important of these was Kilwa, which became the leading coastal town during the fourteenth century. During the fifteenth century, Kilwa was succeeded in importance by Mombasa. Both towns served as the centers of Shirazi culture, where it was able to flourish and spread to other coastal towns during what was no doubt the golden age of Shirazi civilization. This, therefore, was the period in which Islam for the first time was widely disseminated in East Africa—from the Benadir to a few major coastal towns in the south and from there to other minor coastal settlements and offshore islands.

Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese explorer who spearheaded Portugal's drive to expand its influence around the Indian Ocean, visited Kilwa in 1498. A few years later, both Kilwa and Mombasa were destroyed and captured by the Portuguese. These events signaled the advent of Portugal's intervention along the entire coast, which lasted until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Although Portugal's main concern was the control of lucrative Indian Ocean trade and not the Shirazi towns per se, its presence adversely affected the vitality of these towns, whose existence depended upon this trade. As a result, many towns decayed during this period. In some cases, Shirazi families migrated and established new towns, such as Bagamoyo, on the coast. These new places, however, never achieved the prominence and grandioseness that characterized Kilwa and Mombasa in their heyday.

The demise of Shirazi civilization during the sixteenth and seven-

teenth centuries was not due simply to the Portuguese presence. In fact, the Portuguese, who were present in only limited numbers, made little impact on coastal culture. In the immediate hinterland of the coastal settlements, the movements and activities of African peoples were more significant. Frequently, these groups attacked the Shirazi towns, sometimes in conjunction with the Portuguese encroachment. Many settlements found themselves subjected to attacks from both land and sea, a situation that certainly hastened their demise. Thus, the activities of the Africans, and the Portuguese presence to a lesser extent, were major factors in the decline of the Shirazi and, consequently, the inability of Islam to make further gains during this era.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, Omani Arabs began to challenge Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean. They successfully defeated the Portuguese at Mombasa in 1698 and within a few years were acknowledged the new power on the East African coast. But, owing to internecine power struggles in Oman itself, these new overlords were unable to consolidate their gains and exercise effective control over the coast until a century later. In the meantime, the elimination of the Portuguese allowed the resumption of the ties that had historically existed between the Swahili coast and Arab-Persian world. This time, however, southern Arabia, or the Hadramawt, and Oman were the most important centers in the Middle East for the Swahili coast. From these two areas, a new wave of migrants left for East Africa. These migrants augmented the Arab communities in the coastal towns, and, in the context of a debilitated Shirazi community, Swahili society—as it was beginning to be called—increasingly took on a southern Arab character, often at the expense of the Shirazi. Since the Omani Arabs were not Sunni Muslims (they belonged to the Kharijite subsect of the Ibadiyya), the Hadrami Arabs (who, like the Swahili Muslims, were orthodox) had the greatest impact on coastal culture.

Under the leadership of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan, the Omani Arabs were able to reassert their influence in East Africa during the decade between 1830 and 1940. In 1832, Sa'id moved his capital from Oman to Zanzibar, thereby making Zanzibar the leading place in the Swahili world after the middle of the nineteenth century. This move represented the sultanate's recognition of the growing commercial importance of its East African holdings. The entire coast had experienced a resurgence of prosperity at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. While many of the older towns could not be revived to their former state, this period saw the

emergence of important new settlements on the mainland. The economic revival was also a stimulus to Swahili culture and set the stage for the gains that Islam was to make during the coming period.

From Zanzibar, Sa'id and his successors were able to supervise closely the important caravan routes that brought the valuable goods from the interior for the Indian Ocean trade. One of the yet-to-be-answered questions in East African history is the origin of the coastal trade with the immediate hinterland and the deep interior. It seems clear that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Africans from the interior were coming regularly to the coast with goods to be traded.[4] By the second and third decades of the century, Arab and other Muslim coastal traders—usually with the financial backing of Indian merchants and the encouragement of the sultanate—began taking caravans into the interior to obtain the two most-prized commodities for coastal trade, ivory and slaves. The significance of this trade is that it united for the first time the communities of East Africa's coast and interior.[5] It paved the way for Islam's penetration for the first time into the East African interior.

TRADE AND THE PENETRATION OF ISLAM

Most of the trade between the coast and the interior before the advent of European rule occurred by way of three routes. One connected the southern coast—the towns of Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani—with the Lake Malawi area and areas farther west. The second and principal route connected Zanzibar and the nearby coastal towns of Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam with the Manyema region (in present-day eastern Zaire) and Buganda. Tabora and Ujiji were the two key towns in the interior on this route. The third route was between the northern coastal towns of Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani and the interior regions of Mount Kilimanjaro, Mount Kenya, and Lake Victoria.

It is no coincidence that Islam made its major inroads in the East African interior among the African peoples who lived along these trade routes, particularly the southern and central ones. On the southern route, along the southwestern side of Lake Malawi, was the town of Nkhota Kota in what is now Malawi. In about the middle of the nineteenth century, Salim b. Abdallah arrived in the area from Ujiji and ousted the local leader of the town.[6] Salim (who, like his successors, acknowledged allegiance to the sultan of Zanzibar) was perhaps the first Muslim chieftain in this part of East Africa. It appears that his motive in going to Nkhota Kota was controlling the

lucrative trade from there to Kilwa and not necessarily spreading Islam. However, his successors, who were known by the Swahili title of *jumbe,* did engage in some proselytizing. Mwinyi Mguzo, who succeeded Salim in about 1870, was apparently a devout Muslim and was responsible for having Arabic taught to some of the town's youth. By the time of the British takeover in 1895, Islam was intimately associated with the jumbe's office; in the installation ceremonies for the new occupant in 1894, a *shaykh* was brought in to conduct the appropriate Islamic rituals. The termination of the jumbe's office by the British in 1895 did not undermine—at least not immediately—Islam's influence, and for decades Nkhota Kota continued to be the major Muslim center in the Lake Malawi area.

Islam's most significant inroads along the southern route were made among the Yao people who, at the time of their contact with Islam, were living on the eastern side of Lake Malawi (opposite Nkhota Kota) in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The Yao had been in contact with Arab coastal traders as early as the seventeenth century.[7] In about 1870, Makanjila III became the first Yao leader to adhere to Islam. The most important Yao chief, Mataka I, had also come under the influence of coastal Muslim culture during the 1860's, although it is doubtful that he actually converted to Islam. Che Nyenje, who was summoned from Kilwa to become Mataka II after the death of his uncle, Mataka, I in 1877, had become a Muslim. By the mid-1880s, after the succession of Mataka III, Islam increasingly became the dominant religion among this group of Yao. Among the Yao in the Tundura area of present day Tanzania, the Arab traders with whom they had been in contact for some time did not play a major role in their conversion. Following the arrival in 1885 of two people described as "Swahili Islamic missionaries," however, they began to embrace Islam in large numbers.[8] (From here on, *Swahili* will be used in references to people from the coast whose ethnicity is not specified. In practice, the term has a variety of meanings and depends on the context in which it is used. Generally, it refers to someone who is of coastal origin, speaks Swahili as his or her first language, and is a Muslim.)

Apparently, there were two reasons why the Yao or, more precisely, the Mataka and Makanjila dynasties turned to Islam at the same time they rejected the strong overtures from Christian missionaries during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. One reason stemmed from the fact that the Yao had for decades participated in the slave trade between the coast and Zanzibar. The Yao chiefs saw the adoption of Islam as a means of ensuring the continuation of

valuable economic ties with their coreligionists on the coast. Christianity, on the other hand, because of its opposition to the slave trade, represented a threat to the economic well-being of the chiefs. The second reason (as Edward Alpers has persuasively argued) is that Islam, in the practical historical context in which the Yao became familiar with it, was regarded by their chiefs as a vehicle for modernization. Its chief attraction was the possibility of literacy through the Arabic script. Thus, the argument often used by observers sympathetic to the Christian cause—that it was purely the economic motive that led to Islam's success among the Yao—overlooks a major concern of many African leaders at the end of the nineteenth century—transforming their societies in the face of the impending upheaval of European colonization. For some African leaders, Islam appeared to provide the appropriate means for meeting this new challenge.

As the main route that connected Zanzibar, the coast, and the deep interior, the central one attracted the greatest attention from Arab and Swahili traders. In order to obtain victuals and other supplies for their caravans, traders found it necessary to establish stations along the route. These usually became permanent settlements. The majority of the caravan porters were Nyamwezi, and one of the key towns on the route, Tabora, was located in Nyamwezi country. Tabora had become so important to Zanzibar's commercial needs that in the 1860s an official of the sultan appointed Salim b. Saad, an Arab, to serve as leader of its growing Arab community.[9] The Arabs, who were predominantely Ibadi Muslims, were primarily concerned with trade, and they interacted with the Nyamwezi only to facilitate their economic interests.

The Arabs in Tabora in general did not seek to convert their Nyamwezi hosts to Islam. Owing to their presence, however, Africans who were in close contact with the Arabs usually began to affect the manners of Muslims and then, later, convert to the new religion.[10] Though the traders did not encourage this, neither did they discourage it. Aside from their preoccupation with trade, one possible explanation for their apparent disinterest in spreading Islam lies with the branch of Islam to which most of the Arabs in Tabora adhered. As Ibadis they belonged to an Islamic sect that had had a history—at least in East Africa—of exhibiting little or no inclination to win new members to its ranks and that was content to let orthodox, or Sunni, Muslims proselytize on behalf of Islam.[11] Interestingly, as more Sunni missionaries began settling in Tabora during the last decade or so of the nineteenth century, those Africans who had become Muslims through the Ibadi sect changed their allegiance to Sunni Islam.[12]

The importance of Tabora for the history of Islam in the deep interior of pre-European East Africa rests not so much on what happened in the town itself (although the conversions that did occur should not be minimized) but rather on Tabora's role in disseminating Islam farther inland. By 1830, Arab traders from the town had reached as far west as Lake Tanganyika, where on its eastern shore they established the town of Ujiji. This new settlement grew increasingly important for Tabora because of its access to the territories in Zaire, most notably Manyema, where ivory was in ample supply. During the early 1870s, Mwinyi Kheri, a coastal trader who was probably of Arab-Shirazi origin, emerged as the head of the town's Arab community.[13] The very amicable relations that he had established with the African rulers in the region created a climate that was propitious for Islam's growth. By 1891, when formal European control began, Ujiji was a predominantly Muslim town and had begun to serve as a node for the further dissemination of Islam in East Africa.

It appears that the first Africans to become Muslims in Ujiji were not indigenous to the area but rather immigrants from the region in Zaire known as Manyema.[14] Like the Nyamwezi, the Manyema, as they were collectively known, frequently served as porters for the caravans of the Arab traders. More often than not, however, and unlike the Nyamwezi, their service as caravan porters resulted from their enslavement. The Manyema had been in contact with Arab traders since the 1860s and in 1882 theirs and other nearby regions of Zaire came under Arab occupation.[15] The two figures who played a leading role in this event were the famous Tippu Tib (Hammad b. Muhammad) and Rumaliza (Muhammad b. Khalfan), both of whom had ties to Tabora and Zanzibar. Like their kinsmen in Tabora and like other Arabs in Zaire, they did not actively proselytize, but, again, their presence and intimacy with some Africans was enough to lead to the conversion to Islam of a significant number of Africans throughout eastern Zaire, especially in the Manyema and Kasongo districts.[16] Finally, Ujiji was the main center from which Islam spread not only to Zaire but to Burundi and Rwanda as well.

One of the most successful ventures for Islam in the East African interior occurred in Buganda, the home of the Ganda people, which is located northwest of Lake Victoria. From Tabora, Arab traders came into contact with their political leader, the Kabaka Suna, about 1850.[17] The town served as the main link between Buganda and Zanzibar throughout most of the nineteenth century. (Afterwards, the northern route through Kenya was used more frequently.)

From the outset, the Arab traders had excellent relations with Suna. After knowing them for a while, Suna made inquiries about their religion and, a short time later, requested that they teach him about Islam. Ahmad b. Ibrahim, an Ibadi Arab from Tabora, was most responsible for acquainting Suna with Islam. It is doubtful that Suna became a Muslim, but he clearly had a strong interest in the religion. His successor and son, Mutesa, was well aware of his father's interest in Islam, and this no doubt explains in part his own desire to learn even more about the religion. He studied with a number of traders, but it was Ali Nakakula and Khamis b. Abdallah, both of Tabora, from whom he learned the most. By 1867, Mutesa was not only a practicing Muslim, he was also a very ardent one who expected his subjects to follow his example. Certainly, one of Mutesa's reasons for adopting the new religion, like that of the Yao rulers, was his desire to maintain the lucrative trade with the coast and Zanzibar through which he was able to obtain the arms that strengthened his position. Also, again like the Yao rulers, Mutesa recognized that the adoption of Islam brought literacy, which was of administrative value.[18] The period between 1867 and 1875 during Mutesa's rule is approximately the time that Muslim influence reached its zenith in Buganda.

In about 1875, when a group of young, newly converted Muslims in Mutesa's court disagreed with him over what they thought was his growing attraction to Christianity, he had them murdered, and so he robbed Islam of what would have been the first generation of educated Muslims in Buganda. This incident, along with the traders' nonaggressive attitude toward proselytizing (their main interest was always trade and not conversions), made it possible for Christianity to make important gains. By the time of the accession in 1884 of Mwanga, Mutesa's successor, the outcome of the competition for adherents between the two religions was in the balance. On a number of occasions, the competition erupted into violence. With the British takeover of the territory in 1890, Islam lost the initiative to Christianity, which was not regained until much later in Uganda's history.

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN RULE

The establishment of European rule in East Africa had a profound impact on Islam's future. Sometimes consciously, but more frequently not, the colonial governments adopted policies that led to the unprecedented growth of the Muslim community. Since the greatest growth occurred in German East Africa (roughly, present-day

Tanzania), where about two-thirds of East Africa's Muslims reside, our concern with Islam's spread during the colonial period will focus on that territory.

It was from the oldest Muslim centers in East Africa, particularly those along the southern half of the coast, that Islam began to spread. The ethnic groups who lived in the vicinity of the coastal towns came under the influence of Islam much earlier and more extensively than the majority of the peoples farther inland. As trading centers, these towns attracted people from the immediate hinterland, some of whom, after repeated interaction with the coastal residents, adopted Islam as their religion. Those who established more or less permanent roots in the towns were more likely to maintain their adherence to their new religion than those who did not. Also (as with the Zaramo and the Doe who lived near Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam), men from the hinterland groups frequently became Muslims and were circumcised in order to form relationships with coastal Muslim women.[19]

In the towns, the new converts studied under religious teachers and often returned to their areas to seek more converts. The mosque college at Lamu, for example, founded by Habib Salih, attracted many students from hinterland groups, such as the Giryama, Galla, and Pokomo.[20] Some of the teachers in the towns also traveled to nearby settlements to hold classes. Shortly before the establishment of German rule, coastal Muslim teachers were reported to be active throughout Sambara and Bondei villages near Tanga.[21] Bwana Kheri, a Shirazi and a leader of the abortive Arab uprising of 1890, taught in Saadani (north of Bagamoyo) and Zigua villages in the vicinity. Perhaps his most famous student was the Zigua chieftain Sultan Waligane Msonde, who was later instrumental in bringing many Zigua into the ranks of Islam.[22]

Although the coastal towns were most influential in the spread of Islam into the interior during the colonial era, Muslim centers in the interior also played a significant role. From Nkhota Kota and other places where the Yao lived, Muslim teachers traveled to the southern regions of German East Africa. In the Tabora area, a group of Shirazi and Makua from the coast established residence in the village of Sikonge. Along with the Muslim teachers in Tabora itself, these coastal people (or Walungwana, as they were called) actively and successfully proselytized on behalf of Islam in nearby villages.[23] Following their defeats in the "religious wars" of the 1890s, exiled Buganda Muslims were instrumental in spreading their religion to areas outside the Buganda kingdom.

The colonial powers exhibited a reserved if not suspicious attitude

toward their Muslim subjects. Within this framework, however, German policies were somewhat more varied. From the outset in 1891 until about 1912, the Germans did not officially support or discourage the spread of Islam, but, as a result of particular policies, the religion made significant gains. One reason for the Muslim gains stemmed from the origin of German control of the territory. In order to put down local uprisings against their encroachment (such as the Arab-Shirazi revolt on the northern coast in 1888, the Bushiri rebellion), the Germans had to recruit African troops, many of whom were Sudanese Muslims. Frequently, after successfully pacifying an area, individual soldiers remained in the area to work for the colonial government as either policemen or laborers. A 1912 government survey of the state of Islam in each district revealed that the overwhelming majority of Africans who worked for district governments in these capacities were Muslims, even in far upcountry places such as Bujumbura and Arusha.[24] For many people in the interior, their first contact and later familiarity with Islam came through these government-employed Africans.

Another German colonial policy that affected the spread of Islam was the use of coastal Muslims in low-level administrative posts throughout the territory. This policy was based on the assumption that coastal culture was superior to that of other African peoples and was so recognized by the latter. Thus, Swahili was adopted as the language of the administration. The employment of Muslim troops by district governments, the use of coastal Muslims in the administration, and the adoption of Swahili as the administrative language all contributed indirectly to the estimation by many Africans of Islam as the most prestigious and influential religion in the territory. Finally, these policies were coupled with a policy that for many years restricted the establishment of Christian missionary schools and a policy for erecting state or secular schools.[25] These were the reasons argued for by many observers, particularly Christian missionaries, why Islam was able to increase considerably its following in the interior.

From 1905 until 1907, one of the major events in Tanzania's history occurred—the uprising throughout its southern regions known as the Maji Maji rebellion. One of the significant aspects of this movement is that it united for the first time Africans of diverse ethnicity in opposition to colonial rule. Most important for our purposes, Islam is widely reported to have made its greatest gains during the German period immediately after the revolt.[26] This was especially the case among the Ngindo and Pogoro peoples of southeastern Tanzania. It is difficult to say for sure why Islam increased significantly

after the revolt. The fact that Muslim teachers played a role in spreading the ideology of the movement is, no doubt, important.[27] But this does not explain why a religion loosely associated with a movement that had been defeated should afterwards increase in popularity. A possible answer is that, as a result of the defeat, the ideology of Maji Maji, which was certainly more animist than the Islamic ideology, suffered a crisis of confidence. Having been associated with the movement, although only peripherally, and thus familiar to the participants, Islam was able to fill the vacuum created by the older ideology's loss of credibility. Islam was a new and different belief system, but, like the ideology of Maji Maji, its appeal was that it represented a system of values quite unlike those of the German colonizers.

The facts that Islam did grow significantly after the Maji Maji uprising and that there seems to have been some direct connection between the two may explain the sharp change in German policies toward Muslim subjects clear by 1912.[28] What had been a neutral if not mildly supportive attitude became after rather hostile. The policy that best, and somewhat amusingly, illustrates this change was the Germans' futile attempt to persuade Africans to breed pigs.[29] The hope of the colonial government was that, once the Africans developed a taste for pork (a food forbidden under Islamic dietary laws), they would be less inclined to remain or become Muslims.

The anti-Islamic sentiment would probably have continued to the end of German rule in East Africa had it not been for the outbreak of the First World War. One of Germany's allies in the war was Turkey, which was the center of the Muslim world. In November of 1914, the sultan of Constantinople, nominally the leader of all Muslims, declared a holy war against Britain, France, and other Allied forces and called upon Muslims everywhere to fight on behalf of the Central Powers. In an effort to attract the Muslim community to its side against Britain, the German East African governor in March 1915 circulated leaflets throughout the territory to inform Muslims of the sultan's declaration.[30] For the duration of the war and until Germany was finally defeated by Britain, the German administration posed as a friend of the Muslims and actively pursued a pro-Islamic policy.[31]

From the beginning of the British conquest of German East Africa until formal British control was established about 1916 to 1919, Tanganyika (as the territory was renamed) suffered from a lack of direction at the territorial level. Furthermore, the administration of the first British governor, Horace Byatt (1919-1924), may best be

described as a holding action rather than a innovative policy making. It was during this eight-year hiatus in effective colonial administration that Islam achieved its greatest growth in the history of East Africa. According to most estimates, there were about 300,000 Muslims, or 3 percent of the population, in Tanganyika immediately before the war.[32] By 1924, they were estimated to have increased to about 1.5 million, or about 25 percent of the total population.[33] Although the percentage of Muslims has continued to grow, the increase—about 32 percent of the population, according to recent estimates—has far from surpassed that of the 1916-1924 period.[34]

Reports written on, before, during, and after the years 1916-1924 confirm that this indeed was the period of Islam's unequaled growth in Tanganyika.[35] Observers in particular locations also noted the rapid expansion of the religion. Among the Bondei and Zigua people, missionaries from the Universities' Mission to Central Africa (Anglican), after a survey of the Korogwe Archdeaconry, learned how extensivly conversion had occured within the span of three years.[36] Another report from the same area a few years later, in 1921, revealed that the expansion was still in process, with coastal Muslim teachers playing a leading role.[37] The annual reports of the Moravian Mission (Lutheran) in the Tabora area suggested that it was about 1912 when the upsurge got underway there; by 1922, according to the mission's own survey of surrounding villages, the expansion of Islam was beginning to subside somewhat.[38]

Whereas the Arabs, Shirazi, Swahili, and other groups indigenous to the coast had been in the forefront of the initial attempts to spread Islam into the interior, the post-First World War expansion appears to have been led primarily by those Africans who had converted during an earlier period. In the town of Songea, for example, the first two *walimu* (Swahili: Koranic teachers) were Ngindos from Kilwa.[39] Of the nine *walimu* throughout the district in 1913, five were Yaos.[40] In the Dodoma district during the same year, thirteen of the twenty mosque heads were Africans (seven of these were Zaramos) while six were either Arab or Swahili and one was Sudanese.[41] During the postwar period, even among those groups that had come under Islam's influence during an earlier period, many Arab and Swahili walimu were replaced by Africans from other ethnic groups.[42]

Why was Islam able to grow so rapidly during the period between 1916 and 1924? Certainly, the dislocation due to the war and the uncertainty created by the coming of a new colonial power were major causes. The disruption affected not only colonial administration but also the work of Christian missionaries, much of which was

suspended until the British took effective control. On top of this, Tanganyika experienced during these years a severe influenza epidemic and famine. It was in the context of crisis and uncertainty that Islam played once again a crucial social and political role for many Africans. Like the conversions of the Yaos during the 1890s and other peoples after the Maji Maji rebellion, the adoption of Islam during the 1916-1924 period was probably a militant response to the advent of colonial rule—this time a new power—and an effort to bring order to a chaotic situation.

J. S. Trimingham has suggested that Islam's spread into the interior of East Africa resulted from the stability and tranquility brought by European colonial rule.[43] The evidence presented here indicates that Islam's major expansion occurred not during tranquil times but, to the contrary, during periods of upheaval and crisis. If indeed instability was a more propitious climate for Islam's growth, a question that remains to be answered is how, or by what means, this process took place.

CHAPTER 2

Religious Authority in East African Islam

Within any religious system, just as within political systems, there is an unequal distribution of authority in that there are those who command and those who obey—the rulers and the ruled. Though the distinction between the two groups may be less precise than is the case for some other religions, Islam is no exception. Since religion seldom operates in a political vacuum, the authority of the state frequently establishes the parameters in which religious authority is exercised. Furthermore, changes in the political system have repercussions throughout a society, including its religious organzations.

Although the description of the roles and norms of authority relationships is important in itself, of particular analytical value is the determination of the role occupants. To the extent that certain social identities such as race and ethnicity correlate with role positions, the possibility exists that such correlations have broader sociopolitical importance.

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY IN SUNNI ISLAM

The location of religious authority in any orthodox Muslim community presents some difficulty, and East Africa is no exception. The problem stems from the fact that Islam does not provide for an offi-

cial clergy (that is, a class that exercises authority) as many other religions do. This does not mean that such a class does not exist; indeed, one does. Usually, it is called the *'ulama* (singular: *'alim*), the "learned ones." Since Islam does not formally recognize a clergy, the influence, authority, and functions of the *'ulama,* whose members are distinguished by the title of *shaykh* (plural: *shuyukh*), have varied extensively in time and place in the Muslim world.

The classifications of H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen are useful in making clearer the identities of the "learned ones."[1] Gibb and Bowen distinguish three sets of roles within the 'ulama. The first is associated with the study and administration of the *shari'a,* or Islamic law. Those who are concerned primarily with the study of the shari'a are known generally as *fuqaha'* (singular: *faqih*), that is, experts on *fiqh* ("jurisprudence"). The individual who specializes in adjudication is usually called a *qadi* (plural: *qadah*), or "magistrate." To the extent that a faqih is widely recognized for his expertise and asked to give "legal opinions" (*fatawa;* singular: *fatwa*) on various matters, he is known usually as a *mufti,* a "deliverer of legal opinions."

The second set of roles within the 'ulama is that of the teachers, or *mu'allimun* (singular: *mu'allim;* in Swahili, *mwalimu* [singular] and *walimu* [plural]), who teach *'ilm*, the Islamic sciences, usually in a *madrasa,* or college mosque. The last set of roles is those connected with the operation of mosques, in particular the *imam,* or "leader of prayers," and the *khatib,* the "deliverer" of the *khutba,* or "sermon" at Friday prayers (*salat al-juma*). In small communities, it is often possible for an individual to perform more than one of these three roles (that is, an individual could be a jurist, a teacher, and a mosque official).

To become a member of the 'ulama class, "the acquisition of some portion of ilm was the necessary condition."[2] Historically, this was done through formal study over a fairly extended time. Study generally entailed attending the classes of recognized scholars at their schools (*madaras*). The schools conferred upon the student a document known as an *ijaza* (plural: *ijazat*), a license or an academic degree, when the student had successfully completed their requirements. Though there was no set number of courses or years of study that an individual could pursue generally, (except perhaps in some of the larger centers of Islam), those who had studied under the greatest number of scholars were recognized as the most proficient of the 'ulama. This method of training the 'ulama continues, for the most part, at the local level throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, "innovations" such as government-sponsored schools have

been instituted in many countries with large Muslim populations.

Merit is apparently the basis for entrance into the 'ulama community; this may suggest that it is a fairly open class. In fact, throughout much of the history of the Muslim world, especially in the important Islamic centers such as Istanbul and Cairo, access to this class tended to be based on family origins. This tendency was most pronounced in the educational sphere: "While in theory a *madrasa* eduction was open to all seekers after knowledge, the *Seyhly* [that is, 'ulama] profession was, in practice, almost exclusively hereditary."[3]

The authority of the clerical class in Islam evolved over a period of time, and after perhaps a century or two, the 'ulama, in whatever stated form they functioned, came to have, in a wide and vague fashion, the ultimate decision on all question of constitution, law and theology."[4] Of the three sets of roles of the learned class, that of the students and administrators of the shari'a (the fuqaha' and qada) is most important in terms of the authority that they exercise.

As a magistrate, the qadi has jurisdiction over all matters in the sharia, including the purely religious matters (the religious obligations in the narrow sense of the term) and the legal matters (such as questions of family law and inheritance). Though in theory the jurisdiction of a qadi extends to both spheres, the tendency in the history of Islam has been that most or virtually all of their decisions pertain to legal matters. Questions concerning purely religious issues are often arbitrated outside the court of the magistrate, usually by obtaining an advisory opinion, or fatwa, from a mufti.

In legal theory a qadi has final authority in his decisions, but in practice, owing to the origin of this appointment, it is usually the secular authorities who have the final word, particularly in the recent history of Islam. At the same time, according to the shari'a, the qadi's authority "extends beyond the judicial office, and includes the control of property with restricted capacity to dispose of found objects, pious foundations, and estates of inheritance."[5] In the Ottoman Empire, these extralegal functions often entailed the supervision of customs collection and the actual administration of a locale in place of a regular, appointed authority. For reasons already suggested, of the three groups within the 'ulama, it is the qadi class that has tended most to be subject to, and regulated by, civil authorities.

As for the other two components of the learned class, the teachers (mu'allimun) and the officials of the mosque, it is the former who exercise a far greater degree of authority. Since entrance into the 'ulama community depends primarily upon an individual's level of learning, it is the teachers who give legitimacy to that class by certi-

fying with the ijaza certificate that a student has completed the study of a book or body of knowledge. That this authority is important is attested to by the length to which individuals and families have often gone, sometimes illicitly, to obtain the certificate of a certain shaykh.[6]

The mosque functionaries, the imam and Khatib, do not exercise any significant kind of authority compared to the other 'ulama roles other than being in charge of the Friday (*jami'a*) and community mosques. In some provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the khatib acquired a degree of political importance since he was charged with the duty of mentioning the name of the ruling sovereign. This indicated recognition of his authority, subtly suggesting, although not necessarily correctly, that the khatib was the community's link with the ruler of the Ottoman Empire, who was also recognized as the leader of all Muslims.

To conclude this general survey of authority in Islam, I should mention that, except for a few of the centers of the Muslim world (notably Cairo), the 'ulama seldom act as a corporate body; each shaykh is an autonomous authority in his community. Also, in contrast to authority in the political system, the authority of the 'ulama, either collectively or individually, is based almost entirely on the voluntary recognition of the masses of Muslims who are its subjects. However, the extent that this authority rests on the state, coercion, rather than volition, becomes the basis for compliance in the final analysis.

THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

The structure of authority throughout the Muslim world corresponds for the most part to what existed in East Africa. There was an 'ulama, or, to use the Swahili term, *wanawyuoni*, community whose leading members were based mainly in Zanzibar.[7] Before the advent of European colonialism and the establishment of territorial boundaries, the 'ulama in Zanzibar exercised some degree of authority over most Muslims in East Africa. This was because the majority of Muslims in precolonial East Africa lived in areas within the sphere of influence of the sultanate in Zanzibar. The sultan appointed the local Islamic magistrates, and the chief qadi of Zanzibar was usually recognized as having final religious authority.

All three components of the learned community—the teachers, the jurists, and the mosque functionaries—were represented in East Africa, although most 'ulama carried out more than one function. Virtually every qadi of Zanzibar, for example, was a famous teacher

who attracted many students. An excellent example from this period is Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad Ba Kathir, who, while actively teaching, held the post of qadi in a number of places. In addition to their teaching duties, most of the qadi wrote books on religious matters and, in some cases, poetry. Frequently, a scholar would be asked to give an advisory opinion on matters that might arise in locales throughout East Africa; in giving an opinion (fatwa), he was acting in the capacity of a mufti.[8]

Many of these same individuals not only held posts in the most important mosques in Zanzibar and elsewhere in East Africa, they were often instrumental in the construction and supervision of them (for example, Shaykh Muhyi al-Din al-Qahtani with the Friday mosque at Malindi in Zanzibar). B. G. Martin observed that, as a group of individuals who were engaged in numerous and diverse activities, the nineteenth-century 'ulama class of East Africa was indeed an influential community.

> In many ways, the religious, the learned, the legal, and the clerical classes were the flywheel of the Bu Sa'idi state. They hoped to extend the application of the Shari'a at the expense of customary laws. . . . It was they who manipulated, maintained, and operated the legal system at most levels. In general they controlled institutionalized islam.[9]

The precolonial East African 'ulama were not unlike their counterparts elsewhere in that kin ties tended to be the basis of entrance into their ranks. To draw again on Martin:

> The East African 'ulama' class was also closely knit. Whether Shaf'i or Ibadi, they knew each other personally, and many posts and positions were reserved for recruits from within their own groups. Because of the hereditary factor—descent from the Prophet—nepotism could hardly be excluded. However, the best qualification for becoming a learned man was to be the son of another learned man. For the person who wished to reach the higher ranks of the Shafi'i 'ulama', one of the better prerequisites was to be of Hadrami descent.[10]

Thus, membership in the class that exercised authority in the East African Sunni Muslim community, at least during the nineteenth century, was determined in large part not only by kinship but by ethnicity, that is, by being an Arab from the Hadramawt.

A perusal of Martin's article and other biographical data on the learned community during this period reveals fairly quickly that more than three-quarters of them were of Hadrami background. In the East African Sunni community as a whole, Hadrami Arabs constituted probably no more than 2 percent of the population. In Zanzibar, where a disproportionately large number of this elite group

lived, census data suggest that the Hadramis made up less than 5 percent of the population (the total Arab community made up about 12 percent). Zanzibar serves well in demonstrating the extent of nepotism among the 'ulama. The African peoples who were the original inhabitants of the island had been Muslims for a number of centuries. On the mainland, African conversion to Islam had been relatively recent, which might explain Hadrami preponderance among the 'ulama. Such an argument would not hold true for Zanzibar.

Although the Hadrami made up a majority of the 'ulama, another community having a common geographical, if not ethnic, origin was also influential. These were the Barawi, people from the town of Barawa, or Brava, in southern Somalia. Two of the most important learned men of the nineteenth century, Shaykh Muhyi al-Din al-Qahtani and Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Amawi, came originally from the town. Like the Hadramis, the Barawis were a very small minority in Muslim East Africa—less than 5 percent of the population.

The establishment of British and German rule in East Africa, the dismemberment of the empire on Zanzibar at the end of the nineteenth century and the delineation of colonial boundaries served to limit the authority of the 'ulama of Zanzibar throughout East Africa. This was particularly the case for judicial matters in which the new colonial administrations on the mainland appointed the Muslim magistrates and had final authority over all decisions.[11] In most areas, not only did the secular administrators have ultimate authority over the Muslim magistrates, they restricted the jurisdiction of these officials in the application of the shari'a mainly to questions of personal status.[12] Furthermore, after about 1924, the qadi's office was discontinued and the execution of judicial and administrative functions in Muslim areas became the responsibility of one official, usually a liwali (the local government-appointed headman who looked after the affairs of the Muslim community during the colonial period.

The limitations placed on the influence of the judicial 'ulama in Zanzibar by the establishment of colonialism encouraged to some extent the rise to prominence of a learned class on the mainland. Though the British never provided for a chief qadi or mufti in Tanganyika as they did in Kenya and Zanzibar, the individual who came closest to filling this role was the qadi of Tanga, Shaykh 'Ali Hemedi el Buhriy. Shaykh 'Ali, who was of Omani background (al-Hinawi), was highly respected by the British authorities and was often asked to give advisory opinions on difficult questions involving Islamic law and religious disputes.[13] To some degree, Shaykh 'Ali has been

succeeded by his son Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Ali in that he is recognized as one of the foremost authorities on Islamic law in Tanzania today.

Though the imposition of colonial rule placed limitations on the judicial roles of the 'ulama of Zanzibar it had little if any effect on the influence of the teachers, or mu'allimun, who continued to play the leading role in Muslim education throughout East Africa. For about the first half of the colonial period, that is, until about 1930, the two most important scholars in East Africa, Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumayt and Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad Ba Kathir (who died in 1925), both descendants of a long line of religious scholars, lived and did most of their teaching in Zanzibar.[14] Virtually no one in the later years of the colonial period throughout the area could claim membership in the 'ulama community unless he had received a certificate (ijaza) from one of these two men or from one of their many renowned students. Though Sayyid Ahmad was considered the most accomplished of the two scholars, it was Shaykh 'Abd Allah who institutionalized his classes in the form of a school, or madrasa, which was continued after his death by his most loyal students. According to an assessment by a highly reputable Muslim scholar in 1957, "the Madrasat Bakathir . . . has the highest standard of all the traditional Islamic centres in East Africa."[15]

The students of Sayyid Ahmad and Shaykh 'Abd Allah were primarily responsible for the maintenance of the scholarly and pedagogical tradition of the learned class in East Africa. In view of the tendency toward nepotism, it is not surprising that two of the most important 'ulama in the second half of the colonial period were sons of both scholars. One of them, Sayyid 'Umar b. Ahmad b. Sumayt, eventually succeeded to the position that his father had once held, chief qadi of Zanzibar; while the other, Shaykh Abu Bakr b. 'Abd Allah Ba Kathir (who died in 1943), continued his father's popular classes at the famous Gofu Mosque in Zanzibar. Both sons studied under, and received certification from, their own and each other's fathers. They, in turn, attracted many students from all over East Africa. Like their fathers, they wrote numerous publications; this was particularly true of Sayyid 'Umar, who is now a qadi in the Comoro Islands.

One of the students of Sayyid 'Umar and Shaykh Abu Bakr was Shaykh Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, who emerged in the latter decades of the colonial period as a leading scholar. He succeeded Sayyid 'Umar as qadi of Zanzibar. Like his mentors, Shaykh Abdallah, who is presently chief qadi in Kenya, has numerous publications credited

to his name. Another student of Sayyid 'Umar, Sayyid Omar Abdulla, who also earned a bachelor of philosophy from Oxford, became the principal of the government-supported Muslim Academy in Zanzibar, the first Islamic center in East Africa organized along modern lines in 1951. Both scholars are themselves descendents of a long line of 'ulama.

There were a number of important students of Shaykh 'Abd Allah Ba Kathir and Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumayt on the mainland in Kenya and Tanganyika who during the second half of the colonial era began offering supplementary, if not alternative, educational opportunities to what was available in Zanzibar. In Mombasa, a scion of the famous Mazru'i clan, Shaykh al-Amin b. 'Ali (who died in 1968) rose to prominence as the most eminent teacher in Kenya. Shaykh al-Amin, also the son of a famous religious figure of the nineteenth century, was a prolific writer and the first scholar to popularize the use of Swahili in published religious works.[16] About 1930, Shaykh al-Amin was appointed qadi of Kenya, a post that his father held until 1894. The qadi of Tanga, Shaykh 'Ali b. Hemedi of Tanga, who was apparently a student of Shaykh 'Abd Allah or his son Shaykh Abu Bakr, was long considered the leading scholar and teacher in Tanganyika. Joseph Schacht, the eminent scholar of Islamic law, wrote that Shaykh 'Ali "was no doubt the most learned Shafi'i scholar I have met."[17] Shaykh 'Ali also was a descendant of a long line of religious scholars and poets.

Perhaps the most popular teacher in terms of numbers of students in Tanzania (at least after 1940, when he moved there from Zanzibar) was Shaykh Hassan b. Amir al-Shirazi (who was born in 1881). His popularity stems from his having traveled extensively throughout East Africa to teach. He eventually settled in Dar es Salaam, where he opened his well-patronized Madrasat al-Shirazi in the Comorian Mosque. Like the other important 'ulama mentioned so far, Shaykh Hassan was born into a family of religious leaders and has written numerous books and manuscripts. Until his departure from Zanzibar in 1968, Shaykh Hassan was recognized as the leading shaykh in mainland Tanzania.

As was the case during the precolonial period, a disproportionately high number of 'ulama were of Hadrami Arab background after the institution of European rule. For instance, of the eleven individuals discussed, ten were Arabs and one was a Shirazi. Of the ten Arabs, seven were either of direct or indirect Hadrami descent while the other three were of Omani background. This should not suggest that anyone of Hadrami origin could enter the scholarly community; this

Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumayt.

Sayyid 'Umar b. Sumayt (left)
and Sayyid Omar Abdulla

President Julius Nyerere welcoming Shaykh Hassan b. Amir at the dedication of the Muslim Center in Dar es Salaam, 1968. Copyright Tanzania Information Service

Left to right: Shaykh Hassan b. Amir, President Julius Nyerere, Shaykh 'Abd Allah Chaurembo, Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa, at a Muslim religious celebration in Dar es Salaam, 1968. Copyright Tanzania Information Service

is certainly not true for the more recent Arab migrants from Shihr in the Hadramawt, a group whom the older Hadrami migrants have tended to regard with condescension. What this does suggest, however, is that certain families of similar ethnic origins tend to monopolize positions of authority in East Africa's orthodox Muslim community.

Why did some families, most often those of Hadrami Arab descent, have greater access to the scholarly ranks than others? Two possible and somewhat related explanations have to do with achievement in the educational process since this was the main criterion for membership in the 'ulama class. First, it is clear that most of the 'ulama came from families that were relatively affluent compared to the rest of the population. One may argue that some degree of wealth was necessary for educational achievement in view of the length of time involved in becoming a shaykh, perhaps an average of twenty years, the frequent necessity of extensive travel to study under different scholars, and the need of purchasing and collecting books and manuscripts.[18] Therefore, in what had been basically a subsistence economy, it was primarily families that accumulated some capital that were in the best position to pursue the scholarly profession. Traditionally, capital accumulation had been based largely on slave labor, and it is no coincidence that the ethnic group that supplied the 'ulama class in Zanzibar and East Africa with the overwhelming preponderance of its membership—the Arabs of southern Arabia—had at one time been the largest slave owners in the region.

The second reason is based on what has been observed elsewhere about educational achievement.[19] The best predictors of a child's success in school are family background and the educational level and interests of the parents. These factors in themselves could easily account for the hegemony of certain families in the 'ulama community in East Africa. However, it suggests that there were more basic causes at work. Among these factors implicit in family background were the early exposure to Islamic scholarship and ideas and the greater likelihood of private study for a child of such a family. As the former head of the Muslim Academy in Zanzibar, himself a scion of a learned family, explained, "In East Africa, Muslim education starts at home when a child learns, in many cases unconsciously, the chief Islamic beliefs, rituals and general behaviour."[20] Another factor is the expectation that a child from such a family would achieve high levels of scholarship; such expectations were held both by the family itself and by the community, which included the teachers of the child. Finally, it was also the case that the quality of

instruction in quranic schools varied. It is significant to note that schools under the supervision of male Arab teachers were considered to be generally superior to those under African teachers. The fees in the former were higher and thus the schools were patronized mainly by parents who were financially better off, most likely Arabs. Together, these factors may account for the success of the many Hadrami Arabs who became part of the religious elite.[21]

Though the 'ulama community of East Africa was a self-contained community of authority holders in that it was subordinate to no other Muslim office it did recognize its ties with the larger Islamic world. Some of the most prized "possessions" were the accolades that some of the 'ulama's members received from leading scholars and officials in places such as Cairo and Istanbul. They were particularly proud, for instance, of the appointments and awards bestowed on Shaykh Ahmad b. Sumayt by the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid.[22]

Another indication of the pan-Islamic awareness of the 'ulama was the widespread practice during the precolonial period of mentioning in the Friday Khutba, or sermon, not only the name of the sultan of Zanzibar but also the sultan at Istanbul as leader of all Muslims.[23] Through this practice, local mosque officials reminded Muslims throughout East Africa that they were part of a larger Muslim community under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan.

Though mention of the Ottoman sultan as well as the sultan of Zanzibar in the khutba was discontinued in German East Africa, Muslims in the colony and elsewhere continued to look to Istanbul, at least during the early decades of the colonial era, as the capital of Islam and to the sultan as the leader of the faithful. In 1911, for example, Muslims in Zanzibar and a number of mainland towns held demonstrations and offered prayers for the Ottoman sultan following the Italian invasion of Turkey.[24] This was the sentiment that the Germans, as allies of the Turks during the First World War, tried to enlist by portraying the war as a holy one with the sultan's blessings.

To complete the picture of authority patterns in Muslim East Africa, some attention should be focused on the ruled, the Muslim masses who were subject to the authority of the clerical class. Unlike authority in the political system, authority in the religious sphere rested ultimately on the voluntary compliance of its members rather than compulsion. However, as long as the individual remained a Muslim, he or she was expected to abide by the commands of the religious authorities; in practice, these were the rulings of the qadi who was appointed by the political authorities. Under colonial rule, the authority of the qadi was buttressed by the government, although

the precolonial jurisdiction he had had was curtailed by the Germans and the British.[25] The extent to which magistrates depended upon the backing of the secular authorities for the enforcement of their rulings was a function of their personal authority within the community. The individual adherent did not necessarily have to abide by the advisory opinions (fatawa) of the 'ulama.

If the Hadrami Arabs held a disproportionate percentage of 'ulama positions, Africans in turn were very much underrepresented. An examination of the only known account of the learned class of East Africa after about 1850 reveals that, while approximately 85 percent of them were Hadramis and another 10 percent were of southern Somalian or Barawi origin, less than 3 percent were Africans.[26] Thus, Africans were almost invariably excluded from positions of authority in the orthodox community. In coastal areas, where more than three-fourths of the community lived, this pattern was most pronounced; the farther inland a locale—such as Uganda—the greater the likelihood that Africans would hold positions of authority. Certainly, a major reason for African underrepresentation was the tendency toward nepotism in recruitment to the 'ulama. In effect, the clerical ranks in East Africa's Sunni community were relatively closed, with little or no social mobility possible for Africans.

CHAPTER 3

Cleavages and Conflicts

The long-standing divisions in a society, often referred to as cleavages, are the framework for its politics. Cleavages, which reveal themselves in the "us versus them" view of the world, determine who will be on which side of the everyday issues that arise in a community. These divisions take on added importance when they reinforce one another, when the same individuals (for the most part) meet each other as opponents in different contexts. Within the coastal, the hinterland, and a few far-inland areas (where approximately three-fourths of East Africa's Sunni Muslims live), the most important cleavages are those between ethnic and racial groups, free persons and slaves, and the affluent and the poor.

ETHNICITY AND RACE

This category includes three subcleavages that have their origins in the history of ethnic and racial group settlement in coastal East Africa. For convenience, I call these cleavages the Shirazi versus "outsiders," the Arabs versus the Africans, and the Europeans versus "all the others."

The Shirazi versus the "Outsiders"

Any discussion of the Shirazi in recent East African history must

begin with the problem of identifying and defining this community. Before the twentieth century, *Shirazi* probably referred to anyone who claimed ancient Persian ancestry from the early settlers of the coastal city-states. Since then, however, the label has taken on a more ambiguous meaning. In Zanzibar and Pemba, for instance, it seems that people who once identified themselves as Swahili about 1930 began to call themselves Shirazi.[1] Today, the label refers loosely to the apparently indigenous African inhabitants on the islands. And elsewhere along the coast, especially from Tanga to Dar es Salaam—the Mrima coast—*Shirazi* is likely to refer to the earliest settlers and rulers of the coastal towns.

One of the problems in identifying the Shirazi is that most are indistinguishable from the African population, a result of centuries of intermarriage with nearby peoples. Another problem is that some Shirazi have intimate kin ties with various sharif clans, that is, the Arabs who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, the ruling family at Vumba in southern Kenya could be classified as either Arab or Shirazi.[2]

Today, those who call themselves Shirazi make up no more than 5 to 10 percent of the coastal population. In some places, such as Pemba and northern Zanzibar, however, their proportion is much higher. Recent census data from mainland Tanzania suggest that today fewer people prefer to identify themselves as Shirazi than in earlier periods.[3]

As the founders and original rulers, the Shirazi understandably saw themselves as the "masters" or the "lords" (*wenyi*) of the coastal towns, and they regarded subsequent settlers as "outsiders" or "newcomers" or, at best, as their "guests" (*wageni*). This view was also held during and after the colonial era. The Shirazi versus "outsiders" cleavage is actually an expression of the often found division in any settlement between indigenous and immigrant communities.

Various customs were observed in coastal towns that reinforced Shirazi ethnic consciousness vis-a-vis other groups. Many, for instance, appended to their names "al-Shirazi," meaning "the Shirazi." Male elders were often addressed as *mwenyi* (the singular form of *wenyi,* "lords"). Almost every town had a section in which the Shirazi lived and one or more for the immigrant populations. In addition to the Friday mosque, which served nominally the entire Sunni community, there were also communal mosques. The oldest of these was frequently regarded as that of the Shirazi while the other mosques were associated with other groups. Thus, attendance at these mosques tended to follow ethnic lines.[4] Graveyards also were often maintained on an

ethnic basis, and, like the communal mosques, the oldest ones were used by particular Shirazi clans. Finally, and most importantly, political authority in the city-states was monopolized by the Shirazi; virtually all the leadership posts were filled by members of privileged families. Except for the last, many of these customs, or at least some aspects of them, survive today.

The major immigrants to the towns were Africans, Arabs, and Indians. Relations between the Shirazi and the African settlers were generally cordial in that the Shirazi did not regard the Africans as a major threat to their traditional prerogatives. Therefore, as long as the Africans recognized their subordinate status, there was little basis for conflict. Furthermore, the African peoples who lived in the vicinity of the towns tended to be only transitory residents, rather than permanent settlers. As African nationalism grew and independence approached, however, relations between the two groups became more factional.[5] After the revolution in Zanzibar, for example, Sheik Abeid Karume, the head of the Revolutionary Council, launched a campaign to discourage use of the label *Shirazi* for self-identification.

In the case of the Arabs, the cleavage lines were more sharply drawn, certainly at one stage of their interaction. Since the first serious and later successful challenge to their political hegemony came from the Omani Arabs (following the Portuguese era), the Shirazi regarded the Arabs as their principal opponents. The main reason was that the Omani Arabs had a major hand in undermining the economic preeminence of the Shirazi by taking over control of the coastal-interior trade, which had been the basis of the Shirazi's political strength. The Omani-Shirazi conflict was further aggravated by sectarian differences; virtually all the Omani were Ibadi Muslims, and the Shirazi were Sunnis. Finally, as the preceding chapter indicated, the prestige that the Shirazi had once enjoyed as the leading religious figures began to weaken during the first half of the nineteenth century. In their place, Hadrami Arabs, who, unlike the Omani, were orthodox, assumed the top clerical posts in the Sunni Community. However, by allowing the Shirazi to retain some of their traditional status and by giving them a role in local administration, the new Arab overlords did eventually reach a modus vivendi with the Shirazi, leading to a reduction in tensions by the end of the precolonial period.

Indian merchants, who increasingly after 1850 began to underwrite the coastal-interior trade, emerged as the major economic entrepreneurs by the end of the precolonial era. Along with the Arabs, they played a leading role in undermining Shirazi hegemony. However, the Shirazi did not regard them with the same antipathy they once had

for the Arabs. Perhaps the main reason was that Indian advancement during the precolonial era was achieved in a more indirect manner (primarily through financial transactions) and followed somewhat on the heels of the Arab displacement of Shirazi rule.

Though Europeans never constituted a major immigrant group in coastal East Africa, the advent of colonial rule meant that they did become a significant reference group, if not an opponent, for the Shirazi. What had begun with the Arabs and later continued with the Indians, namely the dismantling of Shirazi preeminence, was completed under colonial rule. On the Mrima and southern coasts in what became German East Africa, where the Shirazi had led unsuccessful resistance movements against European encroachment, they lost as a result of their defeats their few remaining traditional prerogatives.[6] The social privileges that the Shirazi had been able to hang on to during the final decades of the precolonial period were seriously undermined by the new rulers. In the eyes of the Europeans, the Shirazi were no different from coastal Africans and, therefore, were to be treated accordingly—that is, relegated to the lowest rank on the colonial social status hierachy. In many communities, politics centered on the attempt of the Shirazi to regain some of their former prestige, an effort that frequently brought them into conflict with the colonial administrators.

The Arabs versus the Africans

The cleavage between the Arabs and the Africans is of utmost importance in coastal society. Like the Shirazi-"outsiders" cleavage, this one has its roots in the history of settlement patterns on the coast. Also, it cannot be divorced from the free persons versus slaves cleavage that I will describe later.

To understand this schism, one must distinguish between the Africans who have historically lived in the vicinity of coastal settlements and those whose origins were in the far interior of East Africa (who are sometimes referred to as *watu wa bara*, "the upcountry people"). The latter were likely to become permanent town settlers much earlier than those people who lived near the town. As a result, they were assimilated to a greater degree into Swahili culture; this process included their adherence to Islam. It was the proximity of their own settlements that explains in part why African peoples such as the Giriyama near Mombasa and the Doe and Zaramo near Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam tended to be more transient residents of the coastal towns; in many of the towns, such groups only settled permanently well into the twentieth century. Africans from far upcoun-

try who became coastal settlers quite often belonged to ethnic groups (such as the Kamba, Nyamwezi, and Yao) who lived along or near the traditional caravan routes that connected the coast with the interior. During the colonial period (and today), they made up about 30 to 50 percent of the coastal population.

To some extent, Zanzibar provided an interesting variant on the upcountry-near interior distinction among Africans. Here the major differences—and one that has had such political import that it may qualify as a cleavage itself on the island—was between mainlander Africans and those indigenous to the island, the Hadimu and Tumbatu. The mainlanders, who made up about 35 percent of the island's population, included not only upcountry Africans, the overwhelming majority, but also coastal Africans. In Zanzibar town, the main urban center on the island, mainlanders outnumbered indigenous Africans by almost six to one.[7]

Chapter 1 makes clear that the histories of Islam and the Arab community in East Africa are intimately linked. The political history of the coast, in addition, was very much tied to the fortunes of the Arabs. These two factors, more than any others, accounted for the enormous social weight of East Africa's Arab community. In turn, they explained in part the community's strong sense of identity and importance vis-a-vis others.

The Arab imprint on Islam was much more pronounced in East Africa than in West Africa. This became particularly true after the establishment of Omani rule. Although the Omanis were not themselves orthodox, they were responsible, indirectly and sometimes consciously, for giving the Hadrami Arabs an even greater role in the Sunni community; during the golden age of Shirazi rule, their influence appears to have been more or less on a par with the Shirazi rulers. Since Islam was the sine qua non of Swahili culture, this meant that Arabs were destined to have, if not the leading role, then certainly a major role in molding the culture. Significantly, *-staarabu,* the Swahili verb root that means "to become civilized" or "to become cultured," derives from the Arabic verb *ista'arab,* meaning "to become an Arab."

Arabs also had an advantage over other groups in Swahili society, as in any Muslim community, in that they could claim ethnic ties with the founder of Islam.[8] Thus, by definition, anyone who claimed descent from the Prophet, a sharif (an extremely prestigious role in Islamic cultures), had to be an Arab. This fact, when coupled with the inordinate emphasis on descent in Arab culture (one's *nasab*—ancestry or pedigree), was crucial in fostering a strong sense of ethnic

consciousness in the Arab community. It was not unexpected, then, that a group with a high degree of self-identity who had once been rulers would have acquired a strong sense of self-importance.

Arab pride, in relation to other groups, expressed itself at best as pompousness and at worst as condescension. Africans, and more specifically those from the far interior, were likely to see the more negative aspects of Arab pride. The reasons have as much to do with the history of Arabs as with the history of ethnic relations in East Africa.

The major historical cleavage in the Islamic world, other than that between Muslims and non-Muslims, was that between Arab and non-Arab Muslims. Frequently, non-Arab Muslims were assigned to second-class status by Arabs even though this was inconsistent with the egalitarian tenets of Islam. Among these second-class Muslims, or *mawali* ("clients"), was a category of individuals who very early in Islam's history were singled out for special treatment:

> A class of *mawāli* who created special difficulties amongst upholders of the theory of equality [in Islam] were the Negroes, whose ancestors, and even sometimes they themselves, had been imported from Africa as slaves. It is clear in the Koran for all to read that God was himself the creator of the diversity of tongues and colours amongst believers. Faith, if not logic, therefore demanded that the Negroes should be permitted to regard themselves as the peers of other Muhammadans. But those Arabs who had been brought up in the older tradition, which was reluctant to concede equality even to free men of their own kind and colour, were still more reluctant to recognize the parity of a people foreign in origin and, in their eyes, of definitely inferior status. The Negro himself, though he might be a Muslim, claimed no privileges, and was perhaps scarcely in a position to do so.[9]

In East Africa, where the majority of Muslims were Africans, a large percentage of the Africans were of slave background and were overwhelmingly from the far interior. Just as important, Arabs were the major owners and the traders of these Africans. As slaves, far from their places of origin and thus, detribalized, the upcountry Africans adhered more quickly than the coastal Africans to the religion of their masters, a religion in which no ethnic group was—in theory—accorded superior status.[10] The basis of the antipathy that the upcountry Africans in turn began to have for Arabs was their contradictory position. On the one hand, they had been assimilated into Swahili culture even earlier than the coastal Africans, while on the other, they were never fully accepted as equals by the influential Arab minority.

During the colonial era and especially during the period leading up to independence, the Arab-African cleavage widened. A major reason

was the change in the status of both groups under the new rulers, which, in effect, aggravated the historical division. The abolishment of slavery, the painfully slow but steady recruitment of Africans into positions of authority after the Second World War, and the growth of nationalism throughout the continent were all responsible for the Africans' increased aspirations. The result was that their de facto subordinate status became increasingly intolerable.

Though no longer rulers of the coast, Arabs were able to retain some of their previous privileges under the colonial authorities, whose own notions of racial stratification served Arab interests. At the local level, a few Arabs were employed by the Germans to assist in governing the African population. The British pursued a similar policy, although they did recruit non-Arab Muslims, including Africans, to such posts on the mainland. There was never any doubt, however, that the British accorded higher status to Arabs than to Africans. Most instructive is a 1947 letter from the colonial governor in Kenya, Sir Phillip Mitchell, to the Aga Khan, the spiritual head of the predominantly Indian Isma'ili Muslim community about the establishment of a college in Mombasa for Muslims.

> To begin with, we have to consider the people for whom provision is necessary. It seems to me, that in ddition to your own followers and perhaps a few Bohora, the main community concerned will be the Arabs. Neither I nor, I am sure, you would wish to exclude Swahili or Moslem Africans from the benefits of such a college in due course, but, as no doubt you know, their mental attainments are such that it is not practicable at this stage to provide educational facilities for them in the same institutions as are intended for quicker witted and more mature races. My conception, therefore, is that in order that the thing should be started quickly, we should in the first instance provide for your people and other Moslem Indians, mostly no doubt Bohoras, and Arabs. Since your people are on the whole rather more advanced than the Arabs it would, I think, be necessary to make some special arrangements so as to ensure that a sufficient number of Arabs obtain entry to the project college.[11]

Aside from his views on the position of Indians in the hierarchy of prestige, Mitchell's comments are indicative of how the British ranked Arabs vis-à-vis Africans.

At times, the British were uncertain about the classification of Arabs. Under some statutes they were grouped with Africans, or natives, while in others they were considered to be part of the non-African, or nonnative, population.[12] Combined with the changing status of Africans during the final decades of colonial rule, ambiguities like these raised anxieties among the Arabs, who then strove even harder to enhance their position in relation to the Africans.[13]

The antipathy between Africans and Arabs reached its greatest intensity on the island of Zanzibar. Significantly, it was there, rather than in Pemba (the other island in the protectorate), that African nationalism made the greatest gains. Zanzibar had a larger percentage than Pemba of mainland Africans, who had been brought as slaves to work on the clove plantations. It was also in Zanzibar that the symbols, if not the substance, of pre-European Arab power and privilege were kept more nearly intact by the British. The colonial government had always viewed the protectorate as an Arab state. As a result, Arabs were given preferential access to the top administrative posts. The establishment of limited parliamentary democracy led in 1957 to the first meaningful participation of Africans in the political system. However, African influence was emasculated when Arabs gained control over the government during the last few years of colonial rule (when the British still retained authority over foreign affairs, defense, and internal security).

The most visible expression of African nationalist sentiment in Zanzibar was the revolution in January 1964 that overthrew the Arab rulers who had inherited complete power from the British about a month earlier. It was no coincidence that mainland Africans were in the vanguard of the opposition to the newly independent Arab-dominated government.[14]

The struggle for independence also affected Arab-African relations on the mainland. In Kenya, where British policies similar to those in Zanzibar gave significantly preferential treatment to Arabs, Arabs were more uneasy about the prospects of independence. There they organized to defend their privileges even to the point of considering secession from the rest of Kenya. In Tanganyika, on the other hand, colonial policies were less biased in favor of Arabs. There Arabs were willing to accept an independent government under African rule: this resulted in more amicable relations between the two communities.[15]

The Europeans versus "All the Others"

Like the Arab-African cleavage, the cleavage between the Europeans and the other ethnic and racial communities had as much to do with the history of Europeans before their settlement in East Africa as with what occurred afterward. As the new ruling class, the British and Germans brought with them well-developed ideas about social status that served to legitimize their own position.

The fundamental social distinction in the colonies for the European rulers was that between whites and non-whites. Within the non-white category, they differentiated between Africans and non-Africans. In

the application of various laws, the Germans made the first distinction in terms of *Weissen,* "whites," and *Farbigen,* "colored persons." The "colored" population included Africans, Arabs, Indians, and any other non-white groups. Rather than employing the equivalent German term, they referred to Africans as *Eingeboremen,* "natives" distinct from the other "colored" peoples. The legal system reflected and served to reinforce the status-hierarchy of these catories. According to the statutes on judicial punishment, for example, corporal punishment was not to be inflicted on Arabs or Indians; however, it could be inflicted on "natives."

The British, like the Germans, placed a great deal of emphasis on color and racial distinctions. Though the white-black distinction was central in their minds (particularly in Kenya, where there was a relatively large European settler population), it was couched in terms that belied its saliency among colonial administrators. Colonial subjects were basically either natives or non-natives, Africans or non-Africans.

The hierarchy of social prestige of the colonial rulers was reflected in their allocation of governmental posts. Ethnicity and race were the two major criteria employed in the selection process. Administrators made their views more explicit in discussing recruitment at the local level; it was tacitly agreed that colonywide-level posts were the exclusive province of Europeans. The opinion of the German colonial secretary, Bernhard Dernburg, in 1910 that only German citizens should have a voice in administering the municipalities of Dar es Salaam and Tanga was representative of his government's position on non-whites in roles of authority.

> Consideration for the relations between the colonizing race and the natives prevents the inclusion of the latter section of the population in municipal self-government. . . . I fear that the need to hear an organized coloured body would lead to embarrassing situations if the decisions of this body were found not to accord with the aspirations of the European municipal organ, or indeed with the government's aims.[16]

British practices were similar to the German approach, although during the final two decades of their rule they made some important departures. Though there were no laws explicitly barring non-Europeans, the top post in the local administration, the district commissioner, was occupied only by Europeans. Where possible, the British administered the African community through a "native authority." In coastal areas, this was constituted by the liwali, who, in addition to their administrative duties, adjudicated matters involving Islamic law. This post, then, was always filled by non-Europeans.

With the establishment of the urban councils, British policies became more clearly defined. In a memorandum on "Native Administration in Townships," the secretary for native affairs in Tanganyika, P. E. Mitchell, wrote in 1929 that the use of standards such as literacy in English and property holdings for nomination to urban councils would effectively eliminate Africans from such positions. "The best way it seems is to treat the native [African] quarter as a unit of administration within the larger unit covered by the authority of the central municipality. . . . This would be consistent with and based on practices in coastal towns."[17] In another memorandum, this one from the central government to the Conference of Governors of British East African Territories in 1933, the position taken by authorities in Tanganyika on the question of racial representation in local government was stated.

> As far as can be seen the presence of three major races makes any system which would naturally develop into majority rule unsuitable here, and this Government would certainly not subscribe to the idea that Government, local or central, can be infinitely racialized or organized on a racial basis.[18]

Contrary to the claim of the second memorandum quoted, these statements illustrate that race was uppermost in the minds of the British colonial officials. It is also clear how they ranked the majority community on the social ladder. Though it was desirable for all races to be represented in local government, only Africans were to be underrepresented.

It was only in Zanzibar that the European rulers delegated a large degree of authority to a non-European community. The original terms of the protectorate agreement between the Busa'id sultanate and the British allowed the former to retain some of their traditional powers. Although the British effectively became the actual rulers after a few decades, they utilized Arabs extensively in their administration.

By the end of the colonial period, race (or perhaps more correctly skin color) had taken on a degree of importance that hitherto had not existed in Swahili society. For many Africans, the overriding social distinction was that between *watu wa weupe* and *watu wa weusi*, "whites" and "blacks." This new weltanschauung was in many ways a reaction to that of their European rulers.

The Kenya coast illustrates the subjective and, thus, oftentimes arbitrary character of these ethnic and racial distinctions. The Arab-African cleavage throughout much of the colonial period manifested itself as the schism between the Shirazi and the Arabs. This was due

mainly to the colonial practice of distinguishing between natives and non-natives. The Shirazi were classified as natives, that is, Africans, and, thus, they were of low status. Prior to the colonial era, the Shirazi and the Arabs saw themselves, for the most part, as one community. The colonial intervention drove a wedge between the two groups. Politics during the colonial period centered on efforts on the part of the Shirazi to regain their former status.

As independence approached, the Arabs and the Shirazi began to see that they had a common interest in standing together in the face of the more numerous upcountry Africans. Thus, the Arab-African cleavage during the last years of the British presence pitted the Arabs and the Shirazi against the Africans, especially those of upcountry origin who were not Muslims.[19]

FREE PERSONS AND SLAVES

By 1910, slavery had been abolished in East Africa by the new colonial rulers. Like every society in which slavery had once existed, East Africa felt the effects of slavery long after its abolishment. To understand this, one must begin with the origins and character of the institution.

The slave trade and slavery in East Africa are inextricably linked with the history of the area. Though both probably existed before the Arabs' arrival, the Arabs were most responsible for the scale to which they developed. The revolt of East African slaves, who were known as Zanji, near Basra on the lower Tigris from 869 to 883 A.D., suggests that the trade in human cargo with the Arab world had developed quite early, possibly before the birth of Islam. Though it is difficult to know with certainty the volume of this trade over the centuries (during the Portuguese interlude, it no doubt decreased considerably), it is clear that Omani Arab rule led to its significant increase. This was due chiefly to the growth of the plantation economy in coastal East Africa.

Unlike the previous periods in which African captives were usually taken to Persian Gulf areas to work primarily as domestic laborers, by the nineteenth century, most slaves were being utilized on the vast clove and coconut plantations on the East African coast and offshore islands. The largest and most prosperous plantations were owned by Arabs, especially those related to the ruling Busa'id family, who by 1850 had consolidated their position in East Africa. Arab rule, from this period until its demise at the hands of the European powers, became virtually synonymous with slavery and slave ownership.

The few Shirazi families who had managed to maintain their fortunes, plantations, and slaves were never able to match the wealth of their new overlords.

Of the various coastal places, Zanzibar was the one where slavery was most extensively practiced. Most estimates, beginning with one for 1811, placed the slave population at about two-thirds of the total inhabitants on the island.[20] A census taken of Bagomoyo by the Germans in 1893 suggests that slaves made up between 30 and 40 percent of the town's population. In Malindi and Mambrui, Cooper estimated the slave population at the end of the nineteenth century at about 75 percent of the total population.[21] It would appear, then, that the slave population varied greatly from one community to another.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the majority of captives were taken from the deep interior of East Africa. Places like Manyema, in what is now eastern Zaire, and the Lake Malawi area furnished a large proportion of the captives. The caravan route that connected Manyema with Bagamoyo on the coast and then Zanzibar was by the end of the Arab period the most lucrative of the coastal-interior routes not only for slaves but also for ivory. Clearly then, Zanzibar, the capital of the Busa'id empire, was at the center of East Africa's slave trade and was the epitome of a slave-based economy.

Generally, there were three types of slaves: those who worked in the slave owner's home and attended directly to his or her needs; those who worked on plantations; and those who worked on fishing boats. The overwhelming majority belonged to the first two categories.

House slaves were usually in a more privileged position than the slaves who worked the plantation fields and boats. They tended to have more freedom and responsibility and greater access to their owners. Concubines are included in this category. Field slaves, on the other hand, led a somewhat harsher existence, as did boat slaves. They worked, generally, three to five days a week in the fields of their masters from sunrise until eleven and then from early afternoon until about five. The other days of the week they used to meet their own needs, either by cultivating food on their own small plots or by selling their labor on the open market. Field slaves were subcategorized in that some were selected to be overseers and suboverseers of the others.

The distinctive feature of slavery in a Muslim society was that it was subject to the sacred law of Islam, the shari'a. This feature was of utmost importance because, unlike the other social distinctions in Swahili society, that between the free person and the slave was sanctioned by religion. Among the key rules governing slave status

was the one that only non-Muslims could be enslaved. The nonbeliever could adopt the religion of his or her owner but that would not lead to his or her liberation. Also, the child of slave parents remained a slave. A provision that has had profound effects in Muslim societies, in terms of social mobility, is that the child of a freeman and his concubines inherits the status and property of the father.

A slave was not legally a responsible person but was dependent upon his or her master. Thus, a slave needed the owner's permission in order to marry. Though a slave could engage in commerce (and there were many in the history of Muslim societies who became wealthy), the master's permission had to be obtained since the latter was ultimately responsible for any debts of the slave. Commerce was an option that was probably available only to house slaves since they were the most likely to have the trust of their owners.

Of particular importance were the rules of the shari'a concerning the manumission of slaves. Except for situations in which the offspring of a slave was automatically free (for example, the child of a freeman and his concubine), the permission of the owner (usually in the form of a written statement) was almost always necessary to change a slave's status to that of a free person. The certificate of freedom, however (and this is a very significant qualification), did not end the ties between the newly freed slave and his or her former owner. Islamic law was unequivocal on this point: "The manumitted slave remains to his former master in the strictly personal relation of clientship."[22] This patron-client relationship, which in many ways was a continuation of that found in slavery, itself was given added strength by another legal principle. Under the doctrine of *kafa'a* (degress of equality of birth), only after the third generation did the descendents of a manumitted male slave attain full equality with freemen.

Various rules of etiquette not necessarily sanctioned by Islamic law were observed in coastal societies; these rules underscored the social distance between slaves and free persons. Slaves, for instance, could not address freemen by their first names but only by the title mwinyi, or "master." Unlike freemen, slaves were not permitted to wear caps, shoes, or the long robes that were common in traditional coastal dress. Female slaves, when out-of-doors could not wear either a handkerchief or a veil on their heads, as could freewomen. At public gatherings, particularly when food was served, slaves were usually segregated. A person's name often revealed his or her status. The two proper nouns in a slave's name were frequently connected by *wa* ("of" so-and-so) or *khadim* ("servant" of so-and-so); *bin* or

binti ("son of" or "daughter of" so-and-so) was the usual form for a free person. Customs such as these, along with provisions in the shari'a, played a major role in reinforcing the distinction between slave and free person, the cleavage that J. S. Trimingham calls "the basic distinction" in traditional Swahili society.[23]

Compared to servitude in the Americas, slavery in coastal East Africa was probably on the whole less oppressive. A major reason, certainly, was the mitigating influence of Islam. Though regarded as property and a nonresponsible person, a slave still retained certain rights. Compared even to what existed among various coastal or near-coastal African peoples before the adoption of Islam, slavery in Swahili society represented an advance in terms of the rights of slaves.

At the same time, one must not overestimate the ameliorating influence of Islam. For one thing, the rules of Islamic law were formulated at a much earlier period of history, an era when domestic servitude was the most prevalent form of slavery. Nineteenth-century slavery in coastal society, especially after the third decade, was in the main tied to plantations and integrated into a worldwide economic system dominated by a drive for profit. Whereas labor time for slaves in coastal societies had once been counted in terms of days before the consolidation of Omani rule, by the end of the Busa'id era it was reckoned in hours,[24] an indication of the advanced character of the production process that sought to obtain as much work as possible from each slave. In such a setting, force or punishment was more likely to be used as an incentive for increased production. This may explain why the only known slave revolt in modern coastal history—in 1820 in Zanzibar—occurred just as the Omani overlords were expanding their plantation system and increasing production.[25]

A final consideration is that, though Islamic law was quite explicit about the regulation of slavery, it had almost nothing to say about enslavement, except that it was forbidden to enslave Muslims. Invariably, enslavement involved a great deal of brutality, either in the capturing or the transporting of individuals. Some of the worst memories and images of slavery are associated with the enslavement process.

The abolition of slavery in East Africa proceeded through a number of stages. Opponents of the institution—abolitionists, Christian missionaries, and then later the colonial governments—focused initially on the slave trade. The sultan of Zanzibar, Barghash b. Sa'id (who ruled between 1870 and 1888), yielded to British pressure, reluctantly agreed to end the trade in 1873. Through subterfuge and escape clauses in the 1873 agreement, the trade continued, though at a

trickle of what it had once been. By 1877, it had virtually been ended in the British territories, in fact as well as in theory. The Germans proceeded somewhat more slowly; only after the formal takeover of their possession in East Africa in 1891 did they end the trade.

Rather than waiting for the institution to die a natural death following the end of the slave trade, the new rulers took explicit steps to abolish slavery. Unlike their predecessors who fought the trade in slaves, local administrators in both the British and German territories were less insistent in this new campaign. Aware of the importance of slave labor to the plantation economy, especially in Zanzibar, they opted for a policy of gradualism. Their concern was that immediate abolition would lead to the economic ruin of the Arab plantation owners. Thus, while decrees were issued in Zanzibar in 1897 and on the British and German mainland territories, respectively, in 1907 and 1905 that emancipated the vast majority of slaves (certain categories, such as concubines, were sometimes exempted), it was one or two decades before slavery actually came to an end in coastal East Africa.

Real success in ending slavery, particularly in the British areas, was achieved only after the government promised compensation to the slave owners. Arabs profited more from this arrangement than the Shirazi, who in fact did experience relative impoverishment in the aftermath of emancipation. Aside from financial compensation, the British rewarded many of the former Arab slave owners with special privileges, such as positions in local government and educational opportunities for their children. Policies like these were responsible for ensuring Arab dominance in the political system during the colonial era.

Had the colonial rulers been as solicitous about the victims of slavery as they were about the slave owners, the subsequent history of many of the slaves might have been quite different. The original decrees abolishing slavery placed the onus for obtaining freedom on the slaves themselves. Even more significant, the colonial governments made little or no effort to provide former slaves with alternative means of assuring their livelihood. Though they could not be made to perform forced labor, newly freed slaves often found themselves in situations in which the only persons they could turn to for help to survive were their former masters. It was fairly easy in such circumstances for many slaves to revert to the patron-client relationship from which they had just been freed.

In addition to material concerns, the prevailing norms of Swahili

society led to the reestablishment of the dependency relationship between former slaves and slave owners. The emancipation effected by the colonial governments was contrary to the shari'a which held that only the owner of a slave could grant him or her freedom. This contradiction was of such significance that an observer of status relations in a coastal Kenya town in 1959 was able to write the following:

> The cardinal fact about slavery today is that its abolition did not change the status of the slaves in the eyes of their masters. Manumission is recognized only in its traditional form, where it was the free will of the master. Government proclamation and the paying of compensation was not a substitute. . . . In the secular law of the land, they are free citizens, but in Islamic law they remain slaves.[26]

Along with these provisions of the shari'a, the rules on the inheritance of status by the descendents of slaves and the doctrine of kafa'a have guaranteed that many persons in coastal communities continue to endure the stigma of slavery and all the encumbrances inherent in such a status. Therefore, it is not unusual even today, especially in smaller settelements, to find former slaves and slave owners or their descendants still linked by patron-client ties.

The heritage of slavery has been reflected in modern coastal politics. Not unexpectedly, the free person-slave distinction has had its greatest impact in Zanzibar. During the period leading up to independence, African nationalism drew its most enthusiastic support from mainland Africans, that is, from those who were most likely to have slave origins. In mobilizing against British colonial rule, and by implication Arab dominance in Zanzibar, African nationalist propaganda made repeated references to the era of slavery. Arab complicity in the horrors of slavery was portrayed as vividly as possible.[27] The purpose was to persuade the African masses to reject an independent Zanzibar under Arab rule. This explains why in Pemba, where there had been relatively few slaves of mainland origin and where the enslavement of local Africans had been far less extensive than in Zanzibar itself, the anti-Arab thrust of African nationalism was less warmly received.

THE RICH AND THE POOR

Inequalities in wealth, as is probably obvious by now, were not unrelated to racial and ethnic differences and the distinction between free persons and slaves. It remains to make more explicit the nature of these disparities.

The differential distribution of property such as land and cash crops, slaves, houses, and boats was the best measure of relative wealth in precolonial Swahili society. The Shirazi chieftains were traditionally the largest landowners. This was due in large part to their being the heads of the clans that originally settled the coastal communities. As rulers, they also had the authority to dispense communally owned land. They often used their large holdings for cultivating coconuts, the major tree crop on the mainland and, until the midnineteenth century, the offshore islands. There are no accurate data for this period on the extent of coconut, or copra, trade; however, each tree did have a fixed monetary value that depended on its age.

The Shirazi rulers were also the largest slave owners. In the major slave trading centers on the coast, local chieftains, by virtue of their traditional prerogatives, were easily able to obtain new captives. Also, unclaimed runaway slaves became the property of the rulers. By employing slaves on their farms, they were able to increase the value of their land. In some of the larger settlements, where rulers owned boats, slaves were also used for fishing. The surplus catch could be sold on the market and, hence, was another source of income. Thus, slaves were a valuable source of wealth.

In addition to income that derived from their own property, a significant portion of the wealth of traditional coastal rulers (again in the large trading settlements) originated in various fees and taxes that they had the authority to levy. The two most important were the rents on land they let to nonresidents and new settlers and the taxes on the human cargo and goods of caravans that entered their towns.

Arabs, who migrated in large numbers during the eighteenth century and especially after Sayyid Sa'id's move to Zanzibar, began acquiring land from the original inhabitants. Some were granted tracts by the Busa'id sultans from among their own extensive holdings.[28] Others purchased land from Shirazi rulers (in many cases, the Shirazi assumed they were only selling usufructuary rights to the lands) or were given it outright. Some Arabs simply took land by force. Most of the acquisitions were converted into plantations for tree crops. The largest plantations located in Zanzibar and Pemba, were used for clove cultivation. On mainland plantations, coconut was the primary crop.

By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Arabs had displaced the Shirazi as the largest landowners. Their enterprises, which were extremely large, required great amounts of labor (both cloves and coconuts are harvested a number of times each year). This explains, then, why Arabs also eventually became the major slave owners. The

value of their land depended in the final analysis on the amount of slave labor the plantation owners had at their disposal.

Arabs were able to use their plantations to acquire other forms of wealth. In almost every settlement, for instance, they occupied the most expensive abodes, stone houses. The very wealthy often owned a number of houses, which they rented for another source of income. Some Arabs also owned boats, usually the largest of the East African variety, for commercial fishing using slave labor. Since tree crops were produced for export, many plantation owners, some of whom were quite successful, became involved in trade.

One of the policies that Sayyid Sa'id adopted in order to consolidate his East African empire was encouraging Indian merchants to settle in his domains. The finance capital that they introduced, usually in the form of loans and advances, facilitated greatly the expansion of trade. He also employed many Indians in the administration of his empire's economy because of his respect for their financial talents. By the time of Sultan Barghash's tenure, "their control over the commercial life of Zanzibar was virtually complete."[29] This was equally true in the major trading centers on the mainland. During the final decades of the precolonial era, therefore, Arabs and Indians made up the economic elite of Swahili society.

Though two ethnic groups contested for the leading position in the economic hierarchy, the base of the pyramid was occupied exclusively by one community—Africans and more specifically, African slaves. In terms of property possession, their situation can be easily summarized.

Slaves, generally, did not own land. They had cultivation rights on small plots of about one half to two acres on the lands of their owners. They used this land primarily for subsistence crop production, not cash crops. Non-slave Africans who lived in coastal settlements usually rented from the large landowners. In the rural areas, there was little or no individual ownership of land. As for housing, slaves occupied the most modest of what might be called "huts" as distinct from "houses." These were very simply constructed, consisting of only wood and matting derived from coconut tree leaves. Other Africans lived in similarly modest housing, with perhaps a few more amenities, such as windows. Few, if any, Africans lived in the more desirable stone houses. When Africans owned boats, the boats tended to be the least expensive type. An African merchant, let alone a successful one, was very rare in coastal society.

The establishment of European colonial rule had as many consequences for the distribution of wealth as for political authority. The

economic demise of the Shirazi on the mainland was probably the most conspicuous result; only in the Zanzibar protectorate were they able to maintain the standard of living that they had historically enjoyed. Though the decline had begun during the final years of the precolonial period, it accelerated in the years immediately following the consolidation of European rule.

Two reasons loom large in explaining the Shirazi's relatively swift decline. One was their unsuccessful attempt to wage armed resistance against European encroachment. On both the northern and southern coast of what became German East Africa, a number of the few remaining Shirazi leaders with influence led and participated in two rebellions; one was called the Abushiri revolt, the other the uprising of Hassan b. Omari Makunganya. The Germans hanged the defeated leaders and stripped other Shirazi chieftains of their traditional powers over land and taxation. Many of the chieftains' relatives liquidated their remaining holdings and moved to other locations.

The second reason had to do with the abolition of slavery. Though Shirazi ownership of slaves was never as extensive as the Arabs', slaves were a major source of their wealth, particularly through their plantations. With more limited resources than the Arabs, the Shirazi had less security in a crisis. Together with the elimination of other traditional sources of income, the ending of slavery had drastic economic repercussions for the Shirazi. The effects on one community on the northern coast of Tanzania were similar to what happened in any number of coastal settlements: "the abolishment of slavery did more than anything else to remove the power of the village ruler—as well as making impossible the kind of large scale plantation . . . practiced by the wealthier people of the village.[30]

Though the Arabs fared better than the Shirazi under European colonialism, they too suffered a decline in their economic status. The reasons are somewhat more complex. In what originally began as a relationship of mutual benefit, the extension of long- and short-term credit to Arab planters by Indian money lenders placed Arabs at a disadvantage in the long run. High and often excessive interest rates on the loans and advances increasingly led to indebtedness. Indian creditors began foreclosing on mortgages and claiming Arab land that was often put forward for security. This state of affairs actually began during the precolonial years, but it accelerated during the colonial period. It reached such proportions in Zanzibar that the British enacted legislation in 1938 to counteract the process. There the indebtedness generated animosities between the Indians and the Arab communities, with political consequences.

High interest rates alone do not explain Arab indebtedness. Other factors included the fluctuation of clove prices on the world market and, to a lesser extent, the abolishment of slavery; the former made economic planning difficult and the latter resulted in an increase in labor costs. Another factor was the Islamic laws of inheritance. Because rights of primogeniture were not observed and wealth had to be divided equally among sons (daughters received less than sons but equal amounts among themselves), capital in families was dispersed rather than concentrated. Heirs who tried to maintain the lifestyle that they had been accustomed to often went into debt. Therefore, the decline of a family's fortunes after two or three generations was a common feature of the Arab community.

However precipitous the decline in their wealth, Arabs did not become impoverished. They still retained ownership of large land holdings, although many of the holdings were mortgaged to Indian merchants. In small communities where Indians were less likely to be present, Arabs made up the economic elite themselves. Furthermore, colonial policies, especially in Zanzibar, tended to assure Arabs opportunities to maintain some, if not all, of their former economic prestige.

The colonial era also witnessed the arrival of new Arab migrants from southern Arabia, who were frequently called Shihiri. Unlike their kinfolk who had migrated much earlier to East Africa, they were primarily traders and merchants and not planters. Along with the Indians, though not as successfully, they constituted the class of small shopkeepers and peddlers.

Virtually throughout the colonial era, Indians were the economic aristocrats of Swahili society. In the major centers, they often owned the largest plantations and commercial enterprises. Arab indebtedness brought the Indians land and houses, which resulted in their becoming the leading landlords in most towns. Most important, they were the major source of finance capital, an advantage that permitted them to extend ownership over other properties. Colonial policies generally enhanced their economic preeminence.

The only group that might have challenged the Indians for economic hegemony was the local European community. Generally, European commercial activities were not as extensive as those of the Indians. Europeans were more interested in the economic opportunities far inland. This is not to say that their presence was insignificant; in certain mainland places (there was little or no European commercial activity on Zanzibar), the few European enterprises sometimes dwarfed those of the most successful Indians. Usually, however, total

Indian wealth was greater than that of Europeans in East Africa. At most, one could say that, where Europeans were present, they were part of the economic elite.

The low position that Africans traditionally occupied in the economic hierarchy did not change under colonial rule. There is some evidence that it may even have deteriorated during the early decades. Except for a few places, most coastal settlements experienced an economic depression after the institution of European rule, and although all ethnic groups suffered in the process, it appears that Africans bore the brunt of this decline. In the opinion of one German governor, the reason could be traced to colonial policies that restricted, often inadvertently, the trading opportunities that had existed for African farmers during the precolonial period.[31] Thus, capital accumulation from surplus produce was obstructed, and many settlements stagnated and some literally died.

Africans recently freed from slavery often found themselves in places with few opportunities for advancement. The disadvantages inherited from slavery were almost impossible to overcome in the context of contracting economies. Most Africans, then, did not become landowners. If they were former slaves, they usually retained access to the plots they had had as slaves under agreements with their former owners and with obligations implicit in such arrangements. Those who had previously rented land continued to do so during the colonial era. In some cases, Africans obtained land through long-term occupancy leases, an innovation of colonial rule. The situation regarding housing remained much the same as it had been before the colonial period.

Only in the Zanzibar protectorate and the few coastal towns that experienced economic growth under colonial rule—Mombasa, Tanga, and Dar es Salaam—did Africans improve their lot somewhat. It was possible in such places for former slaves and other Africans to sell their labor, for example, as plantation and dock workers or as porters. In a few locations, most notably Zanzibar, some Africans were able to become plantation owners. Compared to the plantations of the Arabs, however, theirs were modest. On Zanzibar, for which there are figures available, there were in 1931 7,070 plantations owned by the Swahili, Shirazi and Africans, and 1,869 owned by Arabs.[32] Nonetheless, the average number of trees per plantation, an indication of size, was 394 for Arabs and 33 for the Swahili.

A few Africans in the more prosperous towns were also able to become active in trade. As with plantation ownership, however, in trade Africans were at a disadvantage in relation to Arabs and Indians;

the Arabs and Indians had far greater access to capital. The absolute gains that Africans made from trade and landownership, then, did not alter their relative position on the economic ladder.

As independence approached, opportunities for Africans in the civil service became available. Coastal Africans, however, profited little from this development. The main reason was that as Muslims they had had far less access to the secular education that was generally taught, except in the Zanzibar protectorate, in Christian mission schools. As a result, Muslim Africans were less likely to qualify for government posts. In coastal areas, such positions were usually filled by Christian Africans from upcountry or elsewhere in East Africa.

The tendency for non-Muslim, noncoastal Africans to occupy government posts at the local as well as the colonywide level was the basis for a cleavage—exclusively on the mainland—that has become increasingly important during the postcolonial period. In Swahili society, it is often referred to as the distinction between the *wageni* (those who are "strangers" or "guests") and the *wenyeji* (those who are indigenous). The former often refer to the latter as WaSwahili, "the Swahili," a term that is seldom used in Swahili society for self-identification. This cleavage reflectes the unevenness of development under colonialism; that is, some regions of the colonial domains underwent more modernization than others. This was expressed in both economic and educational opportunities. The governments of Tanzania and Kenya are most aware of this state of affairs and have attempted, with mixed success so far, to redirect development priorities in order to minimize these regional differences. Whether they will be successful eventually remains to be seen.

THE CONVERGENCE OF CLEAVAGES

It is probably apparent that there was a high degree of congruence between all the cleavages in the sense that most or all could be reduced to one fundamental social distinction in Swahili society. When one begins with the three ethnic and racial cleavages, it is clear—certainly during the colonial years—that the overriding schism was that between the *watu wa weupe* and the *watu wa weusi,* "whites" and "blacks." In Swahili society, whites included Europeans, Indians, and Arabs. Under colonial rule, the Shirazi (who may have once thought of themselves as non-African) had, on the mainland at least, come to accept their African classification.

The distinction was basically another manifestation of the white-black cleavage between free persons and slaves. Almost by definition,

slaves were black and whites were free persons. Though every African had not been of slave origin, virtually no slave had not been an African. And there were very few poor whites and, conversely, few rich blacks. The differential distribution of wealth was clearly made on an ethnic/racial basis.

Swahili society was highly polarized between the white, free, and rich on one side and the black, slave, and poor on the other. Stated less cumbersomely, this is simply the white-black schism, the basic cleavage in the society.

In his renowned study on Zanzibar, Michael Lofchie suggested that Islam, the religion of the overwhelming majority, could possibly have been the basis for overcoming "the glaring class differences between the racial groups," what I call the basic cleavage in Swahili society, upon which a unified community could have been built.[33] Though this view is reasonable, it overlooks the historical reality that race has frequently been the basis for social differentiation throughout the Muslim world. As Bernard Lewis showed in his survey of Islamic history, race or, more to the point, the distinction between Arabs and other whites on the one hand and blacks on the other has been a major cleavage in many Muslim societies. What may have been based originally on the free-slave distinction became over time associated with race. "Before long . . . a distinctive color prejudice appeared, and the association of blackness with slavery, whiteness with freedom and nobility became common."[34]

Lofchie's suggestion also ignores the social divisions within the Sunni community itself. The preceding chapter clearly revealed that there was a differential distribution of authority along ethnic/racial lines within the "church." Africans, by and large, were not part of the 'ulama community, the most authoritative and prestigious roles in Swahili society. Rather, Hadrami Arabs were disproportionately represented in the clerical ranks. These inequalities in the distribution of prestige and religious authority coincided, in fact, with the fundamental social distinction. Blacks were not only likely to have been of slave origin and poor but also were deprived of social prestige and authority in the Sunni community. Whites, or more specifically Arabs in this case, in addition to their other advantages, were likely to have had the most authority and prestige. Therefore, rather than mitigating social distance, Islam as it functioned in Swahili society only aggravated the polarization.

Social mobility can often serve to temper the sharpness of a cleavage. If, for example, more Africans had become affluent or acceded to the leading clerical posts, then the ethnic/racial cleavage

might not have been so profound. But this was not the case for reasons already suggested, such as limited economic opportunities for former slaves. The Islamic inheritance laws, which had an inherently redistributive character, might have served the role of social mobilizer had marriages between Arab women and black men been a possibility. Again, this almost never occurred; there is some evidence that it was even frowned upon.[35] The situation was further complicated by the Islamic doctrine of kafa'a, which grants the descendants of a manumitted slave equal standing with a free person and, thus, the right to marry a freewoman only after the third generation.

Finally, the major restraint on social mobility was colonial rule, whose modus operandi tended to intensify traditional social inequalities. Colonial authorities believed, in fact, that Africans were inferior. Not surprisingly, their policies had a self-fulfilling effect. Africans eventually recognized that only through a redistribution of political authority would they be able to eliminate the other inequalities of Swahili society.

PART II
The Tariqa in East Africa

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CHAPTER 4

The Tariqa and the Expansion of Islam

In the aftermath of the British victory over the German East African forces during the First World War, Islam made its greatest gains in East Africa. The reason, in the opinion of some, is that the disruption of the war and the slowness with which the British institutionalized their authority undermined European cultural influence and Christian missionary activities.

Clearly, the disruption of the war is important in explaining the growth of Islam in Tanzania. At best, however, this was a necessary prerequisite but not a sufficient cause of its unprecedented expansion. What is often overlooked or not understood is that within the Sunni Muslim community there was an institution acting as the chief agent for Islam's growth. This was the Muslim tariqa, known also as the sufi brotherhood or order.

SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The tariqa (literally, "the path") is, briefly, the institutional expression of the mystical tradition in Sunni Islam known as sufism.[1] During the fourth century of Islam, wandering and isolated sufis, as the mystics were called, began to band together as aspirants to the mystical path, usually under the guidance of an older man. Near the

end of the twelfth century A.D., the followers of Sayyid Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani decided to perpetuate his ideas and memory; they organized the first tariqa, the Qadiriyya.

The legitimacy of a tariqa as a "path" to God depends on its claim to being a link in a historical chain of spiritual succession from the Prophet Muhammad through certain revered figures. The *khalifa,* or shaykh, of a tariqa is the link in this chain at the local level. The novices, who constitute the rank and file in the brotherhood, are known as the *murids* ("aspirants"). The shaykh is responsible for their initiation into the order, which is symbolized by a written or verbal declaration called an ijaza. Murids who, in the opinion of the shaykh, have progressed farther along the mystical path than others may be promoted by him to a higher rank and given more leadership responsibilities. In some instances, the title *murshid* ("guide") is applied to such murids.

Dhikr, a continuous repetition of various words and phrases in praise of God, is the main ritual of brotherhoods and is performed collectively one or more times a week. The birth dates, *mawlids,* of venerated saints—often the founders of an order—are the most important annual celebrations. These entail visits to the tombs of the saints in which the blessing (*baraka*) of the deceased is invoked. However, "the doctrines of the orders are not so important. The main thing is the bond between the *shaikh* (or *murshid*) and the *murid* . . . nothing else really matters, for the shaikh, if he wishes, can order the *murid* to cease to believe in God."[2]

Early in its history, sufism became what can be called the religion of the masses, or popular Islam. This was because tariqas, rather than "official" Islam, were the usual vehicle for the propagation of the faith in most areas of the Muslim world. The experience of the Ottoman Empire suggests two reasons why they could play this role.[3] First, compared to established orthodox Islam, they tended to be more tolerant of local customs. Second, the sufi orders were regarded as more egalitarian than clerical Islam because status in the tariqa was based more on piety rather than on learning. This proselytizing role enabled the tariqa to carry out what has been one of its most significant functions, that of social integration. The history of the Sanusiyya order among the Bedouin in Libya illustrates, perhaps better than any other, how such a function could be performed.[4]

In black Africa, also, sufi brotherhoods became the main influence in Islam's spread. In the process, they contributed greatly to African Islam's developing independently from Middle Eastern or Arab Islam because "the mystic orders within the African milieu were dominated

by an African leadership and the entire organization of sufi orders remained in African hands. In a limited sense, therefore, Islam was 'nationalized' in West and central Africa quite early."[5]

Related to the functions of proselytizing and social integration is the tariqa's long-acknowledged importance in mass political mobilization. The sufi orders in North Africa, for example, were often in the forefront of struggles to resist European imperialism. During and after the period of the nationalist bids for independence, some orders played either a direct or an indirect role in assisting political parties. Turkey was one of the first countries where this occurred, and recent evidence from Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sudan indicates that the tariqa is still a key factor in the strength of some parties at the local level. Brotherhoods in some places have performed numerous administrative functions. Before the coup in 1969, the Sanusiyya in Libya, for example, under the nominal leadership of King Idris, resembled in many ways a theocratic institution.

THE TARIQAS OF EAST AFRICA

Though much has been written about sufi orders in West Africa, relatively little is known about them in East Africa. Brotherhoods have been present in East Africa since the last quarter of the nineteenth century; if Somalia is included, since the fifteenth century. The orders that are known to exist on the mainland and offshore islands are ranked in importance: the Qadiriyya, the Shadhiliyya, the 'Askariyya, the Ahmadiyya-Idrisiyya-Dandarawiyya, the Rifa'iyya, and the 'Alawiyya. The largest, the Qadiriyya, is divided into independent branches, three of which are the most important. Knowledgeable Muslims estimate that more than 70 percent of the adherents of brotherhoods in East Africa belong to one of the branches of the Qadiriyya.

The Qadiriyya

One branch of the Qadiriyya was founded by the individual most commonly associated with this tariqa's establishment in East Africa, Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad from Brava in southern Somalia.[6] His arrival in Zanzibar in 1884 was due to an invitation from Sultan Barghash b. Sa'id. His various stays in Zanzibar, until his assassination in 1909 in Somalia, resulted in a large number of initiates into the brotherhood, a number of whom later spread it throughout the mainland. The growing popularity of the Uwaysiyya branch led German observes in 1909 to assume that all brotherhoods in German East

Africa had spread from southern Somalia.[7] This was an understandable assumption since almost every khalifa of Shaykh Uways was Bravanese by birth or ancestry.[8]

Shaykh 'Umar al-Qullatyn, who was mistakenly credited by J. S. Trimingham for having brought the Qadiriyya to Zanzibar, was one of the most famous khalifas of Shaykh Uways.[9] Originally from Brava, he played a major role in disseminating the brotherhood through Zanzibar and the vicinity of Dar es Salaam. He was succeeded by his son Muhammad, who was referred to by local Muslims as the chief Qadiri khalifa in Zanzibar.

Another famous khalifa of Shaykh Uways, and also a Bravanese, was Shaykh 'Abd al-Aziz (1832-1896), one of Zanzibar's most learned Muslim leaders. In addition to helping establish the Qadiriyya in East Africa, he organized his own tariqa, which he called the Nuraniyya. His brotherhood's activities were so well known that he was erroneously believed by some to have introduced the ritual of tariqas (dhikr) in East Africa.[10]

Unfortunately, little is known about another khalifa, Shaykh 'Abd Allah Mjana Khayri, who was instrumental in spreading the Qadiriyya into the deep interior of the mainland as far as the Congo. He was even acknowledged as Shaykh Uways's successor and the nominal head of the tariqa in East Africa during the early years of the colonial period. Since it appears that Shaykh 'Abd Allah was an African, this would represent the initial Africanization of the Uwaysiyya branch at the highest level. Among Shaykh 'Abd Allah's many converts to the tariqa the most famous was Shaykh Hassan b. Amir al-Shirazi.[11]

Shaykh Sha'uri al-Hajj, also a khalifa of Shaykh Uways, was very active in northern Zanzibar, where the brotherhood was called Kirama. His successor, Shaykh Muhammad b. Khalfan al-Filani (who died in 1942), popularly called Haj Suweyd, was a renowned scholar as well as a tariqa figure.

The most famous khalifas of Shaykh Uways in the East African interior were two Bravanese Arab brothers. One, Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad, settled in Tabora from 1894 to 1908. During his stay, he laid the groundwork for the brotherhood by teaching dhikr to new Muslim converts; he did not, however, formally establish the Qadiriyya in the town. Shortly after his departure, he sent to Tabora one of his khalifas, Shaykh Tinay b. Juma, from Zanzibar to organize the brotherhood and begin initiating new members. The first recruit, Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, succeeded in planting the Qadiriyya throughout the Tabora district. The result is that Shaykh Mzee is today the most influential tariqa leader in the central region of Tanzania.

Shaykh Zahur's brother, Shaykh Sufi b. Muhammad, settled in Ujiji in about 1930 after having been in Tabora and Bagamoyo for extended periods. Shaykh 'Abdul Muhsin Kitumba, a highly respected scholar on both sides of the Tanzania-Zaire border, was clearly his most accomplished recruit.

Before arriving in Zanzibar, Shaykh Uways had been active in southern Somalia. Though the Qadiriyya had been firmly established in northern Somalia since the fifteenth century, Shaykh Uways is credited with its expansion in the south. The Uwaysiyya became virtually the only branch of the brotherhood in the area.

Even though most Muslims associate Shaykh Uways with the establishment of the Qadiriyya in East Africa, Shaykh Husayn b. 'Abd Allah al-Mu'in was actually the person who first brought the brotherhood to the region.[12] Little is known about him except that he went from Mecca to Zanzibar in about 1875 and became friendly with Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Umar al-Shirazi (who died in 1344 A.H./1925-1926).[13] Shaykh 'Ali and another khalifa, Shaykh Hajji Mchenga, were mainly responsible for making this branch of the Qadiriyya the predominant brotherhood in the Rufiji area. Another one of Shaykh Husayn's many khalifas, Shaykh Ali Msemakweli, spread the order to Kilwa, Lindi, Nyasaland (as it was then known), and Mozambique.

A second generation of leaders disseminated this branch even deeper into the interior. Shaykh Athman b. 'Abd Allah Muki (who died in 1954), was influential in establishing the order in Dar es Salaam and upcountry places such as Shinyanga, Bukoba, and Mwanza. Shaykh Athman stayed for some time with the famous Sultan Makwaya in Shinyanga, where he was able to spread the tariqa.[14] The son of Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Umar is the currently recognized head of this branch of the Qadiriyya.

The third major branch of the Qadiriyya—the subject of part 3 of this book—had its origins in Bagamoyo. It was brought to the town in about 1905 by Shaykh Muhammad b. Husayn al-Lughani, who initiated during his brief stay a khalifa Shaykh Yahya b. 'Abd Allah, popularly known as Shaykh Ramiya (who died in 1931). Through the latter's efforts, this branch spread throughout the Bagamoyo region and then to Tanga and far upcountry. In terms of the number of adherents, it may be the largest of the three Qadiriyya branches.

One of Shaykh Ramiya's most famous khalifas was Shaykh Khalfan b. Muhammad. After settling in Ujiji, he began initiating new members into the tariqa. One of his khalifas, Shaykh 'Abd Allah Kitenge, was most influential in planting the Qadiriyya in the Manyema region of Zaire, where it is known as the Mulidi.[15] Another khalifa,

Shaykh Kibaraka, took the tariqa to Bujumbura and then to Ruanda. Shaykh Ramiya's son, Shaykh Muhammad of Bagamoyo, is the acknowledged head of this branch of the Qadiriyya today.

The Shadhiliyya

Near the end of German rule, the second-most popular brotherhood on the mainland, the Shadhiliyya, began extending itself. Its origins in East Africa can be traced to the Comoro Islands. The individual primarily responsible for its establishment on the mainland was Sayyid Muhammad Ma'ruf b. Shaykh Ahmad (1853-1905).[16] On a trip to Zanzibar, Sayyid Muhammad came under the influence of Shaykh Uways, from whom he took the ijaza of the Qadiriyya. Shortly after his return to the Comoro Islands, he became a khalifa of Shaykh 'Abd Allah Darwish, who was the head of the Yashruti branch of the Shadhiliyya. Almost immediately, he began recruiting adherents and traveling to coastal East Africa to spread the tariqa.

At about the beginning of this century, Sayyid Muhammad initiated his most famous khalifa, Shaykh Husayn b. Mahmud of Kilwa.[17] Through the latter's efforts, this branch of the Shadhiliyya was disseminated throughout East Africa. Shaykh Husayn's school, which attracted students from various places, including Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), was a primary institution in the spread of the brotherhood.[18] Among his leading khalifas were Shaykh 'Abd al-Khayri and Shaykh 'Ali Wafa' (the son of Sayyid Muhammad Ma'ruf) in Dar es Salaam, Shaykh Salum b. 'Umar in Tabora, Shaykh Haidali in Ujiji, and Shaykh Shwaibu b. Semakula in Kampala. Owing to the efforts of the last named, Uganda is the only East Africa territory where the Shadhiliyya is as strong, if not stronger, as the Qadiriyya.

Unlike the Qadiriyya, which has a number of independent branches, the Shadhiliyya in the whole of East Africa was under the authority of Shaykh Husayn; currently, it is under his successor Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman. Both traveled extensively to the branches (*zawiyas*) of the tariqa, and, whenever the need arose, they appointed new khalifas in various locales.[19] Furthermore, directives concerning the brotherhood were sent from the international headquarters of this branch of the Shadhiliyya in Acre (presently in Lebanon) to Shaykh Husayn, who then transmitted them to local leaders.

The 'Askariyya

The only tariqa that is indigenous to East Africa is the 'Askariyya, which was organized in about 1930 by Shaykh Idris b. Sa'ad of Dar es Salaam. The story of its origin is that Shaykh Idris had once

sought the ijaza of the Qadiriyya from Shaykh 'Umar al-Qullatayn in Zanzibar but was told that he would have to wait for a while. Deciding against this, Shaykh Idris returned to Dar es Salaam and started his own brotherhood, which was named after a famous Shadhili, Shaykh Abu al-Hasan al-'Askar.[20] Because of its origins, the adherents of the more-established brotherhoods tend to look askance on the 'Askariyya.[21]

The doctrines of the tariqa are described in an unpublished manuscript written by Shaykh Idris that can only be seen by the murids of the order. Owing to his fame and reputation for devoutness in the Dar es Salaam area, Shaykh Idris rapidly began attracting followers. The 'Askariyya is popular in south-central Tanzania, in places such as Morogoro, Kilosa, Mahenge, and Songea, as well as in Dar es Salaam. It also shares a feature with the Qadiriyya—it has its own flag. The son of Shaykh Idris, Shaykh Muhammad, is the current leader of the brotherhood.

The Ahmadiyya-Idrisiyya-Dandarawiyya

The founder of this tariqa and its various offshoots was a Moroccan, Shaykh Ahmad b. Idris al-Fasi (who died in 1827). A nephew of one of his pupils established in Arabia during the last decades of the nineteenth century an order he called the Salihiyya, which began spreading to Somalia. The most famous Salihiyya khalifa was the so-called "Mad Mullah," Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah Hassan, who led a rebellion against the British in northern Somalia from 1899 to 1920. Shaykh 'Ali b. Muhammad al-Adali was chiefly responsible for establishing the brotherhood in southern Somalia and parts of northern Kenya.[22]

Shaykh Ahmad al-Dandarawi, an Egyptian pupil of Shaykh Ahmad's successor, founded another offshoot, the Dandarawiyya, sometimes called the Ahmadiyya-Dandarawiyya. His disciple, Sayyid Mahmud b. Hamid, brought the tariqa to Zanzibar, where he appointed a khalifa called Shaykh Ilyas.[23] The order was then taken to Dar es Salaam by Shaykh 'Ali b. Salih (who died around 1959). In about 1935, the tariqa was established in Bagamoyo, the only other place on the mainland where it exists. The present head of the brotherhood in Dar es Salaam is Shaykh Hyder b. Mwinyimvua.

In Somalia, the Salihiyya has traditionally been more centralized and hierarchical than other tariqas, such as the Qadiriyya.[24] On the other hand, the Dandarawiyya in Tanzania is, like the Qadiriyya, more decentralized. Like other brotherhoods in Somalia and unlike most in East Africa, including the Dandarawiyya, the Salihiyya

operates numerous agricultural settlements. Finally, the Dandarawiyya, unlike other tariqas in East Africa, does not allow female initiates, an important factor that limits its popularity.

Other Tariqas

One group that presents something of a definitional problem is the 'Alawiyya; it is not always regarded in the East African context as a tariqa in the usual sense. Founded by Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Ali (who died in 1255), it is very popular in the Hadramawt, from where it has spread to coastal East Africa.[25] Its base is Lamu and, more specifically, the town's mosque college (Ribat al-Riyadah). In the Hadramawt, members of the tariqa are not allowed to affiliate with other brotherhoods. In East Africa, however, some of its leading members, like Sayyid Abu Bakr al-Aydarus of Somalia in the fifteenth century, were involved in other orders.[26]

The uncertainty about the 'Alawiyya stems from its apparently hereditary character. In coastal towns (the only places where it is located), it is considered to be the tariqa of the sharifs, most notably the Jamal al-Layl clan. As a result, the tariqa tends to have a clannishness about it that is reflected in its limited membership. Unlike other brotherhoods in East Africa, this brotherhood does not actively proselytize. Whether or not membership is restricted to sharifs (opinions vary on this), the fact is that non-sharifs (and, thus, non-Arabs) are not active in its ranks.

The Rifa' iyya, one of the oldest brotherhoods, was more popular during the early years of the colonial period than it is at present.[27] It seems to have come first to Zanzibar from Aden and then spread to the coast. Kaule, a small settlement near Bagamoyo with a large proportion of Baluchi residents, was probably its mainland headquarters. From there the tariqa was disseminated into the interior to towns such as Dodoma. The more flamboyant rituals of the Rifa' is, in contrast to the other tariqas, were no doubt a source of attraction. Today, however, only a few places, mostly in Zanzibar, can claim adherents to the brotherhood.

Reports that I have been unable to confirm claim that other tariqas have existed at one time or another in East Africa.[28] These include the Sanusiyya, the Tijaniyya, the Khalwatiyya, and the Naqshbandiyya.

THE EXPANSION OF ISLAM

C. H. Becker, the Islamicist who advised German colonial authorities,

stated in an article published in 1911 that tariqas in East Africa "can scarcely play a big role" in the Muslim community.[29] A few years later, however, German officials and their adviser on Islamic affairs, revised their assessment and began to regard brotherhoods with concern, if not alarm.[30]

Becker's original evaluation was not unique. Other observers of the Muslim community had arrived at similar conclusions. In the first major publication on East African Islam by a European, Martin Klamroth, a Lutheran missionary, wrote that the "dervish orders have no marked influence in this part of the world."[31] This view was repeated almost fifty years later by J. S. Trimingham in his comprehensive survey, *Islam in East Africa:* "It is difficult to estimate the influence of the orders among the Swahili. What is clear is that they affect only a small proportion of the population directly."[32] Finally, and most recently, there is the view of J. C. Froelich on the spread of Islam in East Africa: "Les émissaires des grandes confréries furent absents de cette campagne de proselytisme."[33]

Only a few non-Muslim observers perceived the growing influence of brotherhoods in the early years of their dissemination. The same year that Becker's article appeared, another missionary wrote that Islam's spread in East Africa during the nineteenth century could be traced to the proselytizing efforts of the Qadiriyya, which he erroneously attributed to the efforts of Shaykh Ahmad b. Idris, the founder of the Ahmadiyya-Idrisiyya.[34] Another missionary wrote in 1914 that conversions were occurring rapidly and that tariqas such as the Sanusiyya were mainly responsible.[35] Though there is no evidence to substantiate Sanusi involvement, the claim was essentially valid.

By 1914, German authorities had come to appreciate the importance of the brotherhoods. The major reason was that the colonial government had conducted in 1912, upon a suggestion from Becker and others, a survey of each district in its territory to determine the extent of Islam's penetration and influence.[36] (The details of the survey regarding the brotherhoods will be looked at later.) The overall finding about the tariqas was that they were spreading rapidly and were a chief agent in Islam's expansion.

With the advent of the First World War, the investigations of the Germans came to an end. Their British successors in what became Tanganyika did not continue this work, and, throughout the British period, the study of Islam was given little serious attention. Thus, almost nothing was known about tariqas to most people outside the Muslim community. This situation prevailed for the most part in the rest of British East Africa.

One of the very few exceptions to the general lack of knowledge about Islam and the brotherhoods in the post-German years was the work of Julius Richter. He observed in a 1934 publication that among the reasons for Islam's expansion in Tanganyika after the First World War were the activities of the tariqas, "such as the Kadiriya, the Khalwatiya, the Shadeliya and Naqshibendi, [which] have their settlements not only in towns, but in many out-of-way places."[37] Richter's long-standing interest in East African Islam, which dated back to the German era, probably explains the basic accuracy of his observation.

Another exception was F. Schildknecht, a White Father scholar who monitored Muslim activities in Africa for the Roman Catholic Church. In an unpublished 1963 report to the Vatican on the state of Islam in East Africa, Schildknecht sought to explain how adherence to Islam is maintained: "Where Islam builds a Ghetto, there the 'milieu' protects the individual in his faith. . . . The mentality . . . is increasing, and this growth has to be credited to the Tariqa. They succeeded to build up real Muslim communities, with a [*sic*] organization of Islamic life."[38] This integrative function was possible, Schildknecht felt, because the brotherhoods played a leading role in spreading the religion. In a review of Trimingham's *Islam in East Africa*, Schildknecht, not surprisingly, took him to task for underestimating the "vital role of the Muslim fraternity, Tariqa, which have a still wider influence."[39]

Within the Sunni community itself, Muslims were very much aware of the importance of the brotherhoods. A leading and well-traveled shaykh, who estimated that more than 70 percent of East Africa's Muslims are affiliated with tariqas, gave this explanation: "After the coming of Islam here, there was nothing to attract people to Islam—but only after the tariqas came. After they came they helped in spreading Islam and converting people and keeping the community together and solving their problems."[40] Shaykh Muhammad Ali Hemedi, perhaps the most respected Sunni leader in Tanzania today, who himself is not an adherent of any brotherhood, concurs on this point: "Most of the people became Moslems because of the tariqa . . . it had a big role in spreading Islam in Tanganyika and up to now, especially in the interior of the country."[41]

Though Muslims were well acquainted with brotherhoods, many of the 'ulama, who themselves may have belonged to the 'Alawiyya, had reservations about them. In their opinion, brotherhood membership often was a substitute for strict adherence to the essential pillars of Sunni Islam, especially among the less knowledgeable. Their

historical accounts and descriptions of the Sunni community, therefore, tended to ignore the role of the tariqas and contributed even further to misconceptions about the importance of brotherhoods in East African Islam.[42]

When one begins with specific locales for which there is information available, the role of the tariqa in Islam's dissemination in East Africa becomes even clearer. The seven sons of the sultan of Shiraz who are reputed to have settled on the Benadir coast during the tenth century may possibly have been members of a brotherhood or perhaps a forerunner of the tariqa.[43] Though this is at present only speculation, if true, it means that the spread of Islam to East Africa was almost from the beginning associated with the mystical tradition.

There is more certainty about the modern history of sufism in East Africa. In most of the coastal areas and offshore islands, Islam had been well-established before the arrival of brotherhoods at the end of the nineteenth century. In this setting, the orders served to deepen the commitment of Muslims to their religion. Also, they facilitated the integration of newly converted settlers, free persons and slaves, from the interior into coastal society. Through its various institutions and practices, the tariqa met the material and social, as well as spiritual, needs of the residents.

In some coastal areas, nevertheless, the tariqa was the agent for Islam's arrival. This was particularly the case in the Rufiji district, where brotherhoods are today present in virtually every settlement. According to a 1927 government report, the late liwali (the government-appointed headman who looked after the affairs of the Muslim community) of Utete, the district's major town, "was the original Moslem 'missionary' to which he went thirty years ago."[44] Thus, at about the turn of the century or before, Islam was introduced into the area. This liwali was Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Hassan, who at the time of his death in 1924 was the leading Qadiri in the district.[45] In about 1890, Shaykh 'Abd Allah went from his village of Kikale to Zanzibar for religious study and came under the influence of the Qadiri leader Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Umar al-Shirazi; very soon afterward, he became one of his khalifas. After he returned to the mainland, the Germans appointed him liwali, a position he retained under the British.

Amid his administrative duties, Shaykh 'Abd Allah found time for religious activities. Like many coastal districts in the early years of the century, the more-inland areas of Rufiji were less Islamized than those on the coast. By creating his own khalifas who traveled to other towns in the district, Shaykh 'Abd Allah contributed to the

spread of Islam as well as of the Qadiriyya. Though other brotherhoods came to Rufiji, such as the Shadhiliyya and Rifa' iyya, the proselytizing role of the Qadiriyya resulted in its becoming the most popular. The planting and growth of the Qadiriyya coincided with rapid gains for Islam in Rufiji, which was reported in 1913 to be almost entirely Muslim; four years earlier, only about one-third of its inhabitants had adhered to the faith.[46]

Though Kilwa had been a major Muslim center for centuries, there were still at the beginning of the twentieth century ethnic groups in the vicinity of the town that had not been Islamized. The Ngindo, who had been in touch with Muslims through Kilwa and the slave trade for at least a century, began converting in significant numbers near the end of the German period. "The catalyst," in the opinion of the anthropologist A. R. W. Crosse-Upcott, "was the Maji Maji revolt" of 1905-1907.[47] The leaders of the rebellion frequently employed walimu, Muslim teachers, in disseminating the ideology of the Maji Maji cult, and in the process many groups, like the Ngindo, came for the first time into direct contact with Islam. There is no evidence, however, that these clerics explicitly proselytized their religion.

Shortly after the rebellion had been put down, Islam began making major gains. The ideological vacuum created by the defeat of Maji Maji was probably a key reason for Islam's success. As for the specifics of this growth, it seems that brotherhood missionaries were a major factor. Though the connection between the two is not entirely clear, the commitment of the Ngindo to Islam coincided with the institutionalization of the tariqas. Reports on Ngindo religious practices—for example, the widespread celebration in memory of Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani[48] —indicate that the Qadiriyya was most actively involved in this process. In addition to this order, others were also active. In Kilwa, the East African headquarters of the Shadhiliyya, Shaykh Husayn b. Mahmud was able to attract Ngindo, as well as other students in the vicinity, to the school he established in 1910. Many became Shadhilis and returned to their homes to plant the brotherhood and thereby entrench Islam.

Another coastal area where brotherhoods were instrumental in the expansion of Islam was the northern Tanzanian coast and hinterland between Tanga and Bagamoyo. In a 1912 survey of Islam in the Korogwe vicinity (about forty miles inland from Tanga), Anglican missionaries reported optimistically that only a few settlements, such as Korogwe and Mnyuzi, were Muslim strongholds and that most of the adherents were Swahili from the coast.[49] About seven years

later, however, missionaries began reporting from the same area, much to their chagrin, an upsurge in Muslim proselytizing. A government report for 1921 corroborated accounts that Islam was spreading rapidly in this region of the former German possession.[50] The Christians were at a loss to explain the development. Initially, they attributed the conversion to fear on the part of Africans—the Africans were being forced by walimu, or "holy men," from the coast. Also, the Christians felt that the postwar situation and the arrival of the British resulted in an anti-European feeling that was propitious for Islam.

By 1923, new reports from missionaries began to shed light on the actual reasons for the upsurge. The note of an African Christian in the Zigua section of the area is instructive: "Every village has its Moslem teacher, and the Zigua are so keen on becoming teachers that they go to Zanzibar or Bagamoyo or Tanga for instruction by well-known Moslem teachers there. . . . There is an offshoot of a famous Dervish fraternity, that of Abdu-l-Qadir. African dances are abandoned for the Dervish dance or Zikri.[51] Similar reports at this time about the growing popularity of zikri, or dhikr, and other practices suggest that the walimu who were actively proselytizing were probably tariqa officials.[52] Some were from the coast, and others originally from the hinterland became affiliated with brotherhoods while they were on the coast and returned to the area to spread the orders.

In some sections of this northern part of the coast and near interior, brotherhoods followed on the heels of Islam's establishment. Among the Zigua in the Bagamoyo District, for example, the Qadiriyya, which arrived in 1922, did so after a large percentage of the Zigua had already converted to Islam.[53] At the same time, the tariqa, which was taken from Bagamoyo by Shaykh Muhammed Waligane, a son of the traditional ruler, helped strengthen the faithfulness of this group, whose conversion to Islam had been relatively recent.

During the final decade of their rule, the Germans noticed that Islamic activity was more intense not only along the coast but upcountry as well. Among their African troops, they observed that numerous conversions were occurring. One report is of special interest: "At that time [about 1906], three servants who had worked for me for long periods, and had been genuine pagan Wanyamwezi and Wazaramo, suddenly became Mohammedans, to my astonishment, and gave themselves over to frequent and very uncomfortable religious exercises, after successful circumcisions."[54] Quite likely, given the absence of any other such Islamic practices, the "uncomfortable religious exercises" were the dhikr rituals, which involved, at least among the Qadiris, prolonged hyperventilation.

The report from Dodoma, in the 1912 government-conducted survey of Islam, stated that nothing was known of the existence of brotherhoods in the area though Islam was becoming popular. A year later, the official who wrote the report felt compelled to write: "This isn't the case anymore.[55] He had discovered that a "great number of Africans belonged to the Qadiriyya which was established in the town of Mpwapwa in about 1908." There were also followers of the Shadhiliyya and the Rifa' iyya, mainly in the Arab, Nubian, and Baluchi communities. Other communications indicated that Islam was making important gains south of Dodoma, in places such as Mahenge and Songea. Though the reports did not link these developments with tariqas, in these regions of the German East African interior, brotherhoods were known to be active.[56]

The annual reports of the Moravian Missionary Society (Lutheran) provided a sketchy picture of Islam's progress in the Tabora area for the first decades of the twentieth century. They suggested that it was confined to only a few locations, particularly the town of Tabora, "the headquarters of Islam."[57] By 1912, the situation had changed. Whereas the Arabs, the first Muslims in the region, kept their religion to themselves for the most part "today [1912] Islam has changed its mode of procedure."[58] It was being actively proselytized and it was expected to get stronger. Subsequent reports after 1921 confirmed these forecasts. The growth, according to the reports, was due to the "opening up of the interior" by the Germans, the influence of Tabora, and the favorable attitudes of traditional rulers.

The reasons offered by the missionaries to explain Islam's success, though not invalid, were only partially true. According to Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, the most importnat Qadiriyya leader in the Tabora region, Islam did not begin to make significant gains until the arrival of the tariqa in about 1910.[59] As the first locally recruited khalifa and with his headquarters in Tabora, Shaykh Mzee, after about 1920, began traveling to the nearby towns and villages to attract members to the Qadiriyya. He created at least eight khalifas, who spread the tariqa even farther. One town, Sikonge, which the Moravians had always assumed to be a major center of Muslim influence, did not, in fact, become a base for proselytizing until Shaykh Mzee initiated a khalifa there, Shaykh Mwinyigogo b. Mwinyishehe.[60] In the town of Urambo, the missionaries in 1922 thought that Islam was losing out because of a change in attitude of the sultana; after the death of her Muslim husband, it seemed that her interest in the religion was on the wane. However, the efforts of another khalifa, Shaykh Jabiri b. Khamisi, resulted in Urambo becoming a Muslim stronghold. Every

town, in fact, where the Moravians noticed that Islam was influential was a settlement where Shaykh Mzee had visited and established his branch of the Qadiriyya.

North of Tabora, in Shinyanga, the famous Sukuma leader Sultan Makwaya, who had converted to Islam during this era, provided invaluable assistance to the Qadiri khalifa from Dar es Salaam, Shaykh Athman Muki.[61] Makwaya himself does not appear to have become a brotherhood member but he did support both morally and materially the proselytizing of Shaykh Athman, which helped to increase the number of Muslim converts among the chief's people.[62]

Like Tabora, the towns of Ujiji and Kigoma had Muslim communities long before the arrival of the brotherhoods. Other similarities were that Islam by the first decades of the twentieth century had penetrated little into the surrounding villages. Arabs also played a leading role in the communities. After the arrival of the Qadiriyya, in about 1929, Islam began spreading to the rural areas of Ujiji and Kigoma. Shaykh 'Abdul Muhsin Kitumba, the head of one of the two major Qadiriyya branches, was unequivocal on this point: "The tariqa directed the religion—Islam—expanded the religion and brought nonbelievers into the religion. Thus, the religion made progress and it spread everywhere . . . [it] spread into all villages of Kigoma—many became Muslims because of the tariqa. It is the tariqa which attracted many people into Islam."[63]

Owing to their proximity to what was then called the Belgian Congo, Ujiji and Kigoma were the base from which brotherhoods spread into that territory in about 1932.[64] The Qadiriyya, which became known as the Mulidi in Manyema and the former Eastern Province, had the greatest impact. Shaykh Akiba Kangala and Shaykh 'Abd Allah Kitenge were most responsible for the success of the tariqa. Initially, adherents were attracted from within previously Islamized areas. Afterward, however, the brotherhood became the major vehicle for conversion to Islam. As evidence for this, some writers have referred to the activities of Shaykh Hassan b. Amir al-Shirazi of Zanzibar, a Qadiri, who made three trips to the Congo and Ruanda-Burundi in 1948, 1954, and 1957 and won many converts to Islam.[65] Shaykh Hassan stated to me, however, that he made the trips not as a Qadiri khalifa—because he is only a murid and so cannot initiate new members—but simply as a Muslim missionary.[66]

So far, virtually nothing has been said about tariqas and the spread of Islam in Kenya. The reason, quite simply, is that brotherhoods appear to have had little, if any, part in this process. Islam in Kenya, in contrast to the rest of East Africa, particularly Tanzania,

is characterized by relatively little brotherhood activity. The less extensive Islamization of Kenya is not unrelated to this fact.

The tariqa known to exist in Kenya is the 'Alawiyya, the brotherhood that has its base in Lamu and whose membership appears to be based on kin ties. In one sense, the order has played a major role in the dissemination of Islam among some of the near-coastal peoples, such as the Pokomo. Through the mosque college that the tariqa has operated since the end of the nineteenth century, many students received instruction in Islamic studies and later returned to their home areas to teach others.[67] Unlike students in schools run by tariqa leaders in places such as Kilwa and Bagamoyo, however, students at the Lamu school were not encouraged to become members of the 'Alawiyya, giving credence to the view that the 'Alawiyya is indeed an exclusive tariqa.[68] The college was not, therefore, an institution for spreading the brotherhood. Furthermore, the hegemony of the 'Alawiyya in Lamu seems to have prevented other more inclusive tariqas from getting a foothold in the town and elsewhere on the northern coast. As a result, African groups in Kenya that were predominantly Muslim, such as the Pokomo and Galla, did not affiliate with any brotherhoods.

There is some evidence that brotherhoods other than the 'Alawiyya exist in Kenya. In what is now called the Northern District, the majority of the population is Somali. Given the popularity of the Qadiriyya and Salihiyya in southern Somalia, the area contiguous to the Northern District, one may assume that these orders are also present in the district.[69] In Mombasa, groups representing the Qadiriyya, the Shadhiliyya, and the Tijaniyya, a tariqa popular in North and West Africa, are said to be present.[70] It seems that the orders in Mombasa are of recent origin. Though brotherhoods other than the 'Alawiyya no doubt exist in Kenya, their role in the dissemination of Islam is unknown.

If the tariqa, as the evidence seems to show, was the primary means by which Islam penetrated into the East African interior, why was it able to play such a role? Some who are intimate with the Muslim community suggest that the rituals of brotherhoods, particularly the dancing and singing frequently associated with dhikr, had a special appeal to African peoples.[71] Though this might explain at one level the attraction of the tariqas, a more complete explanation is needed in order to understand their appeal. A probable answer for East Africa—until more research is done—is provided by an understanding of the historical role of the sufi order in Islam.

Throughout their history in the Muslim world, brotherhoods had an enormous role in propagating Islam. They appealed to the masses

because of what may be called "the proletarian character of their organization."[72] Although there were gradations within the brotherhoods, an individual's position depended on his or her personal sanctity and not his or her book learning. At the same time, the shaykhs usually exemplified the egalitarian character of the orders through their voluntary poverty and their performance of menial tasks with the murids, the tank-and-file members.

> To all this are added the extensive charitable activities of the orders. . . . The man in the street felt that he was cared for by the dervishes and that he would find help and refuge with them in any emergency. All this seems to be contradicted by the fact that many educated dervish sheikhs rose to high positions, even in politics, and that their learning was explicitly praised. To use this as a counterargument would be to misunderstand the psychology of the masses. The proletarian masses repudiate the "upper classes," whether these are men of wealth or of outstanding intellect. But such repudiation is directed only against those representatives who do not declare their solidarity with the masses. As soon as a man has been acclaimed by a socialistic group as a "leader," although he may be boundlessly rich or a typical "intellectual," he will be accepted and even admired.[73]

The clearest evidence of the egalitarian character of the tariqas in the East African context, in the sense of serving as a vehicle for social mobility for African Muslims, was the overwhelmingly African leadership of the brotherhoods. Virtually every shaykh who was involved in disseminating orders, especially in the hinterland and far interior, was an African. Not until the arrival of tariqas did Africans assume leadership posts in the Sunni community. Traditionally, the shaykhs of 'ilm, the traditional sciences of Islam, had come from the Hadrami Arab population. In the tariqa, it was possible to become a shaykh because of one's piety rather than one's learning. Just as had been the case in West and Central Africa, Islam,therefore, was "nationalized" or "Africanized" through the brotherhood. This, in turn, facilitated the recruitment of new converts to Islam from among the African masses. Thus, Tanzania, the East African country where tariqas had their greatest impact, was also the country where Islam made its biggest gains.

CHAPTER 5

The Sociopolitical Role of the Tariqa

The role of the tariqa in disseminating Islam made it one of the most widespread institutions in the world. The social and political importance of sufi orders, widely recognized, derives from its popularity and influence among the Muslim masses. In East Africa, Tanzania was the country where brotherhoods were most active and where, as a result, Islam made its greatest gains. And in Tanzania the tariqa, almost immediately after its arrival, became a key political institution in the Muslim community.

THE EARLY YEARS OF COLONIALISM

In 1884, Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad, later to become the most famous Qadiriyya leader in East Africa, arrived in Zanzibar after receiving an invitation from Sultan Barghash b. Sa'id. From that year until his assassination (by followers of the Salihiyya in Somalia) in 1909, Shaykh Uways made a number of trips to Zanzibar as the guest of Barghash and his successors, Khalifa and Hamid. He was materially aided by the sultans; this made it possible for him to engage in tariqa activities. As a result, he was able to initiate many khalifas, who later spread the brotherhood throughout East Africa. In one biography of Shaykh Uways, Barghash and Hamid are listed as

his khalifas.[1] All of this was somewhat unusual, especially Barghash and Hamid being Qadiri khalifas. Zanzibar's sultans were strict Ibadi Muslims and so would not normally have encouraged, let alone belonged to, a Sunni institution such as the tariqa.[2]

One reason has been suggested for this peculiar situation. The close ties between Shaykh Uways and the sultans, notably Barghash, resulted from perceived political advantages on the part of Zanzibar's rulers.[3] The Qadiri leader was invited to Zanzibar at the same time that European imperialism was looking covetously at the Busa'id empire. "Hedged in by foreigners, and under constant pressure from them, Sayyid Barghash was ready to use all the political weapons he would find as a means of rallying his old supporters among the Sunni Shafi'is of inner Tanganyika . . . as a center of resistance against European intruders in the interior."[4] Despite some problems with this thesis[5] —that the spread of the Qadiriyya was encouraged by the sultans because of its potential for mobilizing support against European encroachment—if it is correct, then this was the first known instance of political involvement by the sufi order in East Africa.

Just as the Uwaysiyya branch of the Qadiriyya was establishing itself on the coast and other parts of the urban coastal mainland, an incident occurred that prompted the new colonial rulers to notice the brotherhoods for the first time. In 1908, a letter, reputed to be from Mecca, that predicted the end of the world came to the attention of the German authorities.[6] The letter, which had anti-European overtones, had surfaced at a number of coastal and interior towns.

The "Mecca letter affair," as the incident came to be known, caused alarm within the administration, which had just dealt with the Maji Maji revolt of the previous year (1907). The governor of the colony, von Rechenberg, suspected that there was associated with the letter's dissemination an Islamic movement whose ritual was "*zikri* or dervish dance."[7] Furthermore, he thought the movement was pan-Islamic: "The trail leads to Barawa on the Italian Somali Coast. . . . This fits in with the view that Barawa Arabs . . . are the bearers of the movement. A specially watchful eye will have to be kept on Barawa Arabs."

Clearly, the "movement" the governor was unknowingly referring to was the tariqa,and more than likely the Uwaysiyya branch of the Qadiriyya, which had its base in Barawa (or Brava). However, the evidence was far from sufficient to implicate the brotherhood in the opinion of the German adviser on Islamic affairs, C. H. Becker. He felt, on the basis of information he does not cite, that the political significance of brotherhoods in Africa had been exaggerated and that

it was highly unlikely that they were involved in an international pan-Islamic movement. "The Orders themselves do not have an anti-European tendency and, therefore, are not dangerous in German East Africa where the people are harmless and not fanatical. But they have to be controlled, so that the harmony cannot be disturbed by fanatic instigators from outside."[8] In the letter in which he expressed these views, Becker requested that various facts about the Muslim community be collected and sent to him. The control of the brotherhood was no doubt the motive for this suggestion: "I would very much appreciate if investigations could be made about the membership of the leading Muslims in the various Tarikas."

Becker's attitude notwithstanding, there is at least circumstantial evidence that the Qadiriyya was involved in the dissemination of the Mecca letter. For example, the Qadiriyya was established in the town of Mpapwa when the letter was circulated there in 1908.[9] Also, one of the individuals frequently mentioned by the Germans as a key instigator, Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha of Bagamoyo, was a Qadiri murid; he was not a khalifa of Shaykh Uways, however.[10] Another disseminator of the letter, Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad, was clearly a Qadiri khalifa.

Therefore, the government was, understandably, unconvinced of Becker's more skeptical view of tariqa involvement in the incident. Fearful of a new uprising, the German authorities decided about 1909 that dhikr ceremonies should be outlawed.[11] Apparently, they did not want to confront the brotherhood directly; subversion or the threat of it was not given as the reason for the ban. In Bagamoyo, for instance, the pretext was that the rituals caused hoarseness in the voices of school children. In 1911, feeling somewhat more secure, the government decided to lift the ban.

The response of the authorities to the Mecca letter affair from the outset to the lifting of the ban on dhikr reflected the general policy of the Germans toward the Muslim community. That policy, beginning with the first governor, von Soden (1891-1892), had consistently been one of tolerance and impartiality toward Islam. One reason for this approach was suggested by the governor, General von Liebert (1896-1901): "We recognize that the Muslim element is indispensable to the administration."[12] At the German National Colonial Conference held in 1910 (probably in Berlin), the reply of Becker to missionaries who argued for a more pro-Christian policy is also revealing.

> The Government in its policy should not be led by religious, but by national points of view. Is it really true—as has been argued by the missionaries—that

the interests of the State administration in this regard are identical with those of missions? The answer to this question depends upon the judgement we pass on Islam. It must be regarded—at least in East Africa—though hostile to Christianity, as thoroughly capable of development in the direction of modern civilization, if it be brought under the strong influence of European culture.[13]

A more frank assessment of Islam vis-a-vis the "national points of view" was made in 1906 by Carl Peters, the founder of German East Africa.

There is one factor which might fall on our side of the balance, and in the case of a world war might be made useful to us; that factor is Islam. And if German policy is bold enough, it can fashion the dynamite to blow into the air the rule of the Western powers from Morocco to Calcutta.[14]

Within almost a decade, Peter's scenario—except for its outcome—proved to have been amazingly prophetic. The colonial officials in 1913 and 1914, however, could not have foreseen what would occur during the First World War. Acting on perceived immediate needs, they made, sometime during these two years, a sharp turnabout from their previously tolerant attitude toward Islam. The new policy was decidedly hostile to Muslims: "All administrative and military servants were officially instructed by the Governor to do all that lay in their power to discountenance the adoption of this faith by the natives within their jurisdiction."[15] Serious consideration was even given to getting Africans to raise pigs in the hope that they would develop a taste for pork and, thus, reject Islam.

The reason for this sudden policy change is not clear. It seems that the 1912 investigation, or survey, of Islam that Becker and others had recommended provided information that raised new fears about a resurgence of Maji Maji. One of the Germans' main concerns in their investigation of the Mecca letter affair was the possibility of its being the basis for a new uprising. This fear was dispelled in part because the authorities had never associated Islam with the original rebellion. In fact, during Maji Maji, some Arabs had been killed by the revolters;[16] this was further evidence in the Germans' view that Islam was not linked with the rebellion.

The survey's finding revealed that Islam was making rapid gains and, significantly, in areas where Maji Maji had been popular, for example, the Rufiji and Ngindo regions. Whether officials at the highest administrative level began making inferences is not known, but there was evidence that could have linked Islam with the rebellion. Muslim clerics, or walimu, played a role in spreading the movement's ideology by helping the lieutenants of Maji Maji administer their initiation rituals.[17] Among the Ngindo, people were told by the

walimu that, if they did not become adherents, they might be eaten. Furthermore, the conversion of the Ngindo to Islam dates from the revolt.[18] Finally, in view of the role of the brotherhoods in proselytizing Islam and the extent of Qadiriyya adherence among the Ngindo today, it is more than plausible that the tariqa did have some role in the uprising.

Though some reports from the field concluded that Muslims constituted no threat to German rule,[19] others explicitly recommended that steps be taken to curtail Islam's expansion. The district officer at Bagamoyo was in the latter category: "Although I should not like to go so far [as] to impute to Islam a staunch anti-European and aggressive tendency as an intrinsic characteristic . . . I am in favor of any measures suitable to impair and stop Islamic teachings which impede any healthy cultural progress, for the benefit of the Christian and Germanic culture."[20] Since the central government could not have been unaware of the revolt of the so-called "Mad Mullah" in nearby Somalia (1899-1920) and the rebellion a few decades earlier in the Sudan of the Mahdi (1881-1885), both inspired by Islam, such recommendations must have been taken seriously. The institution of the new administration of Governor Schnee (1912-1916) no doubt facilitated a sharp policy change.

At the time the colonial administration began implementing the new policy, the First World War had just started. The war resulted in another policy reversal along the lines of Carl Peters's earlier forecast. With the Ottoman Empire as an ally, Germany sought to use this Islamic connection to its advantage in the East African campaign of the war. A few years earlier, in 1911, the German authorities in Dar es Salaam noted with much interest the response of Muslims throughout East Africa to the invasion of the Ottoman Empire by Italy. Mass protests were staged in coastal and upcountry towns in opposition to the invasion, and money was raised for the families of dead Arab and Turkish soldiers. At Zanzibar, where six to seven thousand Muslims demonstrated, a report mentioned that "many bands of Arabs and Swahilis had 'holy flags' with them."[21] The significance of this is that tariqas are the only Islamic groups that display flags.

Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Germans recognized that there was a reservoir of sentiment among Muslims that could be employed in opposing the British armies that began to move against their positions in East Africa. This was the reason why Governor Schnee, under the direction of Berlin, initiated the campaign in March 1915 to publicize the fact that the Ottoman sultan Muhammad V had proclaimed a holy war against the Allied forces. Thousands of

leaflets were circulated throughout the colony announcing the holy war and exhorting Muslims to fight on the side of the Central Powers. According to the sultan's fatwa, any Muslims who aided the enemy armies would be "scourged by God because they are doing harm to the Khalif of Islam."[22] As a sign of the German-Islamic alliance, local authorities flew the Ottoman and German flags alongside each other atop mosque minarets and other prominent locations.[23]

In addition to circulating the leaflets, the government contacted directly Muslim leaders considered to be loyal.[24] One of the purposes of the 1912 survey was to determine who the government could depend on in the Muslim community. The follow-up report in 1914 from Dodoma mentioned that the head of the Qadiriyya in Mpapwa was a detective of the district administration; that the leading Rifa'i was "supported by the district office and [had] never let arise suspicion on his loyalty;"[25] and that the Shadhiliyya leader had been a longtime tax collector for the government. In locations where brotherhood leaders had friendly relations with the Germans—the 1913-1914 anti-Islamic policy notwithstanding—it is likely that they helped by spreading word of the holy war as well as by resisting the British war efforts.

One can only speculate at this time on the effects that such participation had on Muslims who did aid the Germans. It is possible that the involvement imbued Islam with a more aggressive and confident character. This might explain what Christian missionaries often described as the vigorous and anti-European nature of Islamic proselytizing that they encountered in the early years of British rule, the period when Islam made its greatest gains.[26] Having been mobilized to wage a holy war, Muslims may easily have concluded that the struggle was not only in opposition to the British but also against Christianity and for the expansion of Islam.

COMMUNITY POLITICS

Given the early history of tariqas in Tanzania, analyzing whatever territorywide political significance they had has been problematic for historians. At the local level, however, they often exercised considerable influence.[27] This power rested on their tendency to be the organizational expression of sectarian interests, or cleavages, in a community. The fundamental cleavage in Swahili society outlined in chapter 2— watu wa weusi versus watu wa weupe, "blacks" versus "whites"— was also reflected in the brotherhoods.

Shaykh Zahur B. Muhammad, originally from Brava and a khalifa of Shaykh Uways, lived in Tabora from 1894 to 1908.[28] During these

years, he was active in laying the groundwork for the tariqa by teaching the dhikr ritual; he did not, however, institute a formal organization or initiate new members into the Qadiriyya. His activities came to the attention of the German colonial government when the leading Ibadi Arabs of the town (one of whom, Sulayman b. Zuhayr, had befriended him at the outset of his stay) began to complain about him. Through dhikr ceremonies, it seems that Shaykh Zahur had become increasingly popular with the African masses of the town, especially the Manyema, many of whom were former slaves. His popularity was due mainly to his egalitarian attitude, which contrasted sharply with the behavior of the condescending Ibadi Arabs. "Although white," as one African explained, "he was very friendly with Manyema and Africans and ate with them and carried his own things instead of [acting] like a master."[29]

An incident in August 1908, when Shaykh Zahur had apparently been successful in his rainmaking activities, so angered the Arabs, who had been previously unsuccessful, that they asked the German district administrator in Tabora to expel him. The government, which at that time viewed Shaykh Zahur's growing influence as part of an incipient movement to undermine their position—he was suspected of having spread the Mecca letter—complied immediately with the Arabs' demand and exiled him to Zanzibar.[30] This did not end his influence in Tabora; shortly afterward he was expelled, he sent a khalifa of his, Shaykh Tinay b. Juma, from Zanzibar to begin initiating members into the Qadiriyya. Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji was one of the initiates.

This incident suggests that the Arab-African cleavage existed in Tabora. Although this schism predated the arrival of the tariqa, Shaykh Zahur's dhikr activities, which became a pole of attraction for one side and a threat to the other, brought the cleavage into public view. Furthermore, the opponents of the practitioners of dhikr were Europeans as well as Arabs, that is, "whites" in the widest sense of the term.

Some years later, in 1934, another incident that disrupted Tabora's Muslim community may well have been a continuation in some form of the earlier dispute. The main issue that divided the antagonists, who were called the Left Hand and the Right Hand, was whether or not women should be allowed to pray in the Friday mosque.[31] Another point of contention was the use of drumming in the mosque. The Left Hand party campaigned for both women and drums, leading to a confrontation with the more conservative Right Hand party that required at one point the stationing of government troops near the mosque.

The suspicion that this dispute reflected the African-Arab cleavage, like that seen in 1908, is based on similar disputes elsewhere that involved orthodox religious practices versus innovations. Because Arabs in almost every community were the original Muslims, they tended to see themselves as the guardians of orthodoxy and were, therefore, less tolerant of innovations that more likely to be employed by new African converts. For example, in traditional African society, as opposed to what occurred in Arab culture, women participated more equally in religious activities. Drumming, of course, was almost essential in traditional African rituals.

Two factors suggest that tariqas were involved in the dispute. One was that efforts to introduce innovations such as those in the 1934 controversy were often spearheaded by sufi orders.[32] In many Tanzanian Muslim communities, the tariqa provided the only opportunity for women to participate in religious rituals. Another factor was that at the height of the dispute the colonial officials prohibited dhikr ceremonies in Tabora; the ban was lifted after a brief period.[33] Often, the rationale for such a ban was the claim that the ceremonies posed a potential threat to law and order.

At about the same time that Tabora was beset with strife, to the north in Bukoba the Muslim community was having a similar dispute. Again, the issue was whether or not women and drums could be part of religious ceremonies.[34] This time the ritual was dhikr itself, so the tariqa was clearly involved. The older and more conservative party, which objected to the changes, was led by a sharif, (an Arab), while the proponents of the innovations were led by a Ugandan (an African). The rift was no doubt a manifestation of the African-Arab cleavage "and the struggle of the African town dwellers to obtain some sort of influence."[35] The fact that the controversy continued in various forms well into the 1950s attests to its having been a reflection of a basic social division within the community.

There were two other documented incidents similar to the Bukoba and Tabora controversies. Based on available sources, however, it is less certain that they involved both brotherhoods and the African-Arab cleavage. One, which occurred in Lindi in 1934, resulted from an attempt by younger adherents of an unspecified tariqa to introduce modifications in the dhikr rituals. The conflict pitted two branches of the order against one another—younger members in opposition to older, conservative ones. Of special interest is the fact that "temporal matters extraneous to the religious issue were freely introduced into the dispute and for a period feeling between the two factions was seriously exacerbated."[36] Another quarrel broke out in

1945 between the liwali and the qadi of the town. The new dispute, according to the district officer, "led to widening of the breach between the two opposing Moslem factions." An outside arbitrator, Shaykh Ali b. Hemedi, who was not a member of a tariqa, was brought in by the government to settle the dispute.

The factions referred to in the 1945 report were probably the same tariqa parties involved in the 1934 dispute. This is suggested by an earlier conflict in 1910 that concerned the qadi, Shaykh 'Umar b. Jamal al-Din, an Arab, whom the government retired in 1945 in an attempt to solve the conflict of that year. In the 1910 situation, the qadi convicted his brother, Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim, a Qadiri leader in Lindi, of deviating from stict orthodoxy; among other "deviations," he championed the admittance of women to the mosque.[37] Also, the qadi's two sons were accused of introducing "scandalous" innovations into orthodox ceremonies. Since the qadi was also involved in the 1945 controversy, and assuming that his attitudes and interests remained unchanged, then it seems more than plausible that the events of 1910 were not unrelated to those in subsequent years.[38]

As in Tabora and Bukoba, there were apparently more fundamental issues underlying the conflict. Furthermore, the disputes seemed to center on the tariqa through the dhikr rituals. What is not clear is whether the African-Arab cleavage was the basic issue. If the "women issue" is any indication,[39] then the 1910 quarrel, like the later ones in Tabora and Bukoba, probably did pit the conservative Arabs against Africans who favored changes in orthodoxy; the fact that the leadership of the African faction was Arab (Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim and the two sons of the qadi)—a situation similar to Shaykh Zahur's participation in Tabora—does not invalidate this interpretation. Therefore, assuming that the disputes that arose in 1934 and 1945 were a continuation of the earlier one, then there is some probability that the tariqa in Lindi served as an organizational focus of the African-Arab cleavage.

The second incident took place in Ujiji in 1935. In June, the government learned that a quarrel was brewing between two "rival factions," the Arabiani and Watanganyika, over the celebration of the Mawlid, the Prophet's birthday.[40] The origins of the parties, both of which had branches in Tabora and perhaps other far-inland towns, is uncertain. Sometime in the 1930s, they were born and quickly gained considerable influence as interest and welfare groups.[41] As their names suggest, one represented or was oriented towards Arabs or Arab values, while the other was the party of Africans and, more frequently, urban Manyema.

The specific dispute arose when the Arabiani party wanted the Bravanese Qadiri khalifa, Shaykh Sufi b. Muhammad (Shaykh Zahur's brother), and Muhammad b. Yusuf, a Baluchi of Bagamoyo, to have a prominent role in the ceremonies. The Watanganyika evidently objected and countered by bringing in Shaykh Husayn b. Juma, a Manyema, of Dar es Salaam.[42] Fearful that a violent confrontation might occur, the district officer put the police on alert. After a one-day delay, an agreement was reached between both organizations and the Mawlid was observed.

Clearly, this incident reflected the African-Arab cleavage. Whether tariqas were involved is questionable. Shaykh Sufi's presence certainly suggests that the brotherhoods were implicated in some manner. In addition to his having traveled to Ujiji in about 1929 to establish a branch of the Qadiriyya, there is other circumstantial evidence. A few years earlier, Shaykh Sufi, his brother Zahur, and Muhammad b. Yusuf had tried unsuccessfully on different occasions to undermine the influence of the major Qadiri leader of the town, Shaykh Ramiya.[43] In place of Shaykh Ramiya, who was a Manyemma (an African), they had hoped to make either Shaykh Sufi or his brother the leading Qadiri. Another indication of probable tariqa involvement in the Ujiji incident was that Mawlid activities in many Muslim communities, including this far-inland town, were usually organized by the brotherhoods. One should not assume, however, that the Watanganyika and Arabiani parties and the brotherhoods were the same organizations. It was probably the case that the leaders of opposing tariqas or, more likely, rival branches of the tariqa (the Qadiriyya) played a central role in each party.

Through observing these various disputes, the British eventually became familiar with the sufi brotherhood. Shortly after the Bukoba controversy erupted, an incident occurred in another town that resulted in probably the first and only policy statement on tariqas by the British government. One evening in July 1933, a procession of singing Qadiriyya and 'Askariyya murids, while proceding to a village near Morogoro for dhikr ceremonies, was attacked by a group of Christians.[44] The administration's opinion was that two priests from the Holy Ghost Mission provoked the incident, and the district officer decided to punish them with a fine; a puisne judge, however, overturned the decision. Coming on the heels of the Bukoba dispute, this incident, though not directly related to dhikr rituals, prompted the administration to take a position on the ceremonies and indirectly on the sufi orders.

On December 18, 1933, the government in Dar es Salaam issued a

confidential circular entitled "Zikri," which was forwarded to the commissioner of police and to all provincial commissioners. The substance of the notice regarding the rituals said that their performance in public should be subject to "some measure of control" and that "no considerations should be allowed to enter into the matter other than those affecting public order. Each case should be dealt with by the local authorities on its merits by means of the provisions of the existing laws."[45] A note accompanying the circular, which was to assist local administrators in deciding on any future disputes, contained extracts from a book opposed to the usual forms of dhikr rituals. In some localities, such as Bagamoyo and Tabora, administrators interpreted both statements to mean that the ceremonies should be banned.

Of more immediate concern to our analysis is the administrative opinion that served as a basis for the policy statement. Particularly interesting is the note entitled "Thikr," which was submitted by the provincial commissioner for the Eastern Province in Dar es Salaam about the performance of dhikr in his province, which included the Bagamoyo, Kisarawe, Rufiji, Morogoro, Kilosa, and Ulanga districts. From the beginning of this note, it is clear that the commissioner was unsympathetic to dhikr, which he called "a debased form of the religious rite."[46] According to him, the rituals had only been observed in the coastal areas at that time. He was aware that there was some sort of organizational basis for dhikr, which was under the leadership of shaykhs, who, he said, were usually Africans. At the same time, on the basis of opinions solicited from Muslim leaders in Zanzibar, he said that "the methods and system of these Thikri groups and their so-called Sheikhs was [*sic*] deprecated by all orthodox Mohammedans . . . and no Arab or Somali is found taking part in any of the groups." Believing that he had correctly characterized the groups and their leaders in terms of Islamic religious ideals, the commissioner then suggested how the government should view the dhikr parties.

> It is questionable whether the influence of these "Sheikhs" over their converts and adherents is desirable. Some are men of no substance who, under the guise of religion, appear to make a business of Thikri and hold considerable sway over their followers, and who themselves are more often than not drawn from the less attractive sections of the community. . . . While it is the policy of Government not to interfere with any form of religious observance not actively repugnant to morals or a public nuisance, the fact should not be lost sight of that the influence of these groups over their followers may not be purely religious . . . where such organizations of semi-educated Africans

exist the possibility of communistic or other subversive influences being introduced should be kept in view.[47]

Although never referred to by name, it is patently clear that the tariqa—with its shaykhs, murids, and rituals—is the subject of the commissioner's note. It is not clear whether the opinion of this official was representative of administrative sentiment about the orders. Nevertheless, the confidential circular and its implementation do to some extent reflect this kind of thinking. It is interesting to note that one of the places where dhikr was temporarily banned following the issuance of the circular, Bagamoyo, was under the jurisdiction of the commissioner.

The African-Arab cleavage was not the only social division that underlay disputes involving tariqas. In communities where the Arab presence was insignificant, brotherhoods were more likely to be the organizational manifestation of divisions in which Africans were the antagonists. The Rufiji District during the 1920s and 1930s had a number of such cases.

Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Hassan, the leading Qadiri in Rufiji until his death in 1924, was also the liwali (the government-appointed hea headman of the African community) of the major town in the district, Utete, which made him the most important non-European in the local administration. As head of the largest tariqa in Rufiji, and with the prestige and influence that accrued from such a position, his job as liwali was no doubt made considerably easier. At the same time, the authority he had as liwali enhanced and strengthened his religious status.

Shortly after Shaykh 'Abd Allah's death, the government learned that in a number of villages around the town of Mbwera in the Rufiji District local shaykhs were competing strongly with each other for influence.[48] The administrators discovered that the local headmen were only nominal village heads and that the shaykhs exercised real leadership. Though the initial reports did not explicitly say these leaders were shaykhs of the brotherhoods, reports made in subsequent years did suggest tariqa involvement. The annual report for 1934 makes that point.

Native administration in the Rufiji has as heretofore been fraught with difficulty, the principal reason being that there are no real tribal authorities hereditarily vested with power. In addition to this, each area possesses several Mohammedan propagandists [Waalim], each with his adherents and a banner, and each owing allegiance to a sheikh. The natives are divided between their chiefs and their "Waalim" to the detriment of discipline. It is of course only natural that the natives prefer to follow . . .their "Waalim" with his

banner than to attend their chief's tax meetings. There is no doubt as to the disloyalty of some of the "Waalim" to the native authorities.[49]

Clearly, the religious leaders described here are tariqa heads since they were the only ones who had banners or flags that adherents followed.

The tensions and conflicts among the shaykhs on the one hand and between the shaykhs and the native authorities on the other may be explained as a consequence of Shaykh 'Abd Allah's death; certainly, this was the case for the town of Kikale. There the successor to Shaykh 'Abd Allah for the Qadiriyya's leadership, Shaykh 'Umar b. Hassan, was challenged by another khalifa of Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Umar, the Qadiri head in Zanzibar who had initiated Shaykh 'Abd Allah.[50] The challenger, Shaykh Muhammad Shamte, however, had earlier been disavowed by Shaykh 'Ali because of a disagreement and had obtained the patronage of another shaykh. He then sought to extend his influence in Kikale. This led to a prolonged conflict in the town when the followers of Shaykh 'Abd Allah were commanded by Shaykh 'Ali to reject Shaykh Muhammad Shamte and support only Shaykh 'Umar. It is unclear whether there was a more basic reason for this dispute, but it is almost certain that it affected local government in the African community. To the extent that the Kikale rift spread to other areas in Rufiji, the situation that the 1939 report described about native administration in the district very likely was the result of strife in one branch of the Qadiriyya.

The formulation of the 1933 policy on dhikr and brotherhoods came none too soon, for within a year local administrators had to deal with another controversy in which Africans were antagonists. The administration learned about this situation through a letter written to the district officer in Dar es Salaam by the 'Askariyya leader, Shaykh Idris b. Sa'ad.[51] The letter complained of various efforts made by rivals in Dar es Salaam to thwart his leadership as head of the 'Askariyya and the discriminatory policies of the local council in the nearby town of Ruvu against the performance of dhikr by his adherents. The administration had been aware of the Dar es Salaam conflict for some time. Whether Shaykh Idris's position was being challenged by shaykhs from other orders is unclear.

The complaint about discrimination, on the other hand, specifically dealt with brotherhood competition and local politics, although the details are lacking. What seems to have happened at Ruvu was that the traditional authorities sided with the Qadiriyya and denied the 'Askariyya permission to have their dhikr ceremonies. While the district officer felt that this was necessary to preserve the peace, Shaykh

Idris held the opinion that shaykhs of the Qadiriyya in Dar es Salaam had conspired with the traditional rulers in denying his murids freedom to perform their rituals. It is interesting to note that conflict between the two orders, the reasons for which are not clear, flared up in Mahenge in Ulanga District a few years later.[52]

One of the few attempts to describe systematically the role of tariqas in local cleavages is found in the work of Ann Patricia Caplan.[53] Her recent study, which looks at power and kinship in a small village on Mafia Island, also illustrates how cleavages among Africans[54] can be expressed through the tariqa. In the village, two branches of the Qadiriyya, which were controlled by close relatives of two descent groups, were operating, and virtually everyone in the community was a member of one or the other. Originally, affiliation to a particular shaykh of either one did not follow descent lines, but over the years the situation changed to such an extent that membership became almost exclusively based upon clan lines. The two clans that constituted the leadership core of the two branches of the tariqa had once belonged to the same descent group, but one of them broke away from the other and established itself in a different quarter of the village. Regarding the breakaway group, Caplan suggested that "it is possible that they seized on the *tarika* societies as a method of demonstrating their independence, and rejecting the dominance of the parent . . . group. *Tarika* affiliation thus reflects an important cleavage in [the] society."[55]

The major difference between the two descent groups in terms of religion that was reflected in the attitudes of the two tariqa branches is that the breakaway clan was more tolerant of traditional and popular practices than the parent clan. As a result, the leadership of the brotherhood that came from the parent clan had higher socioreligious status, because of its claim to greater orthodoxy, than the tariqa leaders associated with the breakaway group. At the same time, the brotherhood of the breakaway group was larger than that of the parent clan. Nevertheless, the higher status that followed from their more orthodox orientation and, in addition, their higher rate of mosque attendance gave tariqa leaders of the parent clan disproportionately greater access to the political posts in the village. Though high socioreligious status in general was the main factor in obtaining political power, holding a post in the tariqa was an important specific expression of such status in the context of Mafia society. Caplan's study shows, therefore, that the sufi order can be a significant mechanism for enhancing an individual's sociopolitical status as well as the organizational expression of social cleavages.

The fundamental divisions between Africans and Arabs or, as in the Mafia case, Africans and Africans were frequently the bases for disputes and controversies in Swahili society. As the most highly structured and hierarchical religious institution in many communities, the tariqa often became the vehicle for expressing these cleavages. This tendency of the brotherhoods challenges the somewhat simplistic view of Islam as an integrative mechanism in Muslim society. Rather than uniting all Muslims, Islam—through the tariqa—joins together some Muslims often for the purpose of opposing others.

THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS

The social and political importance of the sufi orders in Tanzania has been revealed most often at the local level. This does not mean that issues of national significance were irrelevant to the brotherhoods. The major issue during the final decade of colonial rule, the struggle for independence, affected all Muslims, including those who belonged to tariqas. African nationalism, the ideology of the struggle, expressed itself in the religious sphere as well as the secular political sphere.

The local disputes based on the African-Arab cleavage that involved the tariqa were primarily manifestations of nascent African nationalism in the religious arena. Since brotherhoods were basically local institutions, it is likely that the expression of this ideology in Islam would have taken a different organizational form on the national level. Little documentation exists, unfortunately, that provides definitive support for such an assumption. There was, nonetheless, a development in the African Muslim community in 1934 that is relevant to this issue. In that year, a group of coastal Africans formed the Muslim Association of Tanganyika.[56] A nationwide organization, the East African Muslims Association, then existed whose purpose it was to unite all Muslims, irrespective of ethnicity. Africans, it seems, became disenchanted with it because of what they saw as discrimination on the part of the Indians in the association. Specifically, the Indian members established their own Islamic schools under the auspices of another organization—schools that evidently did not admit African children. There were also other quarrels between Indian and African Muslims in a number of locales.[57]

Until this schism, Africans had worked closely with other Muslims and apparently had assumed that there was unity in the entire Muslim community. Indian leaders had always emphasized that all adherents of Islam were brethren, irrespective of their race and

ethnicity.[58] Africans seem to have been sincerely surprised by the Indian decision to establish their own schools. The formation, therefore, of the Muslim Association of Tanganyika, which was possibly the first manifestation of African nationalism at the colonywide level in the ranks of Islam, was basically a reaction to the exclusiveness of the Indians. It is not certain whether the African move was also directed against Arabs, but the fact that the new group was explicitly for Africans suggests that this may have been the case (Arabs did have their own organization, called the Arab Association).

What is of particular interest about the Muslim Association of Tanganyika is that its founders were generally the same people who were the leaders of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA),[59] the first colonywide African interest group (founded about 1929) and the forerunner of the party that led the struggle for independence, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The TAA's leadership was composed of civil servants educated in the West and influential community leaders—including a number of retail merchants—mainly from Dar es Salaam.[60] It is doubtful that Muslim religious leaders and, more specifically, tariqa heads took part in the national leadership of the TAA. In various locales, however, brotherhood leaders and other Muslims were quite active in the organization. Other than what this study presents (see chapter 8), very little is known about the motives and the other details of tariqa involvement in the TAA in specific communities. At the colonywide level, nevertheless, the fact that the individuals who formed what was probably the first Muslim organization for Africans were the same people who led the TAA strongly suggests that the former undertaking was inspired by the same sentiment as the latter, nascent African nationalism.

In 1954, the TAA became TANU, the change in name symbolic of a change in orientation from a lobbying organization to a political party whose primary task was to win independence. From that time until the end of colonialism in 1961, a number of brotherhood heads, some of whom had been involved in the TAA, actively participated in the nationalist struggle, either as officials of TANU or in cooperation with leaders of the party. Again, as was true with TANU's predecessor, this activity was virtually always at the local level.

The major role of tariqas in the independence movement was mobilizing support for TANU. Aside from Bagamoyo, there were many locations where influential brotherhood leaders utilized their organizations in this effort. In Dar es Salaam, the heads of the Shadhiliyya, 'Askariyya, and Ahmadiyya-Dandarawiyya—respectively, Shaykh

'Abd Allah Chaurembo, Shaykh Hashur, and Shaykh Hyder—provided invaluable assistance to TANU owing to their influence in the capital.[61] The same thing can be said of Shaykh 'Abdul Muhsin Kitumba of the Qadiriyya in Ujiji. In the Tabora region, Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji was instrumental before and after independence in TANU's success in undermining the power of important chiefs who opposed the party During the postcolonial period, many of these leaders were rewarded for their services with important posts at the national and local levels. The head of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo, for example, became one of the three ombudsmen for the nation. There seem to be some parallels to this development in Zanzibar after the revolution; the nominal head of the Husaniyya branch of the Qadiriyya, Shaykh Muhyi al-Din b. 'Ali b. 'Umar became a member of the Revolutional Council and a member of Parliament.[62]

All African Muslims did not unite behind TANU. Though the overwhelming majority backed the party—in the hope that independence would allow Muslims to obtain influence and to redress the inequities of colonialism, which gave Christians better educational opportunities and, thus, jobs—some for the same reasons thought it would be better if Muslims had their own organization.

The issue of education had long been a major concern of African Muslims during the British era.[63] Under the Germans, when elementary schools were provided by the government (Christian missionaries had even complained that the state schools had undermined their own), Muslims in particular were more likely to patronize the government schools.[64] For this reason, they were able to obtain low-level positions in the administration that required some degree of Western secular education.

The British, however, pursued a different policy; they encouraged the Christians to be the primary providers of Western education. Because proselytizing was an ulterior motive of such schools, most Muslims were reluctant to send their children to them. Traditional Islamic education, through the elementary quranic schools and advanced madrasas, could not compete in personnel or funding with the foreign-supported Christian schools. Coupled with the tendency of Christians to avoid traditional Islamic strongholds such as coastal settlements, the less-advantageous educational opportunities of African Muslims meant that they had less access to Western education and, therefore, less chance of filling low-level civil service posts. Near the end of colonial rule, when more Africans were brought into the administration, Muslims became more conscious of their lack of opportunities. Most viewed independence as a chance for Muslims to

get better education, both secular and religious, and threw their support behind TANU. It was, in fact, their lack of secular education that brought Muslims much sooner to TANU's ranks than Christians;[65] Christians were more likely to be employed by the government and so were prevented from joining the nationalist struggle.

Though many Muslims were active in TANU, the national leadership of the party had a disproportionate number of Christians, including the head, Julius Nyerere, a Roman Catholic. To some Muslims TANU seemed a party of Christians that would not serve the interests of Islam. This sentiment was the prime motive in the formation in 1957 of the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). This organization was not intended to be a political party but rather a pressure group that would lobby with the government to improve the social status of Muslims. The suspicions that AMNUT supporters held about TANU increased to such a degree that, as it became clearer that Nyerere's party would inherit power from the British, the new Islamic organization took the position that independence should be delayed until Muslims had reached parity with Christians in educational attainments.[66] During the year preceding independence, when TANU shared power with the British, the AMNUT attempted to win over religious leaders in different locales to their position, but with little success. In Kondoa, for example, fifty-one shaykhs publicly declared opposition to the delaying strategy.[67]

The strongest support for the AMNUT was in the capital, Dar es Salaam. One of its leaders, Shaykh Hussayn b. Juma, a prominent resident of the capital, was at the same time the head of the United Tanganyika party, a government-supported alternative to TANU that advocated proportional representation based on race. In Dar es Salaam, nevertheless, its support began to wane as both leading and rank-and-file members began to question the wisdom of its policy on independence.[68] TANU was also able to rally the majority of the shaykhs in the capital to its side and in opposition to the AMNUT. In late 1960, forty-three shaykhs gave their written support to the TANU and denounced the AMNUT.[69] The organization became discredited in the eyes of many and, by 1963, it was moribund. On a few occasions, the government threatened to ban it for its sectarianism.[70] This no doubt made other Muslims even more wary of affiliating with it and contributed further to its demise.

Although the AMNUT ceased to exist after independence, the sentiment underlying its establishment, the felt need for a Muslim interest group, did not disappear. Another organization, the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), which was formed in Mombasa in

1945 through the initiative of the Isma'ili Khoja sect and its head the Aga Khan, appears to have attracted to its Tanganyika branch many of the AMNUT's former supporters. Africans who had sentiments similar to those of the AMNUT's and religious leaders who had opposed TANU and were still leery of the government's concern for Muslims were also attracted to the society. Although the organization harbored many of its opponents, the government tolerated and even sought to work with the EAMWS since, in its opinion, the society was the most authoritative body that spoke on behalf of the Muslim community.

The apparently amicable relations between the TANU-led government and the society came to an abrupt end at the end of 1968. In December of that year, the administration banned the EAMWS, and, according to well-informed sources, twenty-one shaykhs (many of whom were from Dar es Salaam and had been active in the society) were arrested and detained. In addition, Shaykh Hassan b. Amir, probably the most popular religious leader in East Africa at the time and a supporter of the EAMWS, was exiled to Zanzibar from the capital. Shaykh Hassan's banishment (he was then about eighty-five years old) angered many Muslims in Dar es Salaam who believed that the government's actions were unwarranted. A very reliable source who sided with the administration and was intimately involved in these events claims that the ban on the society and Shaykh Hassan was necessary because the group was spearheading an attempt to overthrow Nyerere's government. The official reason given for the ban (the arrests and banishment of Shaykh Hassan were never made public) was that the aims of the EAMWS were incompatible with Tanzania's path toward development. In a speech elaborating on this, then Vice-President Shaykh Abeid Karume of Zanzibar "unmasked it [the society] as an instrument of the big bourgeoisie and capitalists exploiting the workers and peasants of the country."[71]

At about the same time the government was preparing to crack down on the EAMWS, it gave encouragement to a new organization that had just been established. This group, the Baraza Kuuwa Waislam wa Tanzania (BAKWATA), the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, was quickly recognized by the government as the only legitimate organ in the country responsible for Muslim affairs. The BAKWATA now administers all educational projects, including the new Islamic center in the capital, which was funded largely by the United Arab Republic. Because of the residue of resentment about the EAMWS and Shaykh Hassan, the BAKWATA, which gave full support to the government, ran into some hositlity, especially in Dar es Salaam.[72]

Many accused it of simply being a front for the administration. Outside Dar es Salaam, it found greater acceptance. By 1973, even in the capital, some former critics of the government were backing the new group.[73]

It is uncertain what role, if any, brotherhoods had in the events surrounding the AMNUT and the EAMWS. None of the major leaders in the AMNUT seem to have been tariqa leaders. In Dar es Salaam, where the AMNUT had its greatest influence, major brotherhood heads seem to have been very pro-TANU or at least neutral in the competition between both organizations. The AMNUT had been unsuccessful for the most part in gathering strength outside the capital. The reason may possibly be traced to the widely acknowledged support that tariqa heads gave to TANU in most areas and to the AMNUT's inability to overcome the influence of the shaykhs. In the larger and more heterogeneous city of Dar es Salaam, it was probably easier than in a smaller town to build an opposition group to TANU.

As for the EAMWS, it too seems to have gotten little or no support from brotherhood leaders. Although a Qadiri, Shaykh Hassan was not a khalifa and was not recognized as a tariqa head but rather as a Muslim missionary.[74] On the other hand, one of the major opponents of the society, Shaykh 'Abd 'Allah Chaurembo, had been a Shadhili leader in Dar es Salaam. The EAMWS, also, had its greatest influence in the capital and not in areas where the tariqas had hegemony. Finally, if the thesis regarding African nationalism in Islam is correct, the large participation of Indian and Arab Muslims in the society may have made it less attractive to groups that had deep roots in the African community, in this case, the tariqas. It is interesting to note regarding this last point that the government drew on the nationalist sentiment in its denunciation of the EAMWS; because the Isma'ili community was the major contributor to the group, it was suggested that Africans were not controlling their own organization.[75]

The apparent absence of tariqas from the ranks of TANU's opponents suggests that the support that they gave the party in the period of the nationalist struggle was still operative at least during the first decade of independence. That endorsement rested originally on the expectation that independence would indeed mean a new deal for Muslims. In theory, then, the maintenance of that support will depend on whether such aspirations are fulfilled. I will return later to this very important issue.

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PART III
Islam and Politics in Bagamoyo

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CHAPTER 6

Social Structure in a Swahili Community

My focus until this chapter has been Muslim East Africa as a whole. To adequately explain the relationship between Islam and politics, however, it is necessary to get a more intimate view of Swahili society. This can best be done by looking at a particular community. Bagamoyo, a small coastal town north of Dar es Salaam, recognized since the nineteenth century as a leading center of Islam in East Africa, is particularly suited for undertaking this kind of inquiry. Over 95 percent of its ethnically heterogeneous population (there are more than 100 ethnic groups, according to the 1957 census) are Sunni Muslims. In addition, Bagamoyo is the headquarters of one of the three branches of the Qadiriyya tariqa, which may be the largest in East Africa.

A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The town began with what was probably a small fishing village on a section of the East African coast known as the Mrima. At some point in the site's history, a Shirazi element called the Shomvi became its rulers. Their rule goes back at least to the seventeenth century. One of the important events in the town's history was the successful defeat of a party of Kamba raiders by the Shomvi in cooperation with a nearby ethnic group known as the Zaramo. The cordial relations

that resulted between the two became strained when Sultan Majid of Zanzibar (who ruled between 1856 and 1870) began to exert influence over the town. During the 1870s, under Sultan Barghash, the tensions were exacerbated until the Zaramo and Shomvi recognized they had common interests against the sultan and his representative in Bagamoyo, the liwali. Local politics during much of the second half of the nineteenth century were characterized by the shifting interests of these three parties.

Overshadowing the political tensions was the emerging economic importance of the town. As the terminus of a major caravan route on the mainland, Bagamoyo by mid-century became one of the most important trading centers in East Africa. The major trade commodities were ivory and, ot a lesser extent, slaves. The town's population before 1885 is estimated to have been about 5,000 inhabitants. Owing to Bagamoyo's importance, the Holy Ghost Order established in 1868 on the outskirts of the town the first Roman Catholic mission station on the East African mainland.

The Africans, the largest racial group, included various nearby peoples such as the Zaramo, Kwere, Zigua, and Luguru and upcountry groups such as the Nyamwezi, Manyema, and Sukuma, who had generally come to the area either as slaves or as caravan porters. The other ethnic groups besides the Africans were the Arabs, both Hadrami and Omani, Baluchi (who had been brought in mostly by the sultan as soldiers), and various Indian communities (who were divided along religious lines, including the Hindus, Ismaili, Ithnaasheri, Bohora, Memon, and Catholic Goans). The merchants, who profited from the town's economic success, were virtually always non-Africans.

In 1888, the German East Africa Company was granted the right to collect customs dues in the town through an agreement with the sultan. The company then made further administrative encroachments, which quickly alienated the local populace and its Shomvi rulers. The result was an armed uprising against the Germans by an alliance of the traditional rulers under the leadership of an Arab by the name of Bushiri. The German government had to send a force in 1889 to put down the revolt. Local rulers who had participated in the resistance and their leader were hanged by the German victors. The merchant community, which had either collaborated with the Germans or remained neutral, became more influential under the new rulers.

After an agreement was made with the sultan, German East Africa formally became a German colony in 1891. Until that time, Bagamoyo had been the headquarters of the territory, but the

Germans decided to move to Dar es Salaam. Bagamoyo retained its economic importance until the government decided not to use it as a terminal point for the railroad or develop it as a major port. These decisions resulted in its economic decline during the early years of the twentieth century. Accompanying its demise was the departure of a large portion of its merchant class.

Today, the town has over 5,000 inhabitants—mainly farmers and fishermen—with a population increase in the African community since 1957 of about 26 percent.[2] Tanzania's twentieth-largest township (out of thirty-one townships) is the headquarters for the district named after it. Thus, Bagamoyo is the seat of the District Council and Court and district headquarters for the ruling party, TANU. Just as important, it is the largest town in the district, offering villagers in outlying areas the various amenities that a town of its size can. Over the last decade, the town has seen a number of developments. A district office building, which will house governmental offices for the district, has recently been completed. Steps for the construction of a new fish market with modern equipment have been undertaken. The Ministry of Education opened up a teachers' college and a newly-constructed secondary school. For the first time, electricity may be available to all the town's residents with the recent construction on a nearby river of a power plant by the national electricity company.

CLEAVAGES AND STATUS

The social structure of Bagamoyo was not unlike that of other Swahili settlements. There were sharp ethnic and racial distinctions as well as inequalities in wealth, social status, and authority (in the political and religious spheres). Nonetheless, there were local variations on the basic themes of coastal Islamic social systems.

Ethnicity and Race

Bagamoyo's version of the Shirazi versus "outsiders" cleavage was the schism between the Shomvi and the Arabs. There is substantial written and oral evidence that the Shomvi had their origins in the different waves of Shirazi immigration to East Africa.[3] These particular Shirazi retained strong kin ties with the Barawa of southern Somalia. As a result of fifteenth-century contacts, they also were related to the al-Hatim, an Arab tribe.[4] Like other Shirazi, the Shomvi intermarried with nearby African peoples and eventually became indistinguishable from them. The African group with whom they had the

closest links was a Kutu clan that later became a ruling Zaramo lineage;[5] similar ties also existed with certain Luguru clans. After generations of such contact, complex kin and ethnic ties developed between the Shomvi, Barawa, and Kutu. Though the descendants of the Shomvi today—called the Shomvi-Shirazi—constitute no more than 4 percent of Bagamoyo's population, before and during the colonial era their proportion in the town ranged from 10 to 15 percent.

Aside from antagonisms that concerned political issues, the antipathy between the Shomvi-Shirazi and the Arabs was often expressed through the competitive dance society (*Ngoma Ya Machindano*), an institution frequently found in coastal Shirazi politics. Under German rule, Bagamoyo witnessed the organization of two new societies, known as the *Goboreni* and the *Seneda*.[6] Other than that the former was associated with the Shomvi and the latter with the Arabs, very little is known about the particulars of the competition between the communities through these societies.

During the 1930s, two opposing dance groups for women were formed that apparently carried on the tradition of the goboreni-seneda rivalry, though not entirely on the same ethnic basis. The antagonism between the two new groups was so intense that the district officer restricted their public activities.[7] One group, the "Mahiwa," was completely associated with the Arab residents of Bagamoyo, while the other, the "T.B.," was the party of the Shomvi-Shirazi and their African allies. Although the two organizations were ostensibly for women, men were active in both, and most townspeople recognized that the competition was simply the feminine expression of the historic Shomvi-Shirazi-Arab schism.

During the early 1920s in Bagamoyo, a dispute arose over the performance of the Prophet's birthday ceremonies, the Mawlid.[8] Specifically, three groups organized to compete with each other in the recitation of the popular Barzanji *Mawlidi*—an epic poem about the founder of Islam. Of significance is the ethnic basis of the three parties: the Bani Sa'ada, as they called themselves, were composed mainly of Shomvi-Shirazi; the Kongo party was that of the Manyema, one of the major African peoples in the town; the third was simply known as the Waarabu, or the Arabs. This alignment suggests that, in addition to Arabs, Africans (in this case, the Manyema) were seen as "outsiders" by the Shomvi-Shirazi. For the most part, it should be pointed out, the Shomvi-Shirazi did not consider themselves to be Africans.

The organization of the Manyema as separate from the Arabs in the Mawlidi dispute was indicative of another key ethnic division in Bagamoyo, the African-Arab cleavage. A longtime African ally of the

Arabs explained the hositility between the Shomvi-Shirazi and the Arabs as a "*shauri la rangi*," "a matter of color" prejudice on the part of Arabs.[9] This was also from the African perspective the basis for the African-Arab cleavage, that is, the tendency of the Arabs to look condescendingly on the Africans. Africans, in turn, reacted to the haughty attitude of the Arabs with an underlying resentment toward them. To the extent that they did get along with one another, it was "*uso tu, siyo roho*"—"only on the surface, not in spirit."

The Arab-African cleavage was not the only distinction in Bagamoyo's society in which color was an important ingredient. Among Africans, a distinction was made between *watu wa weupe*, "white people," and *watu wa weusi*, "black people." The former included Arabs, Baluchis, Indians, and the very small number of Europeans (colonial officials and their families and the officials of the Holy Ghost Catholic Mission); the "black people" comprised all those peoples who were considered to be Africans. In the view of most Africans, their opponents in Bagamoyo consisted not only of the Arabs and the Shomvi-Shirazi but of all non-black, or non-African, peoples.

The African-Arab cleavage coincided to a large degree with the distinction between free persons and slaves. As was the case in the early history of Islam, blacks, or Africans, in Bagamoyo were often of slave origin. In colonial Bagamoyo, about a third of the African population were either patrilineal descendants of slaves or had been themselves slaves, whereas no Arab, Baluchi, or Indian was known to have been of slave background.[10] Of the Africans, anyone of an upcountry ethnic group beyond the immediate hinterland, the Doe, Zaramo, Kwere, Luguru and Zigua, was almost always of slave background; the Manyema were the most frequently mentioned as slaves in oral and written accounts.[11] Although the colonial governments eventually ended the institution of slavery, the social distinction between the free person and the individual of slave origin was maintained throughout the colonial years and, though largely attenuated, exists even today. When an African woman of Manyema descent was asked in 1970 why she joined the predominantly Arab ngoma party in the 1930s, her reply was "because the Manyema are the slaves of the Arabs."

This distinction owes much of its continuance to various provisions in Islamic law concerning clientship between a manumitted slave and his or her master. An excellent example of how this worked from the point of the patron's obligations is the case of Shaykh Ramiya, a Manyema, who had been manumitted by his master, Shaykh Amir b.

Sulayman al-Lamki, sometime before the arrival of the Germans. In April, 1930, a flood in the Bagamoyo area damanged Shaykh Ramiya's plantations near the Ruvu River. According to newspaper accounts, Shaykh Ramiya sent news of the mishap to Shaykh Sulayman b. Nasur al-Lamki in Zanzibar, who was then acting as deputy sultan.[12] In reply, Shaykh Sulayman sent 100 shillings to Shaykh Ramiya by way of his son Nasur in order to aid him. Shaykh Sulayman sent the money to Shaykh Ramiya, as I was told, because Shaykh Sulayman was the *bwana* ("master") of Shaykh Ramiya and the latter was the former's *mtu* ("man" or, in this sense, "dependent").[13] Shaykh Sulayman, as the son of Shaykh Amir, was obliged to assist Shaykh Ramiya or any other former slave of his father's that met any misfortune, an obligation that was also inherited by his descendants. At the same time, it was incumbent upon Shaykh Ramiya and other former slaves to inform the family of their difficulties. In view of the subordinate status that such an obligation on the part of the latter implies, it is perhaps understandable why Shaykh Ramiya's son Muhammad would not avail himself of such an opportunity. On the other hand, one informant who supplied me with the particulars of this story had also been a slave of Shaykh Amir and continued to feel bound by this patron-client relationship. Also, he was quite reverent toward the memory of his former and deceased master (at the same time he was proud of having obtained his freedom).

The cleavage between people of free and slave origins still continues today in Bagamoyo, as I witnessed in 1970 in a minor dispute concerning the position of imam at the Friday mosque. One seeker of the position, a scion of Shomvi-Shirazi rulers, objected to another man's assuming the role because he, a Manyema, was of slave background. Though the dispute was settled by alternating the duties of the job between both aspirants from one week to another, the incident illustrated that the distinction between the free person and the slave had not disappeared from the minds of some residents of Bagamoyo.

Political Authority

During the pre-European period, authority in the town as a whole was shared among a number of Shomvi-Shirazi chieftains called *diwanis*, each of whom had authority over a particular quarter and who were in theory coequals (at different periods, one often emerged as *primus inter pares*) and the local representatives of the sultan of Zanzibar, originally the liwali and Jamadar (later, just the former). Within each quarter (*mtaa*), the diwani shared authority with minor

officials.[14] The diwani's powers were mainly in the areas of adjudication, the dispensation of land, and the levying of duties. The last area affected a relatively small segment of the population, only the mercantile class. The authority of the liwali and jamadar was exercised essentially for protecting and supervising the economic interests (mainly trade) of the sultan in the town.

Regarding succession, the oldest son of a deceased diwani succeeded his father in office. The principle of primogeniture also applied in the selection of minor officials. Thus, only male members of Shomvi-Shirazi families could hope to succeed to positions of authority in the political system. Owing to provisions in Islamic law on the legitimacy of children, succession, and inheritance, it was possible, however, for the offspring of women who were neither kinfolk of the Shomvi-Shirazi nor of the same ethnicity to become rulers. Since the Shomvi-Shirazi frequently intermarried with some of the nearby African peoples, the Kutu in particular, these provisions were sometimes significant.

Though there seem to have been no specific criteria employed by the sultans in appointing their representatives to the various coastal settlements—other than that most of them were either Arabs or Baluchi— in Bagamoyo all of them, except for the Baluchi jamadars Saburi and Isa, were Omani Arabs and kinsmen of the Al-Lamki clan.[15] Liwali Nasur, who was appointed in 1874, was succeeded by his two sons, first Sulayman and then Amir. It would seem, then, that in practice the liwaliate, like the position of diwani, was allocated on the basis of the ascriptive criterion of kin ties. The fact that all three of the liwalis were born elsewhere and not of parents from the town meant that the chances for upward mobility into the role of liwali, unlike the diwani (in view of the actual appointments), was virtually non-existent.

In place of the traditional polity, the Germans erected a new system of government that retained very few institutions from the previous era. The protectorate was divided into nineteen civil and two military districts. Each civil district and the towns therein, one of which was Bagamoyo District, was under the direction and supervision of a district officer (*Bezirkstamtmanner*). Unlike the traditional polity, the colonial government concentrated virtually all executive, legislative, and judicial authority in one person, the district officer.[16] In addition to the liwali, the only pre-European posts that were retained (two other non-European functionaries called jumbes) were filled by the district officer, who used the jumbes to assist him in administering the town.[17]

On several occasions, the Germans attempted to institute local self-government and thereby limit the authority of the district officer. In 1901, Communal Unions (*Kommunal Verband*) were established in coastal districts that united the townships in each district; the union was managed by the district officer and a council composed of three to five nominated unofficial members. Though it was intended that one native would be nominated, the requirement of a knowledge of German made this aim unrealizable in most districts. One of the first unions established was in Bagamoyo, and Liwali Amur b. Nasur was one of its nominated members, long the only non-European on any district council. Governor von Rechenberg dissolved the unions in 1909, the reason, according to one interpretation, being that there was no interest in them in the African community.[18]

German rule, like that in the traditional polity, was also characterized by the allocation of authority on the basis of ascriptive criteria; in this case, however, the criteria were explicitly ethnicity and race rather than kinship. In Bagamoyo, about the only position that non-whites could serve in was the appointive one of the liwaliate, which was held by two Omani Arabs, Shaykh Amir b. Sulayman and Amur b. Nasur. Amur, also, was the only non-European of the five nominated members on the Council of the Communal Union. In practice, access of non-whites to positions of authority was extremely limited. Though intergenerational mobility was a reality during the traditional era, the facts that interracial marriages between Europeans and "coloreds" was virtually nonexistent and that the offspring of a mixed couple were not given European or white status meant that this form of mobility was not available during the German period.

Having been declared a township almost at the beginning of British rule, Bagamoyo for the entire period was administered directly by the most senior administrator of the district, who was variously called the political officer, the district officer, the administrator officer, or the district commissioner. Like his German predecessor, the British district administrator exercised considerable authority over townships such as Bagamoyo. A candid description of the district commissioner of Bagamoyo from 1935 to 1940, F. W. Bampfylde, by one of his junior officers, J. D. Bates, is instructive about the authority and power wielded by these officials during the British era.

> The District Commissioner, who was a man of about fifty, had years of Africa behind, and to some extent inside him. He was more or less king. Louis XIV may have thought that *l'état c'est moi;* but even Richelieu, who like a good Chief of Staff probably invented the phrase to keep the King happy while he himself held the reins, would I think have been surprised at the way

this seed flowered in the fields of District Commissioners in the years between the wars in Africa. More often that not it was benevolent despotism. "You are my father and my mother," they used to say to us, and not all of them were just sycophants. But it was despotism all the same.[19]

Also like the German district officer, the British counterpart appointed a liwali who assisted him in administering the town. The liwali's major task was the adjudication of matters involving Islamic law. The liwali, assisted by jumbes, also collected hut and poll taxes.

The Township Authority, a body that assisted in the administration of Bagamoyo, began holding regular meetings in 1938. Five unofficial or nominated members with two-year tenures were appointed to the body by the governor, based on the recommendations of the district and provincial commissioners. The senior district administrator served as president. A frank assessment of this council's role in administering the town was made in the 1956 draft report on local government.

This is an intelligent and potentially able body but the trade of the township is decreasing and there is very little that can be described as development in the commercial sense. The townspeople live happily together in their various communities, the streets are kept clean, etc., and there is little in which the Township Authority can in fact interest itself collectively. The actual administration of the Township is done by the District Office.[20]

In 1951, another body called the African Ward Council was instituted. This was clearly an organ without real power since it simply advised the district office and Township Authority on African affairs in Bagamoyo. It frequently came into conflict with the liwali, who in fact had authority over the African community.

The British administration in Bagamoyo continued the German practice of allocating positions of authority on the basis of ethnicity and race, although in the final decade of their rule they made some departures from it. Only Europeans occupied the top post in the local administration, the district officer or commissioner. Since "a wide knowledge of Mohamedan laws" was necessary for the liwali's position, non-Europeans (an African and a Baluchi) were the only occupants.[21]

Though racial discrimination was not the avowed aim of the British, race and ethnicity were crucial in apportioning seats on the Township Authority. The nominated appointees on the authority beginning in 1938 consisted always of a European, the father superior of the Holy Ghost Mission, an Isma'ili Khoja Indian (M. G. Meghji), a Hindu Indian (Kalyanji Tulshidas and later Champsi Mulji), and an Arab (Salih Hassan and later Su' ud b. 'Umar).[22] In 1948, the

first African, Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, was appointed and later joined in 1951 by Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, a descendant of a Shomvi-Shirazi diwani. That racial and ethnic considerations figured significantly in the appointment of these people is indicated by a report on local government in the East Province, which included Bagamoyo, for 1956. Except for the father superior, each of the unofficial members is referred to as a "representative" of a particular "community," either African, Indian, or Arab.[23]

The racial basis of local government was clearly illustrated with the establishment of the African Ward Council in 1951. The council was composed of ten Africans, with Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani as its head.[24] The ethnic distribution of positions on the council and the authority was maintained until almost the final year of British rule, at which time the last British provincial commissioner appointed six Africans and one Indian to the Township Authority.

Authority in the Sunni Community

During the precolonial period in Bagamoyo, a distinction was made in the 'ulama class between those teachers (walimu) who taught young children to read and write the Quran and those who taught the higher sciences, 'ilm, to adults.[25] There was more than one of the latter, the shaykhs, who taught in the town as well as a number of Quran teachers. In addition to checking the teachers' ijazas (certificates or diplomas), townspeople would sometimes pose difficult legal and theological questions to shaykhs who had recently arrived. The shaykh who supervised the Friday mosque, usually the same person who performed marriage rites and other ceremonies, was appointed and maintained by the diwanis.

There does not appear to have been a group of 'ulama or an individual shaykh exclusively concerned with judicial matters. In fact, it seems that the diwani administered the shari'a, or Islamic law. No doubt local shaykhs who were specialists on the shari'a gave advisory opinions on difficult matters that came before the diwani. Near the end of the period of Zanzibar's hegemony, however, a separate office of qadi was established.[26]

Though fragmentary, there is evidence that Bagamoyo's Sunni community in the pre-European period had ties with, and viewed itself as part of, the larger Muslim world. Occasionally, the legal opinions of leading 'ulama in Zanzibar (for example, Shaykh Ahmad b. Sumayt) were sought by local officials and residents. Also, the names of the sultan of Turkey as well as the sultan of zanzibar were mentioned in the Friday sermon (khutba).[27]

The traditional pedagogical responsibilities of the 'ulama were little affected by colonial rule. Under new rulers who were Christians, and with the former diwanis (those still in the town who had not been hanged by the Germans) no longer in a position to carry out their former duties, the shaykh who supervised the Friday mosque had to find an alternative source of support. This post was held by Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha until his death in about 1911.[28] He received some subsidization from a rich Memon merchant (the Memons were Sunni Muslims from the Indian province of Gujarat). During the British period, the responsibility for the Friday mosque fell largely on the shoulders of Shaykh Ramiya and, later, his son Shaykh Muhammad. The duties of the qadi, mainly dealing with judicial matters, were carried out by the government-appointed liwalis.[29] The only member of the 'ulama to hold this post during the colonial era was Shaykh Ramiya. Both the German and British administrators, including their liwalis, nonetheless, did consult the shaykhs on various matters of Islamic law when necessary.

In precolonial Bagamoyo, kinship and ethnicity apparently served as the bases for recruitment into the 'ulama class. Whereas in Zanzibar it was the Hadrami Arab community that held a disproportionate number of posts among the 'ulama, in Bagamoyo it was the Barawi and the Shomvi-Shirazi who occupied a comparable position. The only mu'allim of 'ilm in traditional Bagamoyo on whom there is some information is Shaykh Taha al-Jabri, a Barawi who had kinship ties with the Shomvi-Shirazi. He was not only the leading 'alim (singular of 'ulama) in the town but also the imam of the Friday mosque. Shortly before or during the German period, Shaykh Taha was succeeded by his son Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha as the leading shaykh, or 'alim, of the town. In addition to these two, the only other known mu'allim of the pre-European period was Sayyid 'Abd Allah, a member of the famous Jamal al-Layl Hadrami sharifian clan.

Fifteen individuals can be identified during the colonial period in Bagamoyo who either taught 'ilm or were considered to be well versed in it: Shaykh Taha, Shaykh Abu Bakr, Mu'allim Mnyamani, Mtoro b. Mwenyi Bakari, Shaykh Ramiya, Sayyid 'Alawi, Mzee wa Kongwa, Shaykh Sufi b. Muhammad, Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad, Shaykh 'Umar b. 'Awad, Shaykh Muhammad b. Husayn, Sayyid 'Ali b. Abu Bakr, Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Mzee Juma Bahram, and Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya. Of these fifteen, eight (or 53.5 percent) were of Shomvi-Shirazi origin, four (or 26.5 percent) were of Hadrami Arab background, and three (20 percent) were Africans. Given the relative percentages of these groups—Shomvi-Shirazi,

Hadrami Arab, and African—in the total population during the colonial period (about 10 percent, 3 percent, and 84 percent respectively), it is apparent that ethnicity played a significant role in recruitment to the 'ulama within Bagamoyo. Obviously, an individual who was of Shomvi-Shirazi or Hadrami background was more likely to be in the 'ulama class than an African.

The significance of ethnic ties as an avenue to the learned class was in part a result of kinship. For instance, seven, and possibly eight, of the fifteen 'ulama were known to have been descendants of, or related to, an 'alim; of these, four, and possibly five, were Shomvi-Shirazi. Thus, a Shomvi-Shirazi had a greater chance of becoming a member of the 'ulama class during the colonial era when he was a descendant or relative of an 'alim.

The fact that three Africans made it into the ranks of the 'ulama indicates that it was not a completely closed class. Depending on an individual's own talents, it was possible for someone to rise to the rank of the 'ulama within his lifetime. Therefore, at least ideally, this class of authority holders in Sunni Islam was an open one. This ideal manifested itself most notably in the case of Shaykh Ramiya, the first known African of slave origin to become a shaykh in Bagamoyo. Shaykh Ramiya's experience, however, was an exception to actual practice. The facts that apparently no other African had achieved this distinction before Shaykh Ramiya and that only one other not related to him, Mu'allim Shani, did so after his death show how uncommon the example of his mobility was. Informants who related the details of Shaykh Ramiya's life were likely to stress how unusual it was for someone of his background to achieve the distinction of shaykh of 'ilm. Since Shaykh Ramiya was succeeded by his son Muhammad as the leading 'alim of the town, it might be argued that, given the inherently nepotic character of the 'ulama, Africans could gain equal access to authority positions only after their forebears had managed to make an entrée. That so few, however, did become 'ulama is evidence that the 'ulama was far from being an open class for the masses of Africans in Bagamoyo.

The allocation of the position of imam for the various mosques in Bagamoyo was not dissimilar to the pattern for the rest of the 'ulama class. Approximately thirty-two different individuals have held the position in the town's existing mosques. Thirteen (or about 40 percent) of the position holders were Arabs. The most prestigious place, imam of the Friday mosque, was held throughout most of the colonial period by an Arab, Sharif Burhan. The Shomvi-Shirazi held twelve places (or about 38 percent), including for many years before

and during the German period the prestigious Friday mosque post. Seven (or about 21 percent) of the positions were occupied by Africans, three of whom were Manyemas. Except for the Manyema who had to share the post with a Shomvi-Shirazi in 1970 (see p. 9), no African has ever served as imam on the Friday mosque. It is, therefore, patently clear that the Shomvi-Shirazi and Hadrami Arab communities, along with certain families of the two, had disproportionately greater access to authority in the Sunni community than did the Africans.

The Rich and the Poor

As was true for Swahili society elsewhere, the ownership of property was the best measure of relative economic standing and wealth in precolonial Bagamoyo. Although some data exist on the ownership of slaves, more is available on the ownership of land.

In general, the Shomvi-Shirazi had a monopoly on land during the precolonial era. More specifically, the diwanis and their families had the authority to dispose of land.[30] As foreigners—including merchants, traders, and missionaries—began to settle in the town owing to its growing attractiveness during the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a corresponding demand for land, which the diwanis were willing to oblige at a price. Unlike many other traditional authorities in Africa, the chieftains of the town were not unaware that they were making outright sales to these immigrants; once an agreement on price had been reached and the price had been paid, the diwani wrote the purchaser a deed of sale.

The Holy Ghost Mission became the town's first important landowner of foreign origin. The sultanate's officials in the town, the jamadars, liwalis—especially Amir b. Sulayman al-Lamki—and customs officials also made major purchases. The most significant category of purchasers during this period, many of whom later ranked among the largest landowners in Bagamoyo, was made up of Indian and Arab merchants.[31] The leading landowner in this group was the Isma'ili Sewa Haji Paroo. Another important proprietor was the Omani Arab trader Sulayman b. Zahir. As purchases increased during the two decades before the advent of German rule, a large amount of land came into the possession of the new immigrants to Bagamoyo; eventually they surpassed the diwanis in total landownership. Thus, the general economic position of the traditional rulers at the end of the precolonial period, according to one observer, was only a bit better than that of the average residents in the town.[32]

Since land was principally used for staple and, later, cash crop farming, the biggest landowners tended to be the largest slave owners.

Even the Holy Ghost Mission, which had access to the labor of "ex-slaves," could be included in the latter category. It is significant that "ex-slaves" at the mission worked longer hours without pay than slaves owned by Muslims.[33] Originally, the diwanis were the foremost slave owners; they were eventually displaced by the Arabs for this distinction. The possession of slaves or "ex-slaves" was important in that the value of cropland was related to the productivity of labor power and the cost of its reproduction; for the mission, the productivity was higher than that of the Muslim slave owners; the reproduction cost was low for both.

Unless one was a Shomvi-Shirazi or related to them, virtually the only way to possess land was to purchase it. Thus, those who had access to a sufficient amount of money were most likely to become landowners. The overwhelming majority of Bagamoyo's residents, African subsistence farmers, took part only marginally in the money economy. They formed the bulk of the residents who rented land for either money or payment in kind. Slaves generally were provided with small plots for raising subsistence crops. In theory, it was possible for a slave to buy land, but there appears to be only one known instance of this happening.[34] In sum, the social layers that constituted the vast majority of the nonpossessors of land in precolonial Bagamoyo were the subsistence farmers and slaves—Africans.

The patterns of landownership during the colonial period were similar to those in the previous era. This was largely the result of colonial land ordinances that, while preventing the further alienation of land from the "native" population, made it impossible for Africans to own land outright on an individual basis. The most prominent landholders were the leading merchants and businesspeople in the town. The colonial period witnessed the emergence of a new generation of wealthy businesspeople who had purchased their land from the earlier merchants; they were still mainly Indians and Arabs. This group also included the Roman Catholic mission, which was able to increase its holdings. Under the British, the mission was probably the largest landowner in the town. It also held numerous mortgages on Arab coconut plantations.[35]

Another category of landowners consisted of those merchants who were not as wealthy as the first group but still possessed some holdings, usually one or two large plantations. Arabs were more likely to be in this category, while Indians were in the former. The last layer constituted those whose main livelihood was farming and whose typical land possessions were limited to small farms from which the grow-

ers were able to support themselves and their family. Of this group, it seems that the descendants of the diwanis owned the largest farms.

The overall picture of landownership from 1917 to 1932 is based on the Bagamoyo Estate Book.[36] Of the 29 persons whose occupations were listed as merchant or trader, 60 percent were landowners. Of the 56 individuals whose ethnicity indicated descent from the diwanis, 43 percent owned land. Of the 307 who were farmers, only 21 percent possessed land. The last figure is probably inflated since a large percentage of individuals who were listed as having been retired at the time of their deaths did not own any land; more than likely, most of them had been farmers.

It is possible to make some inferences about relative income during the colonial period. Cash crops were the main money earners in the predominantly agricultural community of Bagamoyo; coconuts, from which copra is derived, were the most important. The Estate Book indicates that those planters with the largest plantations tended to have the largest number of coconut trees. Thus, there was a positive correlation between the size of an owner's land holdings and his income.

In addition to farmland, another source of income was housing, especially stone houses that could be rented. Of the average total number of houses during the British period, about 225, the vast majority were owned by merchants. More than a third of the total were owned by four businessmen, three Indians and one Arab.[37] Those who owned more buildings, therefore, derived a correspondingly higher income in the form of rent.

Economic standing in colonial Bagamoyo based on property ownership paralleled the ranking based on relative income. The top rank was occupied by the most prominent merchants and traders—exclusively Indians and Arabs—followed by the less prominent ones, and on the bottom rung was the vast majority of farmers, Africans.

The Hierarchy of Social Prestige

An examination of a wide array of practices and customs of traditional etiquette and protocol makes it possible to delineate the hierarchy of prestige in precolonial Bagamoyo.[38] The diwanis were at the apex of the status pyramid. Next in rank were two religious figures, the mu'allim and the sharif; the latter appears to have been more prestigious and at times equal to the diwani. Of the different mu'allims, the teacher of 'ilm was most esteemed. The officials who aided the diwanis in the administration occupied the next rung of

the social ladder. These functionaries were followed by free persons. Slaves, of course, occupied the lowest place in the hierarchy. Broadly speaking, then, there were three basic statuses, the nobles (the rulers and their families and the religious leaders), the free persons, and the slaves. This status system did not include the merchants and other foreigners who began arriving in large numbers during the last decades of the precolonial era. By the time of the German takeover, Bagamoyo's hierarchy of prestige was in flux, due in part to the flow of immigrants into the town.

The Germans and the British effectively altered the traditional social status system. Their major innovation was the employment of race and color to determine degrees of prestige. The Germans introduced the basic distinction between whites and "coloreds." In the latter category, they distinguished between "natives" and "non-natives." They included the Shomvi-Shirazi in the "native" (that is, African) category. Therefore, in addition to being classified as "coloreds," whom the Germans considered to be inferior to whites, Bagamoyo's former rulers were then "natives," on the lowest rung on the social ladder.

Illustrative of this change in status for the Shomvi-Shirazi is the case of Mtoro b. Mwenyi Bakari, a scion of an important Shirazi family, who, although he returned to Germany, had been slated to become the next liwali of Bagamoyo after Shaykh Amir. He returned to Germany because the German authorities in East Africa objected to his presence in Bagamoyo with the German wife he had married while working as a translator in Hamburg; the fact that a "native" had a white wife would have called into question one of the basic assumptions of their status system, that whites and Africans were unequal.[39]

The British kept intact, for the most part, the prestige system the Germans had erected. Thus, the German practice that classified Bagamoyo's former rulers as "natives," or Africans, was continued. The British, however, were not consistent in their usage of "native"; under one piece of legislation, for instance, Arabs were "natives," while under another they were not.[40]

An excellent example of how the British administration viewed the social status of Africans vis-a-vis the rest of the population can be seen in the visit of Governor Horace Byatt to Bagamoyo in December 1924. After greeting the leaders from the various communities—Indian, Arab, Baluchi, and "native"—upon his arrival, he had a meeting with them the following day. What is relevant is the manner in which he met with them.

Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya (center) taking the oath of office for the President's Commission of Inquiry, with President Nyerere watching, 1966.
Copyright Tanzania Information Service

Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, 1970.

Sewa Hajj Paroo, Bagamoyo's most famous merchant, around 1884.
From Frtiz Bley, *Deutsche Pionierarbein in Ost-Afrika* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1891)

Shaykh Amir b. Sulayman al-Lamki, liwali of Bagamoyo (right), and Shaykh Taha al-Jabri al-Barawi, qadi of Bagamoyo (left), around 1884. From Fritz Bley, *Deutsche Pionierarbein in Ost-Afrika* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1891)

Bwana Heri, a Shirazi diwani from Saadani, near Bagamoyo, with his sons, around 1884.
From Fritz Bley, *Deutsche Pionierarbein in Ost-Afrika* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1891)

His Excellency . . . wanted to talk to all of us. There was a large conference. The Indians were the first to talk, then the Arabs, Shihiris, and the Baluchis followed all together. When they left the Liwali and his elders of the town went in. When they left the Akidas and all the Jumbes [entered].[41]

The protocol of the conference clearly indicated what the hierarchy of prestige was in Bagamoyo, at least in the non-European community. At the top were Indians, followed by Arabs (Shihiri and Omani) and Baluchi, and last came Africans, who included the liwali (at that time, Shaykh Ramiya, a Manyema). (The akidas and jumbes were the local authorities from surrounding villages outside Bagamoyo.)

The British conception of social status was also reflected in the invitations sent by various district officers to town and district residents for the queen's birthday party during the 1950s, the most important social event—at least for the British—in the town. During the years for which lists are available, 405 individuals were sent invitations.[42] The best way to view these data is to compare, as in table 1, the average annual percentage of invitations that each ethnic/racial group received with the group's percentage in the total population of the town and district (based on the 1957 census). It is possible then to rank each group on the basis of the percentage of invitations it received in relation to its size.

Table 1. Population and Invitations to Groups, Bagamoyo District, 1957

Ethnic or Racial Category	Populations	Average Annual Percentage of Invitations[c]	Percentages to Receive Invitations
Europeans	108	39	36
Indians	252	26	10.3
Arabs-Baluchi	277	7	2.5
Africans I	3,455[a]	13	0.37
Africans II	88,159[b]	22	0.025

[a] African population in Bagamoyo Town, Tanganyika, *African Census Report* (Dar es Salaam, 1963), p. 16.

[b] African population in Bagamoyo and the rest of the district, *African Census Report* (Dar es Salaam, 1963), p. 16.

[c] Based on the invitation lists for 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1959.

The ranking that emerges from the data in table 1 clearly parallels the actual status hierarchy in colonial Bagamoyo, with Europeans at the top, followed first by Indians, then Arabs and Baluchi, and last Africans. What is interesting to note in the table is the suggestion that the British viewed the Arabs and Baluchi as much closer in status to Africans than to Indians since the percentage points separating these two communities from Africans is smaller than that between them and the Indians. Given the not infrequent ambiguity in colonial legislation on the status of Arabs—"natives" in some cases but not in others—this suggestion is probably a valid reflection of the then-existing social reality.

There were differences among individuals of the various ethnic/racial groups as to how often they received invitations over the four years. Of importance for this analysis are the non-Europeans. Of the Indians, only the Isma'ili Khoja merchant Meghji and the Parsee merchant Dupetawalla received invitations all four years; the Hindu merchant Champsi Mulji was invited to the coffee parties for three years. Among the Arabs and Baluchi, only Liwali Gulamrasul Sherdel, a Baluchi, received invitations all four years; the Arab merchant Su'ud b. 'Umar was invited the last three years. Only three Africans—Ramadhani b. Diwani (a Shomvi-Shirazi and a farmer), Mtumwa Maksud (a Manyema truck driver), and Kudura Feruzi (also a Manyema and a long-term resident who worked for the government)—were sent invitations for all four years; two other long-term residents who were government employees (Muhammad Abu Bakari and 'Ali 'Abd Allah) and the town's leading religious leader (Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, a Manyema) were invited for three years. Finally, it should be mentioned that of the Europeans the father superior of the Roman Catholic Mission was invited all four years.

THE CONVERGENCE OF AUTHORITY, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY

Three kinds of social divisions, or cleavages, in Bagamoyo's traditional and colonial social structure have been delineated. The first were the divisions based on the ascriptive criteria of ethnicity, race, and social origin. The second was the distinction between those who possessed and those who did not possess authority in the political system and the Sunni Muslim community. The third were the distinctions that resulted from the unequal distribution of economic values and social prestige—socioeconomic status differences or simple class divisions.

As in other Swahili communities, there was a high degree of congruence between the three kinds of social divisions in Bagamoyo.

This was most clear during the precolonial period before the entrenchment of the immigrant merchants. The ethnic group that possessed authority in both the political and the religious spheres, the Shomvi-Shirazi, was at the same time the group that was preeminent in economic and social standing. The groups that were subordinate or without authority in both spheres, primarily Africans, were also the most deprived in terms of wealth and prestige. This congruence was maintained by the Shomvi-Shirazi view of themselves as a group with separate interests distinct from the "outsiders" or peoples who settled after them in Bagamoyo: first Africans and then later Indians, Arabs, and Europeans.

During the colonial period, there was also congruence or superimposition of the divisions, but not to the same degree as during the pre-European era. At this time, the occupants of positions of authority in both the political and the religious systems were from, not one, but four ethnic groups—Europeans, Indians, and Arabs in the political arena and Shomvi-Shirazi and Arabs in the religious community. Of these, the Europeans, Indians, and Arabs consistently made up the economic and social elite.

If there was some variance among the groups that occupied the leading positions of authority and class, this was not the case for the subordinate and low socioeconomic status ranks. Just as during the traditional era, Africans were consistently relegated to the lowest echelons and positions in Bagamoyo's colonial social structure. This division between Europeans, Indians, and Arabs on the one side and Africans on the other coincided almost perfectly with the fundamental schism in Swahili culture, that is, the white-black cleavage.

In conclusion, the superimposition of all three social divisions in Bagamoyo testifies to what was a highly polarized society before and after the advent of colonialism. What remains now is to see how this basic schism in Bagamoyo's social structure was reflected in the political process.

CHAPTER 7

The Tariqa in Bagamoyo

Early in the twentieth century, Shaykh Muhammad b. Husayn al-Lughani, a religious figure from the Middle East about whom very little is known, visited Bagamoyo and met with some of the local Muslim leaders. During his apparently brief stay, for reasons that will probably never be clear, he conferred on an African Muslim teacher known then as Mu'allim Ramiya an ijaza of khalifa of the tariqa al-Qadiriyya. Mu'allim Ramiya, a Manyema and a former slave, set out almost immediately to attract a following. Within a few years, the Qadiriyya emerged as a leading institution in Bagamoyo. By the time of his death in 1931, Shaykh Ramiya's fame had extended throughout East Africa. Muhammad, his son and successor, inherited from him an institution whose impact on the political course of Bagamoyo is felt until this day.

To understand the success of the Qadiriyya under Shaykh Ramiya and his son Shaykh Muhammad, we should conceive of it as an interest group based on the exchange of benefits. Thus, the leadership/organizer invests "capital" to create benefits in order to attract a following. In return, he receives benefits from the tariqa's members. Therefore, the group will thrive as long as there is a two-way flow of benefits between its leadership and its members. Since another tariqa—the Ahmadiyya—was also established in Bagamoyo, but with

less success, it would be useful to compare somewhat—for illustrative purposes only—the experiences of the two in terms of this model. If a tariqa is analogous to a benefit exchange, we must begin the analysis by looking at the "entrepreneur" and the "capital" employed in launching his enterprise.

THE ASSETS OF THE LEADERSHIP

The Qadiriyya

Shaykh Ramiya was born in the area in the eastern Congo (Zaire) known as Manyema of Kusu (one of many Manyema ethnic groups) parents. At the age of about eight, he and a brother were captured and sold to one of the many Arab slave caravans operating in the Manyema area during the second half of the nineteenth century. While his brother was eventually sold to owners in Tabora, young Mundu, as the shaykh was known then, was brought by Amir b. Sulayman al-Lamki, who later became the liwali of Bagamoyo. Because of his young age, Mundu became a domestic slave of Amir; his master gave him the name Ramiya.

Generally, domestic slaves were in a somewhat better position than farm (or *shamba*) hands, and many were elevated to responsible positions during their state of bondage. Such was the case with Ramiya, who, having exhibited marked intelligence and dependability, apparently became the favorite of Amir to the extent that he was allowed to engage in commercial activities.

His first commercial endeavor that can be remembered was that as a retail fish trader; this involved the buying of small quantities of fish from fishermen and selling them at a profit at the market. After his success in this venture, by which he was able to accumulate some capital, Ramiya turned his attention to copra, a commodity whose commercial value was just beginning to grow at that time (about 1880). He began buying coconuts at the weekly market auction; these he then dried to make copra to sell, usually to export firms. He had very few, if any, competitors initially, and this fact contributed to his overwhelming success in the copra trade.

Having acquired sufficient capital, Ramiya began purchasing a number of coconut plantations, one of which, at Kingani, was one of the largest near the town. The Kingani plantation was made up of four contiguous plantations purchased between 1910 and 1911.[1] As an indication of its size, one can note that there were 2,500 coconut trees on it in 1931, when part of it was used for the cultivation of

other crops. These acquisitions made Mu'allim Ramiya, as he was then known, the largest African landowner (including the Shomvi-Shirazi) as well as enhancing his position as a copra trader. In addition to copra, he traded millet and gum copal. He had accumulated enough money by 1912 to become the first African in the town to own a stone house rather than a *makuti* (coconut leaves) dwelling.

After becoming liwali in 1916, Shaykh Ramiya, as he was later called, made a number of small land purchases between 1918 and 1919. Though by then he had either sold or given away some of these later acquisitions, at the time of his death in 1931 his estate included two large plantations with a total of 4,000 coconut trees and two stone houses in town with numerous valuables. He was by far the wealthiest resident of the African (again, including the Shomvi-Shirazi) community in the town throughout most of his adult life.

He also achieved a distinction among Africans throughout Tanganyika because, until his death, the government had not encountered any cases of Africans claiming freehold titles to land. An extensive legal discussion among administrators in Dar es Salaam, including the governor, on the question of whether Africans actually had freehold title under the German administration came about when Shaykh Ramiya's son Muhammad sought to mortgage one of the plantations in 1940.[2] It was finally decided that they could hold such titles. The point here is that Shaykh Ramiya was perhaps the first African to make land purchases during the colonial period and to acquire freehold titles. Since the British recognized freehold only for purchases before 1923, it is highly probable that Shaykh Ramiya's claims were among the few freehold titles ever held by Africans in Tanganyika.

It was the custom of Muslim slave owners to encourage their slaves to adopt Islam. However, owing to the endogamous nature of the Ibadi sect to which his master Amir adhered, Ramiya became a Sunni Muslim and was given the name Yahya b. 'Abd Allah. Unlike a freeman, Ramiya began his religious studies at a relatively late age—about thirty (around 1886)—which suggests it was a voluntary rather than a compulsory endeavor. He completed the course of a regular Quranic school, which was taught by Sharif 'Abd Allah b. 'Alawi al-Jamal al-Layl, after about three years.

The formal education of most Muslims ended after quranic school, and only a small percentage of students continued afterward to study the higher sciences ('ilm), such as jurisprudence (figh), a *tasawwuf* ("mysticism"), *tafsir* ("commentary on the Quran"), *tawhid* ("theolgoy") and *mantiq* ("logic"). Ramiya was one of the select few, along

with others such as Mtoro b. Mweny Bakari and Mu'allim Mnyamani, who pursued such studies at the then-famous madrasa of Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha al-Jabri in Bagamoyo. This endeavor took him about ten years. During this period, Ramiya was successfully active in his commercial pursuits; this was perhaps a necessary condition for the study of 'ilm since it enabled him to make the necessary payment of fees for enrollment in the madrasa and to have enough time to spend on his studies.

Shortly after his formal matriculation at Shaykh Abu Bakr's madrasa, in about 1900 (he continued to study informally until the shaykh's death), Mu'allim Ramiya, as he was known then, opened up his own school to teach 'ilm, and, after Shaykh Abu Bakr, he was recognized as the leading scholar of about thirty walimu in the town.[3] He was able to enhance his scholarly prestige further by inviting scholars from elsewhere to the town and subsidizing their short-term visits in order to study under them. Again, owing to his wealth, he was in a position to strengthen his growing reputation as a benevolent person by taking upon himself the responsibility of caring for orphans and strangers in the town. In addition, his school was able to flourish in large part because he could subsidize the room and board of students who came from far and wide to study there.

All of these factors, along with such personal attributes as initiative and administrative acumen, contributed to his selection and acknowledgement by the Sunni community, following Shaykh Abu Bakr's death in about 1911, as the shaykh of the town and the leading 'alim, a position he held until his death in 1931. His selection by the British in 1916 as liwali was in large part due to his position as shaykh of the town.

Perhaps the most popular institution Shaykh Ramiya established after becoming shaykh of the town was the Muslim celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the Mawlid. The event grew to such proportions that it became the most popular Muslim celebration on mainland Tanganyika for much of the colonial period. It inspired the establishment of the same event in Dar es Salaam some years later. By-products of the Mawlid were the establishment of Bagamoyo as a major center of Islam in East Africa and the spread of Shaykh Ramiya's fame throughout Tanganyika's Muslim community, which, in turn, led to the attraction of students from all over the mainland to his school. The wealth of Shaykh Ramiya proved important in the success of the Mawlid since a significant part of the celebration involved extending hospitality in the form of lodging and sustenance to the many visitors.[4]

In a tariqa manual that is popular among Qadiri followers in Bagamoyo and elsewhere in East Africa, *Zimam al-salikin fi adab al-tariqa* (literally, *The Guide for Mystics in the Morals of the Tariqa*), the requirements for being a shaykh of the tariqa are spelled out.[5] In addition to the fact that a shaykh owes his position to a divine order (*amr samawi*), he is someone who knows "the way to reach God" (*tariqa al-wasul ila Allah*), which means the he must possess gnosis (*al-'arif*). Gnosis, in turn, depends on education (*tarbiya*), which is of two kinds—external (*zahir*) and internal, or secret (*batin*). In this context, the first refers essentially to worldy knowledge (*'ilm al-dunya'*) or the higher sciences in Islam, especially jurisprudence (fiqh).

In the case of Mu'allim Ramiya, his long study of 'ilm certainly qualified him to be a shaykh of the tariqa in regard to zahir. Batin, or secret knowledge, which the followers of the tariqa value even more than zahir, can come about only through God's grace for the individual who has exhibited an exemplary life filled with striving toward knowing God. Most of Mu'allim Ramiya's followers considered him to be blessed by God or to have baraka, "blessing." He was commonly referred to as a *wali* (in Swahili, *walii*), a "saint," or a man close to God.

The fact that Mu'allim Ramiya, who had come from humble origins as a slave, was able to achieve all that he did must have enhanced the belief that he was blessed; informants constantly expressed their amazement at his success.[6] The fact that he was a very pious man who confirmed his benevolence by repeated acts of charity gave added credibility to his reputation as a man of God. Furthermore, he was considered by many to have supernatural powers, such as extrasensory perception. Whether or not these powers were recognized before he sought to advance the tariqa is difficult to say. Whatever the case, his learning and his recognition as a blessed man and his piety and benevolence supplemented his material resources as the "capital" he used to launch the tariqa.

As the new leader of the Qadiriyya after the death of his father on May 21, 1931, Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya inherited an organization that had already been established by Shaykh Ramiya. Almost every resource—both material and spiritual—discussed in regard to Shaykh Ramiya was inherited by his son Muhammad.

Shaykh Muhammad came into possession of most of his father's properties, including the plantations and the houses in town. As Shaykh Ramiya's only son, he had been exposed early and continuously to Islamic education in general and tasawwuf ("mysticism")

and tariqa principles in particular. Though not recognized as the most knowledgeable 'alim in the town at his father's death—he was twenty-two years old at the time—Shaykh Muhammad did possess the minimal requirements of a learned person in conjunction with the other resources. The most important resource that he was seen to have was baraka, which the followers of the tariqa believed he had inherited from his father.

The choice of Shaykh Muhammad rather than one of Shaykh Ramiya's closer and older assistants was based on the assumption that, as his son, Shaykh Muhammad was the embodiment of his father and the transmitter of his baraka. As one person explained, when Shaykh Muhammad "was appointed to be the substitute of his father, . . . we agreed that he had inherited the baraka of his father."[7]

These characteristics—wealth, learning, and baraka—were the three basic resources that Shaykh Muhammad had at his disposal in perpetuating and developing the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo.

The Ahmadiyya and Other Efforts

The Ahmadiyya tariqa took root in Bagamoyo in 1938.[8] The circumstances of its coming were related to the death of one of the prominent residents of the town and the recognized leader of the Shihiri Arab community, Shaykh 'Umar b. 'Awad. It is the custom at orthodox Muslim funerals, particularly when the deceased is well known, for leaders of various brotherhoods to participate by offering prayers, even if it means that the leaders must travel. This was the case at Shaykh 'Umar's funeral, which was attended by the head of the Ahmadiyya in Dar es Salaam, Shaykh 'Ali b. Salih. Before coming, he wrote to Shaykh 'Umar's family to say that he wanted to establish a branch of the fraternity in Bagamoyo and would use the occasion of the funeral to make a start. After the funeral, Shaykh 'Ali led a brief ceremony of the tariqa at which he appointed the oldest son of Shaykh 'Umar, Mzee Fereji b. 'Umar, as his khalifa in Bagamoyo. Until his death in 1970, the Ahmadiyya in the town was largely under the direction of Mzee Fereji, with the assistance of his brother Mzee Su'ud b. 'Umar and Salih b. 'Abudu, a prominent Arab merchant in Bagamoyo.

Like Shaykh Ramiya, Mzee Fereji was relatively affluent, having obtained much of his wealth as one of Bagamoyo's important businessmen. He also owned a number of properties, including extensive plantations and cattle. As an Arab, the son of one of the town's most respected religious leaders, and the brother of a leading merchant

(Mzee Su'ud), Mzee Fereji enjoyed very high status in Bagamoyo. Unlike Shaykh Ramiya, however, Mzee Fereji was considered neither an 'alim nor a wali ("saint") who had baraka. Though Mzee Fereji had been educated relatively well in Islamic subjects and had lived an exemplary life as a Muslim, he was by no means seen as an equal of Shaykh Ramiya in these two areas. The most valuable resources that Mzee Fereji had at his disposal in organizing and leading the Ahmadiyya were prestige and material wealth.

The resources Shaykh Ramiya and Mzee Fereji possessed, especially the former, present a striking contrast to those of individuals who were not successful in establishing branches of brotherhoods in Bagamoyo. For example, Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha's inability to establish the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo stemmed simply, as far as I can determine, from his not being a khalifa and, therefore, his not being unable to issue the ijaza to prospective members.[9] As for Mu'allim Muhammad b. Husayn (not to be confused with Sayyid Muhammad b. Husayn al-Lughani), who came to Bagamoyo in about 1917 and was unsuccessful in instituting a branch of the Shadhiliyya in the town, his failure stemmed apparently from his lack of resources, such as material wealth, baraka, and long-standing status in the town, although he was evidently regarded as very learned.

Two other individuals had hoped to establish tariqa branches in Bagamoyo, and both failed largely because of their inability to lure followers away from Shaykh Ramiya. The first was Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad al-Jabri, in about 1922, a relative of Shaykh Abu Bakr and a widely recognized 'alim. However, he was neither seen as possessing baraka nor was his material base as strong as Shaykh Ramiya's. The second was the head of the Shadhiliyya tariqa in East Africa, Shaykh Husayn b. Mahmud, who, after arriving in Bagamoyo in about 1928, decided that it would be futile to try to establish the order in the town in view of Shaykh Ramiya's overwhelming popularity.[10] He felt that there was no one with adequate resources whom he could appoint as khalifa.

THE BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP

The success that Mu'allim Ramiya had in building the tariqa following his appointment as khalifa by Sayyid Muhammad b. Husayn al-Lugahani was in large part due to the kinds of benefits that he offered his murids. An analysis of these benefits must begin with the understanding that benefits are subjectively defined according to an in-

dividual's own values. The concern here is to describe the benefits that Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad made available to their murids.

To begin with, there are what might be called strictly religious benefits that accrue to those who are followers of a tariqa.[11] The popular manual *Zimam al-salikin* argues that dhikr (or the commemoration of God), which is the main rite of the tariqa, is more important than the five pillars of Islam (such as praying and fasting) because the pillars are incomplete without the ceremony. On the basis of various *hadiths* ("traditions") of the Prophet Muhammad, the author of the manual makes the claim that the performance of dhikr is a sure way to avoid sin and hell (*'adhab Allah*). Since the goal of this endeavor is to reach God and since very few people are able to do this alone, it is necessary for the aspirant, the murid, to have a shaykh for assistance: "With the absence of a shaykh-murshid [or shaykh-guide], and the absence of religious exercises [that is, dhikr], one does not deserve the name of adherent of the tariqa because the purpose of the tariqa is to know how to reach God."[12] The point that is emphasized is that "the shaykh who attains gnosis is the means for reaching God" and "he who has no shaykh has Satan as his shaykh." It is clear from this account, which was confirmed and emphasized by followers of Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad, that membership in the tariqa conferred a benefit that, as I will show later, was immensely attractive to orthodox Muslims in Bagamoyo.

Beyond the religious benefits there were a number of material benefits that accrued to the murids of Shaykh Muhammad. First, his followers unequivocally stated that the shaykh was obligated to aid his murids in every way. As one murid stressed concerning this obligation, "It is quite clear—it is absolutely incumbent on him [the shaykh] for any kind of difficulty whatsoever, because [the murid] is his child."[13] Another respondent, an official in the tariqa under Shaykh Muhammad, said of this obligation, "This is a necessary thing for the shaykhs of the tariqa."[14]

When Shaykh Muhammad was asked whether he and his father were obligated to assist their murids, he said this was true and he also pointed out that they extended help to people outside the tariqa, also. The extension of aid to people who were not murids by both shaykhs does not diminish the point being made here. First, the perception of Muslims in and outside the Qadiriyya was that the adherents of the order did receive benefits beyond what nonadherents

obtained; and second, aid to nonadherents was an indirect benefit to murids because it lent credence to the benevolence of Shaykh Ramiya and his son, which was an essential quality for one who was believed to be "the means for reaching God."

When asked to elaborate on the nature of the assistance a murid received, one of them who had gotten the ijaza from Shaykh Ramiya give this answer: "If a person was destitute he [would give him] assistance. If he did not have a house or wife he would help him; and he would give him food for any situation. Therefore, many murids followed him because he used to help them in any situation whatever."[15] Another murid of Shaykh Ramiya gave other examples of his aid: "He helped a murid in various ways such as visiting a murid if he were sick, or if one died he would provide a shroud, assist in the funeral, and hold a formal mourning."[16]

The most influential present-day 'alim in Bagamoyo after Shaykh Muhammad, Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, who received an ijaza of the Shadhiliyya, claims that the aid from Shaykh Muhammad, though extensive, is not as great as that of his father. One of the reasons why Shaykh Ramiya had so many murids, he went on to say, was because many of them depended on him for food, wives, and money for taxes. Shaykh Muhammad, when asked how his father helped his murids, said:

> He used to help them in various ways. For example, if a man did not have money for marriage expenses, he [Shaykh Ramiya] gave him the money; if there was any difficulty concerning food, Shaykh would offer to help; he even gave clothing to them. When he was qadi [a position he held as liwali] here there were men who used to quarrel with their wives over clothing; he used to take three pieces of cloth and give them to him.[17]

Shaykh Ramiya was considered by many to have had supernatural powers. On at least two occasions it is claimed that he performed miraculous feats, one involving the transformation of tin into money and the other the transportation of a party of his murids across a river without the aid of any visible means.[18] The belief in such accomplishments enhanced not only his status as a saint (wali) but also his reputation for beneficience. After giving examples of his assistance to murids when he was alive, one of the murids said, "Until today people still grieve and go to his grave."[19] As I was able to observe, visits to his grave (visiting graves is a practice popular in Muslim East Africa wherever saints are buried) were often made for the purpose of offering intercessory prayers to him so that his baraka would transmit grants from God.

In addition to religious and material benefits, adherents of the

Qadiriyya also received what Salisbury called solidary benefits. Every Thursday and Sunday evening since the introduction of the tariqa in Bagamoyo, the male murids have gathered at the home of their shaykh. The purpose of the meeting is to perform the ritual of dhikr, a ceremony that consists of reading and chanting, rhythmic swaying, and a respiratory exercise that results in hyperventilation (which often leads to unconsciousness). The purpose of the dhikr is to attain a level of spiritual transcendence through the repetition of the names of Allah and His attributes. Virtually all of the ceremony, which ends after about three hours' duration in a crescendolike fashion, is done in unison, thus creating a tremendous sense of group solidarity. Aside from the ceremony itself, the sense of comaraderie is also fostered by some socializing among murids before and after the dhikr, primarily in the form of congenial conversation.

Along with the twice-a-week dhikr ritual, the Qadiri murids hold a number of annual celebrations. These include the commemoration of the birth of the founder of the Qadiriyya, Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1 Ramadan); the *hawli*, or anniversary of the death of Shaykh Ramiya (5 Safar); the celebration of the breaking of the fast, or *Idi Ndogo* (1 Shawwal); and the most popular festival, the birthday (or Mawlid) of the Prophet (12 Rabi' al-Awal). These celebrations include the collective dhikr, which usually lasts all night for these occasions, as well as musical accompaniment and food. They attract murids from Bagamoyo as well as from other locales, with the attendance at the Mawlid of the Prophet as high as 3,000 to 5,000 people.

The female murids meet on Friday mornings at one of the residences of the shaykh; at this meeting, called the *zawiya,* they perform the dhikr ritual under the shaykh's leadership. The women also take part in the annual celebrations, although their participation is carried out in quarters separate from the men.

Perhaps what most sharply distinguishes the Qadiriyya tariqa from the Ahmadiyya tariqa in Bagamoyo is the relative absence of benefits that accrue to the murids of the Ahmadiyya. First, the khalifas of the Ahmadiyya have not been recognized as shaykhs in the same sense as Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad have been by their murids; they have not been considered to be walis or to have baraka. Thus, what religious benefits adherents of the Ahmadiyya receive they derive directly from the performance of dhikr. Second, as a partial result of the first shortcoming, the khalifas of the order are not under the obligation that Shaykh Muhammad is to aid their murids; any help they do extend is based more on friendship ties than on religious necessity. It is mainly in the area of solidary benefits

that both orders exhibit the greatest similarity. The Monday and Wednesday night dhikrs of the Ahmadiyya provide the kind of fellowship found at Qadiriyya dhikr rituals, though not to the degree of intensity found there. At the same time, however, the Ahmadiyya does not hold annual celebrations to the extent that the Qadiriyya does. Therefore, in terms of benefits, the two orders are vastly different, with the Ahmadiyya resembling a kind of fellowship society.

THE ATTRACTION OF FOLLOWERS

After receiving the ijaza of khalifa from Sayyid Muhammad b. Husayn al-Lughani in about 1905,[20] Shaykh Ramiya set out immediately to build the tariqa. In its initial stages, he attracted followers by performing dhikr alone, either in front of his house or elsewhere in the town, which lured onlookers who would then join in with him. When he had a sizable number of followers, he took steps to institutionalize what was slowly growing around him. A *banda* (a kind of shed) was built next to his house for the early adherents to use for celebrating the weekly dhikr rituals, and roles and procedures were established. A follower became a formal adherent of Shaykh Ramiya by receiving an ijaza from him; this involved a ceremony in which he said a short prayer, either while holding the prospective murid's hand or giving him a mixture of water and sugar to drink. It was upon completion of this ceremony that the individual became known as a murid of Shaykh Ramiya and later of Shaykh Muhammad.

In addition to the procedures for formal membership, a hierarchy of roles was instituted. As a khalifa, Shaykh Ramiya was authorized to create khalifas of his own who could then spread the tariqa in other areas. Below the khalifas, the next most important figure was the murshid, who was responsible for leading the dhikr at the weekly ceremonies. Next in importance after the murshid was the *bishawishi*, whose job it was to look after the well-being of the zawiya, the place where the dhikr was performed. Once these roles and procedures had been established, Shaykh Ramiya was in a position to attract more followers because the benefits he had to offer could be made available on a systematic basis.

The reason why Shaykh Ramiya and, later, Shaykh Muhammad were successful in attracting adherents depended, not simply on the structure for the distribution of benefits, but primarily on the nature of these incentives in the context of what might be called "market conditions" in Bagamoyo. It must be emphasized in regard to the religious benefits that Bagamoyo was not only 90 percent orthodox

Muslim in population, but it was a town in which religion, as one resident has stated"holds prominence over other activities."[21] Informants emphasized that as shaykh of 'ilm, Shaykh Ramiya was able to draw many Muslims to the Qadiriyya. He did so primarily through his madrasa, which became the most important one in Bagamoyo after the death of Shaykh Abu Bakr. Two of his earliest khalifas became active in the tariqa after studying 'ilm with him. As Shaykh Muhammad explained to me, people in the town were attracted to the tariqa because Islam was already entrenched in the town when it arrived.[22]

The religious as well as the material benefits that Shaykh Ramiya was able to offer to adherents appealed to a large segment of the population in Bagamoyo. Throughout its history, Bagamoyo was characterized by a sharp cleavage between the "haves" and "have nots," with the overwhelming majority of its people in the second category. The economically deprived class comprised almost entirely Africans, especially those of slave origin. It was no coincidence that the Qadiriyya became known as the tariqa of "the people from upcountry," the source of most slaves.

The very first followers of Shaykh Ramiya, Africans from hinterland backgrounds, were supported by him and lived at his compound. Of the approximately thirty khalifas, murshids, and bishawishis of Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad in Bagamoyo, all but two were Africans.[23] At the level of the rank-and-file murid, the tariqa was totally African in composition, except for a few very young Arabs. When an African informant was asked why Arabs did not enter the Qadiriyya, he gave the somewhat pert and cryptic reply *"sababu wanajua wenyewe"* ("they themselves know the reason").[24] Thus, in addition to a ready audience for religious and material benefits in Bagamoyo, there was also one available for the solidary incentives the tariqa had to offer.

Like many coastal towns, Bagamoyo has long been characterized by a cleavage between the indigenous and the immigrant communities. For the various upcountry immigrants who could not easily return to their homelands, one of their main tasks was to integrate themselves into a way of life dominated by the Shirazi-Islamic culture. For the immigrants, "conversion to Islam . . . [was] both a symbol of the acceptance of the Coastal way of life and also a means of participating in local events and values."[25]

There had been only two Islamic holidays observed in the town, Idi Ndogo and Idi Kubwa, the Id al-Fitr (the breaking of the fast) and Id al-Hajj (the feast of the pilgramage). With the establishment of

the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo, opportunities for participation in the "local events and values" of the community were considerably widened through the various weekly and annual celebrations connected with the tariqa. Of these events, it was the Mawlid celebration that attracted adherents to the Qadiriyya more than any other and, perhaps, more than anything else that Shaykh Ramiya instituted.

The solidary incentives of the tariqa were even more attractive to the women, whose social and religious options in the prevailing Muslim milieu were fairly limited. After Quran school, which was usually attended before puberty, a woman's participation in organized religious activities was restricted because she either could not or was not expected to pray at the mosques. Also, with the breakup of the women's dance societies after the confrontation in 1936, women's social options were further limited. Given these restraints, it is, again, no coincidence that the greatest influx of women into the Qadiriyya occurred immediately after the dance socieites were disbanded.

By the time the Ahmadiyya arrived in Bagamoyo in 1938, the "market" that it would have appealed to for membership had largely been captured by the Qadiriyya. Therefore, it was attractive to those groups or individuals in the orthodox Muslim community who were sympathetic to tariqa affiliation but had not joined the Qadiriyya; this category included the Arabs, who became the predominant group in the Ahmadiyya, and the Shomvi-Shirazi, who in recent years have joined the order. Just as the Qadiriyya became known as the tariqa of the people from the hinterland, the Ahmadiyya has been referred to as the tariqa of *mwinyis* ("masters" or "owners"), in reference to the dominant historical position of the Arabs and the Shomvi-Shirazi in Bagamoyo.

Another and very important limitation on the ability of the Ahmadiyya to recruit murids was their prohibition on allowing women to become adherents. A leading murid of the Ahmadiyya in Dar es Salam gave this as one of the main reasons why the order has not been able to broaden its base.[26] This prohibition explains to a large degree why a number of Arab women, who would more than likely have become murids in the Ahmadiyya as their menfolk did had that been possible, became affiliated with the Qadiriyya.

THE EXCHANGE OF BENEFITS

In order for an organization to be sustained, it is necessary that there be an adequate flow of benefits to the organizers as well as to members, returns that pay the cost of the benefits from the organizers to the members, plus some profit.

For a sufficient flow of returns to Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad, it was necessary that there be a sizable membership in the order. Estimates on the number of murids in the Qadiriyya throughout its history in the town differ considerably. For example, before the death of Shaykh Abu Bakr in about 1911, one appraisal says there were about 100 adherents while another claims as many as 25 percent of the male population, which at the time would have totaled between 800 and 1,000 adherents. For the tenure of Shaykh Ramiya, when he was the liwali from 1916 to 1928, estimates range from 200 murids, including men and women, all the way to more than 50 percent of the town's total population.

Under Shaykh Muhammad's leadership, which includes the present period, opinions concerning the number of Qadiriyya in the town vary from less than 20 percent to 75 percent of Bagamoyo's residents. Aside from the fact that the estimates vary significantly, depending on the tariqa affiliation of the informant (those who were members and active in the order tended to give the highest estimates while those who were not tended to give the lowest), there is the problem of distinguishing actual murids from followers of the tariqa. Further questioning of informants revealed that approximately 50 percent of the adherents of the Qadiriyya during the tenures of Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad had not received the ijaza, though they called themselves murids. With this qualification, it can be conservatively estimated that the number of murids throughout the existence of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo averaged about 25 percent of the town's total population, or about 750 to 1,200 people.

Though the number of murids is impressive, especially since there was no other organization of this size in Bagamoyo (except perhaps for the Tanganyika African National Union by 1960), the significant fact to note is what membership in the Qadiriyya entailed. Along with various ritual obligations, such as the performance of special prayers (*awrad*) and recitations, the murid has very strict obligations to his or her shaykh. According to tariqa doctrines, once an individual becomes attached to a shaykh, he relinquishes his will and must totally submit to his shaykh. To quote again from the popular Qadiri manual, *Zimam al-salikin*: "He who disobeys his shaykh is exactly like he who disobeys the Messenger of God."[27] It is necessary to obey the shaykh if one wants to reach God because the commands of the shaykh are from God.

The act of submission by the murid is expressed by his or her being extremely courteous in the presence of the shaykh. "He who is not courteous with his shaykh will not be courteous in the presence

of God."[28] For example, the murid cannot speak in the shaykh's presence until he or she is given permission. The murid is also obligated to give of himself or herself, his or her time and possessions to the shaykh. And he or she must obey not only the shaykh but anyone to whom he has delegated authority.

These obligations of the murid to the shaykh, as stated in *Zimam al-salikin*, were corroborated by the leader and the followers of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo. When asked to make a broad comparison between the manners of a murid before his or her shaykh and a student before his or her mu'allim, Shaykh Muhammad said "The manners of a murid with his shaykh are more than those [of a student with his mu'allim]. . . . A murid is told to be like a corpse in the hands of the washer [of the dead]; he cannot take a new direction but must do as the shaykh tells him to do."[29] (The expression "like a corpse in the hands of the washer" is mentioned in *Zimam al-salikin* —*"ka-al-mayt bayna yaday al-ghasil"*).

More specifically, Shaykh Muhammad said, "A shaykh can put a murid to work on something." At the same time, as he explained, the shaykh should excuse the murid who is unable to carry out an assignment. A murshid of Shaykh Muhammad said that the manners of a murid toward his or her shaykh have many ingredients. "One of them is obedience and when we say obedience it includes everything that pleases the murid to perform for his shaykh."[30] One of Shaykh Ramiya's murids was asked how they behaved with him: "When they were in his presence they were very obedient to him and feared him reverently. . . . They could not be disorderly, and they abided by everything he told them."[31] Shaykh Muhammad affirmed also that in Bagamoyo the murid observed the custom of remaining silent until given permission to speak by his shaykh. "This custom is practiced in Bagamoyo: they [murids] cannot do a thing until they are permitted or told by me."

The feeling among many informants was that the discipline of a murid was much greater in former times than is the case now. Shaykh Muhammad's opinion was that about half or more closely followed their obligations. On the other hand, it does not appear that the benefits from Shaykh Muhammad to his murids are as great as they had been in the past. It was the unanimous opinion of most respondents that those Muslims who called themselves murids of either Shaykh Ramiya or Shaykh Muhammad, even though they had not actually been given the ijaza, for the most part followed the obligations of actual murids. At the same time, as one murshid pointed

out, such followers were distinguished from the adherents who had received ijazas.

As the heads of a tariqa with a large membership and following, Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad were accorded the highest adulation that could be bestowed on anyone in Bagamoyo by the vast majority of its population. A murid of Shaykh Ramiya said that "he was liked, worshipped [and] obeyed" by the people.[32] In the case of Shaykh Muhammad, one had only to be in his company for a brief period to become aware of the extensive reverence in which he was held by the townspeople. He was granted, as his father had been, the custom, of having his hand kissed which was usually reserved for sharifs. Many people, especially the women, gave the impression of being awestruck by him and a stroll by him in town created a stir as numerous people rushed toward him to pay their respects by bowing, genuflecting, or kissing his hand. This outpouring of esteem came from people not affiliated with the Qadiriyya as well as from his murids. Some suggested that this homage had been even greater for Shaykh Ramiya.

Along with the tremendous respect they received, Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad also obtained occasionally or, in some situations regularly, the services of their murids. One of the main reasons why the annual Mawlid, or celebration of the Prophet's birthday, was so popular and successful in attracting adherents and sympathizers to the Qadiriyya was the substantial assistance both leaders received from their murids in its preparation and execution. Their help included the acquisition and preparation of food for the townspeople and visitors, the planning and staging of the ceremonies, and the provision of accommodations and hospitality for the many guests and visitors. Furthermore, though they were under no obligation to do so, many murids in Bagamoyo and nearby settlements made material contributions for the occasion in the form of money and foodstuffs.

In addition to the assistance they received for the Mawlid, Shaykh Ramiya and his son could count on their murids to help on the plantations when needed. One murid of Shaykh Ramiya said "They followed his orders like slaves, even to the point that they used to go and cultivate Shaykh's plantation at Mtoni [near the Kingani River]."[33] The products of this labor were often used by Shaykh Ramiya to help people—murids and nonadherents—in need. Shaykh Muhammad also utilizes murids on his plantation (which he inherited from his father) but he employs more extensively the boarding students for whose upkeep he provides. It is assistance of this kind that

pays for both the direct and overhead costs of the material and solidary benefits provided by the leaders of the Qadiriyya.

Just as the Ahmadiyya differed sharply from the Qadiriyya in that its leadership in Bagamoyo was neither obligated to provide its murids with the level of benefits given by the Qadiriyya nor did so, so there was no corresponding level of benefits that flowed to its leaders. Though Mzee Fereji b. 'Umar was highly respected by his followers, this regard did not approach in any way the reverential attitude of the Qadiriyya murids toward their leaders. Neither was there any of the outpouring of sentiment for the Ahmadiyya's head among the general population that there was for Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad. Again, insofar as Mzee Fereji received assistance of any form from his murids, it was the result more of friendship ties than of religious obligations.[34] Since the overhead costs of the solidary benefits that he provided were small in comparison to what Shaykh Ramiya and his son incurred, he was in a position to bear them himself, as he usually did. In light of his affluence and that of his family, such costs entailed relatively little burden. In conclusion, therefore, the Ahmadiyya as an organization was characterized by minimal exchange of benefits between its organizer and members, a characteristic that radically distinguished it from the Qadiriyya.

CHAPTER 8

The Tariqa and Prenationalist Politics

The sufi brotherhood can be viewed as an interest group, and one of the main activities of its leaders is to lobby in the religious community of which it is a part and/or in the wider public arena. Such activities can obtain benefits for the membership itself (selective benefits) and benefits for the wider community (collective benefits). Given an interest group that was overwhelmingly African in composition and a social stratification system in which Africans occupied the lowest positions, the question is to what degree did the activities of the Qadiriyya's leadership advance African interests in Bagamoyo's Sunni community and in the broader polity before the nationalist movement?

CONFLICT IN THE SUNNI COMMUNITY

The Shomvi-Shirazi had traditionally filled positions in the learned class in Bagamoyo. Mtoro b. Mwenyi Bakari, a Shomvi-Shirazi who was expected to succeed Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Taha as the leading shaykh of 'ilm in the town, happened to be in Germany at the time of the shaykh's death in 1910.[1] The most qualified person in the town then was Shaykh Ramiya, a Manyema who, owing to his slave origins, was of a low social status. Aside from his learning, an im-

portant factor in Shaykh Ramiya's selection by the Sunni community was that, as shaykh of a very popular tariqa, he could draw on the assistance of his followers to carry out the other vital duties of shaykh of the town, such as caring for orphans and receiving strangers.

Though there was no question among the majority of Sunni Muslims that Shaykh Ramiya was unequaled in learning in Bagamoyo, there were, nonetheless, two direct and unsuccessful challenges to Shaykh Ramiya's accession to the post, both by individuals who were Shomvi-Shirazi. The second challenge, the one for which there are some details, was that of Mzee wa Kongwa, who opened a madrasa with the intention of attracting more students of 'ilm than Shaykh Ramiya. It was clear, however, after about three days that Shaykh Ramiya was the most popular teacher of 'ilm in the town.

Although unsuccessful in their earliest challenge to Shaykh Ramiya as the town's leading shaykh of 'ilm, the Shomvi-Shirazi did not give up their struggle. This became evident in a number of disputes over the post of imam in the Friday mosque. In about 1909, Shaykh Sufi b. Muhammad, the son-in-law of Shaykh Abu Bakr and the acting imam whenever the elder shaykh went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, was accused by the brother of one of the leading Baluchis of the town, Muhammad b. Yusuf, of illegally fathering a child by a woman in Muhammad's household. A bitter dispute arose, and Shaykh Sufi was removed from the post after an opposing coalition of the leading Arabs, the Baluchi, and Shaykh Ramiya was formed. Though Shaykh Abu Bakr was still alive then, he had to acquiescence in the move since there was overwhelming evidence against his son-in-law. The Shomvi-Shirazi also went along with the decision, but they tried to have another member of their community, Rajabu b. Marera, fill the post permanently, (Shaykh Abu Bakr had died by then). But Shaykh Ramiya successfully supported the leader of the Arab community, Shaykh 'Umar b. 'Awad, for the post.

Shaykh Sufi left Bagamoyo and did not return until after the First World War, when he was accompanied by his brother Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad. With the support of the Shomvi-Shirazi, he regained the post of imam. But in about 1922 another dispute, the details of which are not clear, came about, and Shaykh Sufi once more was removed from the post because of popular sentiment against him. This time Shaykh Ramiya played the leading role in appointing his successor, Shaykh 'Umar, for a second time, in addition to two younger men to assist him, Sharif Burhan and a Baluchi, 'Isa b. al-Qadir.

Never having reconciled themselves to Shaykh Ramiya's new

appointments, the Shomvi-Shirazi attempted to have 'Isa dismissed in 1932, a year after Shaykh Ramiya's death, by publicly accusing him of incompetence while privately charging that he had committed adultery. They sought the support of the assistant district officer, D. W. Malcolm, but to no avail since he argued that the appointment had been the work of the late Shaykh Ramiya and could not be undone; he advised them to perform their Friday prayers elsewhere if they disliked 'Isa, which they did for a period.

These disputes reveal the attempts of the Shomvi-Shirazi to reassert their traditional preeminence in the 'ulama community, which entailed both direct and indirect conflict with the coalition of Shaykh Ramiya, the Arabs, and the Baluchis. That Shaykh Ramiya "was on the side of the Arabs,"[2] the community that the Shomvi-Shirazi had opposed since the final decades of the precolonial period, only intensified their struggle against him. It is apparent that Shaykh Ramiya felt he had more in common with the Arabs and the Baluchis than with the Shomvi-Shirazi.

The Shomvi-Shirazi's most direct challenge to Shaykh Ramiya was to his position as head of the Qadiriyya. In November, 1922, the administrator in charge of the district, C. G. Richards, wrote a letter on the subject of "zikiri" (dhikr) in Bagamoyo in which he said, "Of the two main Mohamedan sects in this town, one is entirely opposed to Zikiri, while the other, and more numerous one is very ardent in its observance. As a result of this difference of opinion, there is bitter enmity between the two leaders."[3] Richards was referring to a dispute between Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad, the brother of Shaykh Sufi, over the performance of dhikr.

Shortly after the First World War, Shaykh Sufi and his brother returned to Bagamoyo from Tabora and Zanzibar, respectively. Since both were khalifas of the famous Barawi Qadiri leader, Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad, they were in a position to initiate murids into the order. However, neither was able to attract anything near the number of Shaykh Ramiya's followers, and virtually all the ones they did have were "*watu wa KiMrima*," Shomvi-Shirazi.

The dispute of 1922 came about when Shaykh Zahur accused Shaykh Ramiya of improper behavior because he allowed his murids, in performing their dhikr rituals, to clap their hands, a custom that Shaykh Zahur considered to be blasphemous. In addition, he argued with Shaykh Ramiya over whether or not a non-Muslim could inherit from a Muslim sibling. He also disagreed with the Baluchi concerning the proper ritual for a funeral. The arguments were

referred to the 'ulama in Zanzibar, and in every case Zahur was declared in error. To save face, he decided to leave Bagamoyo, and eventually he settled in Pemba, where he died in about 1944. A Shomvi-Shirazi informant claimed that Shaykh Zahur had still been liked by the people when he left, but an African said that the people began to have less respect for Zahur after these quarrels and started regarding him as a troublemaker. When asked whether the issues in the disputes concealed other motives of Zahur, the same person said, "He wanted to be more influential than anyone else . . . he was jealous . . . of the fact that Shaykh Ramiya had so many murids."[4]

During the dissension of 1932 over the imam of the Friday mosque, the Shomvi-Shirazi tried to remove 'Isa b. Abd al-Qadir, a Baluchi, from the post. Their unsuccessful attempt occurred a year after the death of Shaykh Ramiya, when his son Shaykh Muhammad, who was twenty-two at the time, had not yet firmly established himself as the leading shaykh of 'ilm in the town. Shaykh Ramiya had arranged the imam's appointment and Shaykh Muhammad had supported it, and so Shaykh Muhammad saw the Shomvi-Shirazi attempt as one aimed against himself. In Shaykh Muhammad's opinion, this was to be expected of the Shomvi-Shirazi: "Even the P.C. [provincial commisioner] said this was the nature of the people of the Mrima [the Shomvi-Shirazi]"; that is, it was in their nature to sow discord.

Within the tariqa itself, Shaykh Muhammad gained firm control only after he had initiated a group of khalifas and murids whose loyalty he could trust rather than having to rely on those who had been his father's closest followers. This can be seen in regard to Shaykh 'Isa b. Mzee, a khalifa of Shaykh Ramiya and perhaps the closest one to him in Bagamoyo. Right after the death of Shaykh Ramiya, Shayka 'Isa donned a turban, the symbol of leadership, acting on the assumption that he would be chosen Shaykh Ramiya's successor. However, the other leading members decided that Shaykh Muhammad would succeed his father. The differences that later emerged between Shaykh Muhammad and Shaykh 'Isa over the struggle for independence probably owed their origin to this decision.

The last conflict of relevance within the Sunni community came to light in 1938. A letter written by the acting district commissioner to the provincial commissioner is informative.

> I have the honour to report on an unfortunate internal dissention [*sic*] that has sprung up in Bagamoyo Township among the local Moslem leaders. A short time ago Sheikh Mohamed Ramia [son of a former Liwali, and a Manyema by tribe] pronounced twice in a local Mosque that the Prophet was

not an Arab. Other Sheikhs and local Arabs were incensed at this heretical statement, while many adherents of the religion took a keen interest in the matter.[5]

The official went on to say that the disputing parties, Shaykh Muhammad on one side and Salih b. Hassan, the head of the Arab community, on the other, would submit the question, with the government's assistance, to the chief qadi in Zanzibar (then Sayyid 'Umar b. Ahmad Sumayt) for settlement. The question was sent to him (without the government's help because it felt it was not appropriate for it to become involved). Sayyid 'Umar issued a legal opinion saying that the Prophet was indeed had been an Arab.

This did not end the dispute, which continued for about three years and which Shaykh Muhammad described as "an enormous controversy," especially since all of the Arabs in Bagamoyo had taken a position opposing him. Both sides—Shaykh Muhammad's included his numerous murids and followers—even prayed Friday prayers in different mosques during the entire period. It was finally settled by a foreign sharif after he had a vision in which he claimed to have met the Prophet, who had ordered both parties to settle their differences.

Shaykh Muhammad explained that his statement on the Prophet's ethnicity meant that, though his physical birth was by means of Arabs (*"katika matumbo WaArabu,"* literally "in the stomachs of Arabs"), he was a man of all races; "He was a personage of Arabs, Swahilis and other peoples." However, an 'alim and longtime ally of the Arabs claimed that the statement reflected a long-standing dislike Shaykh Muhammad had for the Arabs, which was based largely on their former role as slave traders and owners, particularly as it involved his father. He also said that the Arabs, along with the liwali at that time (Gulamrasul Sherdel, a Baluchi), sought to have someone other than Shaykh Muhammad succeed Shaykh Ramiya to the posts of tariqa head and leading shaykh of 'ilm. This was another reason for Shaykh Muhammad's hostility toward the Arabs.

Shaykh Muhammad himself has given information that supports this view. On a number of occasions in talking about Bagamoyo's history and the slave trade, he referred to the Arabs, along with the Baluchis and the Shomvi-Shirazi, as evildoers for what they did to Africans. Shaykh Muhammad has never availed himself of the assistance for which he is still eligible from the family of his father's owners, the Arab al-Lamki family. The reason, according to one informant, is his dislike for Arabs. (It is also probably the case that he is unwilling to perform an act that would confirm his status as

slave.) In conclusion, the dispute about the Prophet's ethnicity reflected the cleavage between the former slave owners and the former slaves in Bagamoyo and resulted from the effort of former slaves, in the person of Shaykh Muhammad, to undermine the influence of the Arabs, the former slave owners, in the religious sphere. This division and competition manifested itself in the political sphere as well.

THE QADIRIYYA AND THE COLONIAL AUTHORITIES

Shortly after Shaykh Ramiya's tenure as head of the Qadiriyya began, he found it necessary to lobby in the public arena. In about 1909, the Germans issued an order banning the performance of dhikr. They claimed that it caused hoarseness so that the young children who participated in it were unable to sing in school. Had the order been implemented, Shaykh Ramiya would have been deprived of one of the most important benefits he could offer to his followers, and this would probably have meant the early end of the tariqa in Bagamoyo. And so, after the arrest and incarceration of one of his murids for performing dhikr, Shaykh Ramiya went to the government officers to obtain permission for continuing the ritual. After some discussion, an agreement was worked out whereby his murids were to carry an identification card, with Shaykh Ramiya's signature, that would allow them to engage in dhikr.

On at least two occasions during Shaykh Ramiya's period, the British authorities tried either to prevent dhikr or to harass the murids. In one instance, the government said that the performance of the ritual would lead to a violation of the curfew, which had been set to begin at 11 P.M. "But Shaykh talked to the officials until this thing [the ban] was gotten rid of, and then they performed the dhikr as usual."[6] In the other instance, the district officer in 1922 tried to ban the ritual because of the dispute that year between Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Zahur. In the midst of the dispute, he sent the militia to prevent the murids from performing the ritual, and on the next day Shaykh Ramiya went to speak with him. Again it was arranged that his murids would carry permit cards as they had during the German period. In all of these instances, Shaykh Ramilya's efforts were directed at securing selective benefits for his murids in order to maintain the internal exchange of benefits in the tariqa.

As liwali, Shaykh Ramiya was able to lobby for policies that benefited the vast majority of Bagamoyo's residents as well as his murids. Given the ethnicity of the past holders of the post, Shaykh Ramiya's selection represented a significant change. Though it cannot be said

that he used the tariqa to obtain the position, the Qadiriyya was instrumental in his selection. The reason Shaykh Ramiya was appointed as liwali is partially revealed in a letter he wrote to the government in Dar es Salaam in 1930, requesting a pension after his retirement in 1928.

> It is I who was first caught on the day the English arrived in Bagamoyo. I was busy extinguishing fire from houses which were burning, as I was pitying the country and [fearing] other unpleasant events, lest thieves should harm people's property. This happened on 15th August, 1916. . . . I was given the work of assisting Porters for going to the front, and to perform other work in the town, such as collecting cattle required for food, and to keep the town clean. . . . After some days, I was given the work of Liwali.[7]

As the letter suggests, Shaykh Ramiya was selected to be liwali by the British because of the initiative he took during the crisis and the assistance he gave to the newly arrived rulers. What he was able to do depended in large part on the fact that he had an organization, the tariqa, to assist him, without which his initiatve would have been meaningless and his help to the British of little importance. For instance, he and his murids were responsible for extinguishing the fire in the town caused by the British artillery. Shaykh Muhammad cited this as an example of the kind of assistance his father could expect from his murids; "He left the house here with his murids and took buckets, water vessels, tin cans, and went to fetch water in order to extinguish the fire."

Since the townspeople had abandoned their homes during the bombardment and Shaykh Ramiya and his followers were the only residents whom the invading troops could find, he and some of his murids were taken to one of the British ships offshore. There he negotiated the town's security with the British, and, after he sent one of his murids to summon the important elders of the town, an agreement was made that Bagamoyo would be spared from further bombing. The result was that the "sheikh was viewed by the townspeople as a Saviour both of the people and of the town."

Shaykh Ramiya was assisted by his murids in other tasks that aided the British during their first few weeks in Bagamoyo. The murids who were most helpful at that time were those who lived at his compound. Because of his assistance to the British and the fact that the vast majority of the town's residents did not like the liwali whom the Germans had appointed (Amur b. Nasur), the new rulers, after canvasing popular opinion, appointed Shaykh Ramiya as the town's new liwali. He was the first African in Bagamoyo, and perhaps in all of Tanganyika, to hold the post. Certainly a very important factor in

this decision (as was the case in his selection to be the leading shaykh of 'ilm) was the fact that he, unlike anyone else at the time, had at his disposal an organization that had no equal in the town.

As liwali, Shaykh Ramiya performed the functions of town headman and qadi (in Swahili, *kadhi*). As town headman, he was responsible primarily for the collection of hut and poll taxes and secondarily for the general supervision and maintenance of the town on behalf of the district office. As qadi, his job was essentially to rule on and administer matters concerning Islamic law. Though in both capacities he was able to lobby for benefits for the larger community, it was as liwali that Shaykh Ramiya was most effective.

Most informants recalled that as liwali Shaykh Ramiya represented and advocated the interests of the people before the government. This was usually stressed when I asked people to compare Shaykh Ramiya with his successor as liwali from 1929 to 1961, Gulamrasul Sherdel. The following comment is typical.

> The late shaykh tried very hard to make peace among the people, also he offered suggestions to the government concerning things that the people wanted. . . . I cannot say that the late shaykh was like Gulamrasul, he did not do these things. Gulamrasul tended to be more on the side of the government, not the side of the subjects [people].[8]

When people, especially Africans, had certain needs or problems, they were much more likely to go first to Shaykh Ramiya for help than to the district officer. Usually, the shaykh would try to provide a solution on his own, and, if he were unsuccessful, he would then go with the individual to the district office. He had built such a reputation in this regard that, even after he had retired from the liwaliate in 1928, people came to him with their problems and often wanted him to intervene on their behalf with the government. There is no question that, after he left office and until his death in 1931, people solicited his assistance far more often than that of his successor, Gulamrasul Sherdel. Shaykh Ramiya represented the interests of the wider community as well as individuals. One example is that the government, in respect for his views as the head of the Sunni Muslim community, did not permit the establishment of bars in the town during his lifetime.[9]

The great majority of people in the town, especially the Africans, considered Shaykh Ramiya to be a representative of their views to the government, or "*upande wa raia*," "on the side of the subjects." This no doubt explains his success in gaining their compliance with virtually every one of his requests. Also, as one informant explained, people obeyed him because they considered him a God-fearing man

(*mcha mungu*) and reasoned that he must be "feared" in return. Another attributed the obedience he obtained from the people to his religious stature, not only as a shaykh of 'ilm, but as the head of a tariqa, whose membership included a large percentage of the town's population. Just as the assistance of his murids, in obeying his commands, had influenced his appointment to the liwaliate, so also their aid enabled him to carry out various administrative duties for which the government had not specifically provided assistance.

The compliance that Shaykh Ramiya could expect from the broader populace takes on added significance when contrasted with what his successor, Gulamrasul Sherdel, was able to get. The main difference between them was that, whereas the people obeyed Shaykh Ramiya because of his personal qualities (such as his religious stature), Gulamrasul obtained compliance primarily because of the support of the district office. Correspondence between the district and provincial offices one year after Gulamrasul had assumed the duties of liwali supports this view. Both offices began requesting that the central government confer greater legal powers on the liwali to "compel a native" or "native leaders, elders, and people" to do things that, according to informants, Shaykh Ramiya had been able to make people do without special legislation.[10]

During his tenure as liwali, Shaykh Ramiya was able not only to provide benefits to the wider community but also to his murids. For instance, he often helped them to pay their taxes. It is interesting to note that the district office did not always think he was adamant enough with people in the collection of taxes. To the extent that this was true, his murids as well as others benefited from the apparent laxity. Also, there were numerous ways in which Shaykh Ramiya as the liwali personally aided his followers; this explains in part why, as most people have agreed, the greatest increase in the number of murids occurred when he held the post.

As was often the case with colonial rule, the views of the subjects and those of the rulers differed sharply on what constituted an able administrator. Though Gulamrasul, who was not especially liked by most of the townspeople, particularly the Africans, earned the admiration of virtually every district officer and commissioner under whom he served, Shaykh Ramiya was not similarly acclaimed by his British overlords in Bagamoyo.

The misappropriation of tax monies in 1928 by two assistants of Shaykh Ramiya whose job it was to collect hut and poll taxes brought to a head what had been a strained relationship between Shaykh Ramiya and J. L. Woodhouse, the district officer. Shaykh Ramiya

resigned from the liwaliate because of the revelation of the embezzlement and the conviction of his assistants. Woodhouse said that, "even if the Liwali was unware of these irregularities, as he states, I consider that it was his business to have known of them, and I informed him accordingly."[11] Informants say, however, that Shaykh Ramiya resigned because Woodhouse disliked him and that the district officer accused him wrongly of the crime and also tried to accuse him fraudulently of other irregularities.

The incident had ramifications beyond Shaykh Ramiya's difficulties with Woodhouse because it involved the earlier conflict that surfaced in the Sunni community between Shaykh Ramiya and the Shomvi-Shirazi. In a letter to the provincial commissioner about the resignation, Woodhouse recommended as replacements for Shaykh Ramiya, Gulamrasul to serve as town headman and Shaykh Sufi b. Muhammad to be qadi.[12] An individual who was close to the Shomvi-Shirazi at the time said Shaykh Sufi had been plotting with Woodhouse and a Baluchi named Muhammad b. Yusuf to remove Shaykh Ramiya from the post because Shaykh Sufi wanted to become qadi, if not liwali. In view of Woodhouse's failure to say anything about Shaykh Sufi's contentious history in his letter of recommendation—a letter that otherwise provides background information on him that goes back to the German era—it is plausible that Woodhouse was not straightforward in his explanation of the circumstances of Shaykh Ramiya's resignation.

Woodhouse did mention that, in his discussion with representatives from the Arab and Baluchi communities, "one Arab, Omar Awadh, said that the Arabs wished Ramia to be reinstated, but he did not appear to receive much support from the others." When one recalls that Shaykh Ramiya successfully supported Omar Awadh (Shaykh 'Umar b. 'Awad) for the post of imam in the Friday mosque in a controversy during the German era, it is understandable that Shaykh 'Umar wanted Shaykh Ramiya returned to the liwaliate.

Another paragraph of Woodhouse's letter perhaps reveals his true intentions. He stated that he did not consult the "natives" of Bagamoyo for suggestions about filling the post of liwali for the following reason.

> I do not consider that a native would have sufficient authority to perform the work required at present, as things have been allowed to become very slack under Ramia, and also I could not recommend any native in the District, from personal knowledge of his capabilities, for the post.

In the opinion of everyone to whom I read this statement, Woodhouse was entirely incorrect in his assessment of the "capabilities" of

"a native" for the post, particularly since there was no non-native who they felt could even compare to Shaykh Ramiya in abilities. The real meaning of Woodhouse's statement, according to a close confidant of the Shomvi-Shirazi, was that he did not want an African in the post.

Shaykh Muhammad's opinion of Woodhouse's statement provides not only an important insight into the dispute but reveals the shaykh's perspective on ethnic politics in Bagamoyo.

> I think it was because of the dislike of the white people in the past—Europeans, Indians—in the past they strongly hated Africans. The Arabs strongly disliked Africans and they used them only as servants. Thus, [according to them] the servant is not supposed to exercise authority over the master.

Once again, as was the case in the dispute over the Prophet's ethnicity, the African versus non-African/white versus black cleavage was the framework through which Shaykh Muhammad viewed this particular issue. Whether or not it was valid, the tendency of Shaykh Muhammad, and no doubt many Africans, to view politics in Bagamoyo in such terms is of profound importance in understanding his active participation in the struggle for independence.

It was not long after he became head of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo that Shaykh Muhammad found it necessary to approach the colonial authorities, for the same reasons that had prompted his father to do so earlier, to press for the removal of governmental restrictions on the performance of dhikr. The central government issued a confidential circular in 1933, which subjected dhikr to the administrations's scrutiny.[13]

Bagamoyo was one locale where the district commissioner interpreted the circular very conservatively since at that time, about two years after Shaykh Ramiya's death, the ritual was banned. Shaykh Muhammad and his close followers decided to meet with the district officer and explained that permission had been granted to them to perform the dhikr ever since the German period; they even produced the permit cards that murids had been required to carry then. It is not clear what the outcome of this meeting was, but it seems that the Qadiris took their case as far as the governor, from whom they did receive permission to carry out the ritual and a guarantee not to be bothered again. As a result, Shaykh Muhammad was able to maintain the flow of the benefits that derived from the performance of dhikr to his murids.

The period before nationalist politics became popular in Bagamoyo was one in which the leaders of the Qadiriyya (Shaykh Ramiya and, later, Shaykh Muhammad) were preoccupied with conflict within the Sunni community that indirectly focused on authority in the

community and with the lobbying activities that maintained the flow of benefits to the murids. Although, at the broader level of the total East African Sunni community, there had been conflict and tensions between the traditional 'ulama class and the tariqa followers—as there had been in other places in the Muslim world—in Bagamoyo such friction was not so common. The conflict there was less one in which the tariqa rivaled the 'ulama class for influence than one in which brotherhood leaders struggled for acceptance as the head of the 'ulama.

THE POLITICS OF THE TANGANYIKA AFRICAN ASSOCIATION

In August 1939, a branch of the Tanganyika African Association was established in Bagamoyo. There seems to have been little direction from the center in Dar es Salaam before the Second World War, and activities and programs in the branches tended to be based almost exclusively on local issues.

Mtumwa b. Maksudi, a Manyema truck driver from Bagamoyo whose work often took him to Dar es Salaam, where he became familiar with the association, was the individual most responsible for establishing a branch in the town. After consulting some of the leading people of the town, including Shaykh Muhammad, and getting the permission of District Commissioner F. W. Bampfylde, Mzee Mtumwa invited a group from the association's headquarters in Dar es Salaam to come and open a branch office.[14] In persuading people of the value of having the organization in Bagamoyo, Mzee Mtumwa said he told them, "This party has much importance for us, which is that of fighting for our 'rights.'" One individual whom he had long conversations with, Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, said the purpose for bringing the association to Bagamoyo had been to make certain that the government learned the views of Africans, an aim that is understandable in view of African opinion about the representation of their interests during the tenure of Liwali Gulamasul Sherdel.

The African Association in Bagamoyo was composed of four officers (a president, a vice-president, a secretary and a treasurer), a category of members called the "strong members" that included about ten people, and the rank-and-file members. Day-to-day work came under the supervision of the president and the secretary. The "strong members," later called the *Halmashauri*, or committee, who were selected by the wider membership because of their commitment, were the association members most responsible for deciding and executing policies.

There were a number of individuals who played predominant roles in the organization in terms of the length of time they served as either officers or strong members from 1939 to 1954. They included Mtumwa b. Maksudi, Shaykh Muhammad, Mtumwa b. Diwani, Ramdhani b. Diwani, Tamim b. Salum, Shani Kissawaga, and Khamisi b. Selemani. Though the main African ethnic groups were fairly proportionately represented in the association, figures based on the membership list for 1944 and later census data show that it was at the leadership level that an important divergence occurred.[15] Of the seven individuals named above, three (almost half) were Shomvi-Shirazi while, within the African population in the town, they constituted no more than 10 percent of the total for the entire period.

One reason for the disproportionate Shomvi-Shirazi representation at this level can be traced to Mzee Mtumwa, who, in seeking support for the association's establishment, made a special appeal to them because, as he said, they were the "*kwanza wenyeji wa Bagamoyo*" ("the original inhabitants of Bagamoyo"). Though this may explain why they became involved in the organization, Shaykh Muhammad offered a reason why they were concentrated in the leadership: "They felt perhaps that they would be able to control the party without [having to be] elected."

Though the government in Bagamoyo for the most part gave passive approval to the African Association, or at least did not try to prevent it from operating in the town, Liwali Gulamrasul opposed the organization. The liwali's opposition to the TAA surfaced initially on the issue of Shomvi-Shirazi involvement. In August 1943, the association, whose president and secretary at that time were Shomvi-Shirazi, wrote to the district commissioner asking why there were no elders who were Africans on the liwali's baraza, or the committee to assist the liwali.[16] After about a three-week delay, the district commissioner replied with a letter from Liwali Gulamrasul, who pointed out that two of the three people on his baraza were Africans while one was an Arab. He went on to say that things had been running smoothly with his baraza and that the people who wrote the letter asking about it were trying to make trouble for him because they were Shomvi.[17] In a sarcastic reply to this, the secretary of the association wrote that his original inquiry was written on behalf of the African Association and not the "Shomvi Association" and suggested that the liwali had a dispute with the Shomvi-Shirazi in which he was trying to involve the government.[18]

The secretary, Mtumwa b. Diwani Kurandi, scion of a famous Shomvi-Shirazi chieftain, was correct—the liwali did have a conflict

with his ethnic group. The origins of this dispute can be traced to the Shomvi-outsiders cleavage and the history of the nearby village of Kaule, from which Gulamrasul, a Baluchi, came. In reporting on the history of Kaule, the secretary for native affairs, P. E. Mitchell, wrote in 1925 that the "Baluchis are the landowning aristocrary. . . . The so-called 'alien' element in these [coastal] villages where they have been settled for certainly 200 years and probably longer call themselves 'Washomvi.'"[19]

What Mitchell was referring to—somewhat confusingly—is that the "Washomvi," or Shomvi-Shirazi, regarded the Baluchi aristocracy, of which Gulamrasul was the leading descendant, as usurpers of their former preeminence as the rulers of Kaule, an attitude that their kinfolk in nearby Bagamoyo held toward the Arabs and the Indians. Thus, it is no coincidence that the Shomvi-Shirazi in Bagamoyo opposed Gulamrasul's selection by the British, shortly after Shaykh Ramiya's retirement in 1928, to become the new liwali.[20] They opposed him not only at the time of his appointment but throughout most of his tenure, a fact of which Gulamrasul was not unaware and which explains the tone of his response to the association's inquiry. The opposition of the Shomvi-Shirazi to Gulamrasul understandably made for very poor relations between them.

One of the implications of this dispute is that participation for the Shomvi-Shirazi in an organization whose main objective was to struggle for the interests of Africans—a community with which the Shomvi-Shirazi had not always identified—was motivated in large by their desire to regain hegemony over the internal administration of the town at the expense, not so much of the European rulers, but of the Arabs, Indians, and Baluchi. When I asked a leading member of the Shomvi-Shirazi why so many persons from his community were active in the association in comparison to other groups, he said that "Arabs, Baluchis and others were not permitted [to join] because it was a party only for Africans." The response suggests that his preoccupation was not primarily with the African groups in the association but with the fact that Arabs and Baluchi were excluded from its membership.

I do not want to suggest, as Gulamrasul evidently did, that the African Association was being manipulated by the Shomvi-Shirazi for their own interests but rather that there was a common interest between them and the larger African community in removing Gulamrasul from the liwaliate. Shaykh Muhammad did not hold a high opinion of him and said that most Africans did not either.

The territorial convention of the Tanganyika African Association

in the town of Dodoma in 1946 passed the following resolution, which Bagamoyo's representative to the meeting, Mzee Mtumwa b. Maksudi, strongly supported.

> This Conference resolves that where the community that is being ruled is an African community the ruler or rulers of that community should be Africans and not non-Africans. In towns and townships there should from now on be African Liwalis, African Akidas, African Jumbes and African Councils to rule the Native populations of those towns and townships.[21]

A similar resolution was adopted and also strongly endorsed in 1947 at the Zanzibar convention, at which Mzee Mtumwa was also present. This position, which called for the appointment of African liwalis, was one that the leaders of the African Association in Bagamoyo, such as Shaykh Muhammad, enthusiastically backed and one that was adopted in the later struggle for independence.

Shaykh Muhammad played a very influential role in the postwar history of the African Assocation in Bagamoyo. The presidency of the TAA before and during the war had been in the hands of Mzee Mtumwa b. Maksudi first and then Mzee Tamin b. Salum. In 1946, Shaykh Muhammad, who had been a strong member since the association's inception, was selected to be its president. Mzee Mtumwa explained the selection on the grounds that "for the people of Bagamoyo Shaykh Muhammad was not the most important person; he surpassed Mzee Tamin because he [Mzee Tamim] had not been able to perform his job [as president] very effectively." Shaykh Muhammad held his post for about two years and afterward served as secretary and vice-president of the association while continuing to maintain his status as a strong member.

In 1940, the TAA asked the district officer to allow it to appoint a member to the Township Authority, the seven-member board of officials and nonofficials whose job it was to implement and enforce the various rules of the town. In relaying the request to the provincial commissioner, district officer F. W. Bampfylde wrote that "the African Association here represents all classes of the native community. . . . It also seems unfair to me that largest [*sic*] body of citizens on [*sic*] the township have no member to represent their interests as all the other communities are represented."[22]

Though the Conference of Provincial Commissioners in April 1940 recommended that Africans be appointed to the Township Authorities,[23] it was not until January, 1948, that the government named the first African in Bagamoyo to the authority, Shaykh Muhammad. Though his selection was made by the government, it was done after the district officer and provincial commissioner had consulted with

the African Association. In Shaykh Muhammad's words, "After consulting with them, the African Association chose me." The association's choice, according to Mzee Mtumwa, was based on the fact that Shaykh Muhammad was the most influential person in the African community. Again, in Shaykh Muhammad's opinion, "I was selected because I was not timid—not timid even before the D.C. [district commissioner]."

The association tried unsuccessfully to get an additional African on the board later that year, and Shaykh Muhammad, until 1951, was the sole representative of African interests in the town on the Township Authority. However, his role was less one of representing the interests of Africans before the authority than one of keeping the association and the African community informed of the board's activities since most of its business, as revealed in the minutes of its meetings, concerned only the merchant interests in the town. In Shaykh Muhammad's view, the merchants and the district commissioners were political allies.

As one of the leaders of the TAA, Shaykh Muhammad strongly backed the organization in its efforts to improve the position of Africans and thus shared its views regarding the colonial authorities. When the dispute with Liwali Gulamrasul arose concerning the ethnic composition of his baraza, Shaykh Muhammad was one of the strong advocates for the appointment of an all-African board because "the Arabs [there was one on the baraza] were not good people to Africans, and if Africans would have been on this Baraza then he would have been prevented from hurting or oppressing Africans." However, it was not simply a question of having more Africans on the baraza since there were already two. What the association wanted were Africans who were independent of the liwali rather than like the two who "used to obey the orders of Liwali Gulamrasul."

The wartime situation forced the government to ration certain staples and merchandise for Tanganyika's citizens. In 1944, the TAA tried with some success to have the government alter the restrictions since it felt that the arrangements were particularly burdensome for the African community. Since he was a major African purchaser of foodstuffs, owing to the large number of people who depended on him, Shaykh Muhammad worked especially hard to modify the arrangements and end inequities in the distribution of staples. The disparities were that "the Arabs were given more [foodstuffs] than Africans . . . [and] people on the side of the liwali were given more than those whom he did not like." Whether or not this charge was true about the Arabs and the liwali, it illustrates again Shaykh

Muhammad's views on the differential distribution of influence and authority in terms of ethnicity during the colonial period.

Liwali Gulamrasul's opposition to the TAA eventually brought him into conflict with Shaykh Muhammad as the shaykh became more active and influential in the organization. In what was interpreted by the association to be an attempt to harass its leaders, on February 25, 1946, Liwali Gulamrasul exercised an infrequently used power of his to order all African farmers to appear before his baraza.[24] Shaykh Muhammad says he had been forewarned by a government official that the liwali would do this in order to annoy the association's officers. This proved to be the case when Gulamrasul dismissed all the farmers who had assembled except for Shaykh Muhammad, who was president of the association, and the association's other officers. Gulamrasul then demanded that they show him their farms in order that he could inspect them. Shaykh Muhammad, however, refused to go on the grounds that his farm, which was about five miles away, was too far away, especially since it was in the middle of a hot afternoon. Gulamrasul threatened then to prosecute him, to which Shaykh Muhammad replied, "I am prepared to be prosecuted rather than go." Gulamrasul's threat was an idle one; he did not bring charges against Shaykh Muhammad, who, with the other association leaders, complained to the district commissioner. They were evidently successful in their complaint because Gulamrasul never bothered them again.

Gulamrasul's retreat, if not his initial action, may be explained by what one murid described as his attitude toward Shaykh Muhammad: "He feared him because many people liked [Shaykh Muhammad] and Gulamrasul was afraid he would be toppled by him."[25] To the extent that this was true, Gulamrasul's fears were well founded as later events show. At the same time, his actions were, no doubt, for Shaykh Muhammad another example in the long history of abuses that Africans suffered from the *watu weupe*, "white people."

Shaykh Muhammad felt that the interests of Africans could be better served by the TAA than by governmental institutions such as the Township Authority. He explained his reasons for becoming a member of the African Association as follows: "I entered in order to press for the rights of Africans only; I felt that this was indeed the path to stand up for the rights of Africans." Shaykh Muhammad participated in the association for the purpose of delivering benefits to that sector of Bagamoy's population that had consistently been the most deprived throughout the town's history.

As the head of the Qadiriyya, Shaykh Muhammad was in a position

to draw many people into the African Association because of his large following in the town. Although he did not require his murids to join the association, he said that "all of the murids took part when they saw me." Though it is doubtful that all murids became formal members since the membership list in 1944 (two years before Shaykh Muhammad became president) listed only about seventy-five names, it is significant that of the seventeen persons on the list who were either officers or strong members, ten (almost 60%) were affiliated with the tariqa.[26] In addition to murids, there were five murshids of the Qadiriyya who were members of the association.

Conspicuously absent from membership in the TAA was Shaykh 'Isa b. Mzee, the khalifa of Shaykh Ramiya who had mistakenly assumed he would be his successor. In fact, he sided with Liwali Gulamrasul in opposition to the TAA. He was one of the three persons on the liwali's council and always went along with Gulamrasul; Shaykh Muhammad explained his behavior on the grounds that "he was very afraid of him [the liwali]." Though Shaykh Muhammad would not say so, Shaykh 'Isa's alliance with the liwali probably owed its origin to Shaykh Muhammad's succession to the head of the tariqa, a post that Shaykh 'Isa coveted. He never probably reconciled himself to Shaykh Muhammad's leadership.[27]

It is difficult to say for certain how the Shomvi-Shirazi reacted to Shaykh Muhammad's ascendancy in the African Association. His influence in the organization did not necessarily result in their eclipse in the TAA. However, when I asked the acknowledged head of their community, Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, why Shaykh Muhammad had been the choice of the African Association for membership on the Township Authority, he avoided answering the question and explained why he himself had been appointed to the authority in 1951.

The Arabs reacted to the stirrings in the African community by establishing the Arab Association a few years after the African Association took root in Bagamoyo. Unfortunately, the individuals who had been active in the Arab Association would not reveal anything about it.[28] A nonmember who was close to the Arab community said that it included Baluchis. The organization was short-lived and did not have much strength. Many of the people active in the Arab Association also affiliated with the Ahmadiyya-Dandarawiyya tariqa.

CHAPTER 9

The Nationalist Struggle and Political Change

In a letter dated January 31, 1955, the Bagamoyo branch of what had been called the Tanganyika African Association wrote to the district commissioner to inform him that the "party has now changed its name [and] is called the Tanganyika African National Union, for short TANU."[1] This matter-of-fact report on the change in names signaled a more profound change in the political orientation of the African nationalist leadership. It realized by this time that no significant redistribution of authority in favor of Bagamoyo's African community could be accomplished under colonialism. A movement had to be forged that would unite Africans to end colonialism and effect political change.

THE POLITICS OF TANU

The transformation of the African Association in Bagamoyo into TANU was part of a larger process that occurred throughout Tanganyika as a result of a decision made at a national conference of the TAA in Dar es Salaam in 1954. The new president of TANU and the future leader of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, explained in an appearance before the United Nations a year later the nature of the new organization and the reasons for the change.

> The Tanganyika African National Union has taken over from what was formerly called the Tanganyika African Association [and] is a new organization in the sense that it is a political organization whereas the former was semi-social and semi-political. During the last ten months during which we have become really a political organization we have tried to organize ourselves. The branches of the Association become automatically branches of [TANU].[2]

The activities of the TAA in Bagamoyo confirmed Nyerere's claim concerning the semipolitical character of TANU's forerunner. It was Nyerere's intention to establish an organization with a total political commitment; the TAA, on the other hand, was more like an improvement association. TANU, unlike the TAA, had the single objective of *uhuru*, of independence, from British rule for the country. This goal was to be fulfilled by a mass-based party with political ends.

Another reason for the change from the African Association to TANU was Nyerere's desire to establish an organization with central direction.[3] The TAA, as Bagamoyo's experience confirmed, tended to be parochial in its preoccupation with local issues. Influenced by the example of Nkrumah's Convention People's party in Ghana and the British Labour party, Nyerere was instrumental in getting the 1954 conference to adopt a constitution that provided for a strong central body for the new party.[4]

The experience of TANU in its first year and a half in Bagamoyo suggested that Nyerere's objective of forming a centrally directed political movement throughout Tanzania did not become a reality for some time. It is significant that, after it was decided to transform the TAA of Bagamoyo into TANU, a decision that the leadership, rather than the rank-and-file members made, the new branch waited almost six months to inform the district government of its decision.

The heritage of the African Association in Bagamoyo manifested itself most clearly in the orientation and activities of the TANU branch throughout virtually all of 1955. The correspondence reveals that the branch was preoccupied with the same kinds of issues that had occupied the TAA.[5] Nothing indicates that the activities of the branch were directed toward national goals. Toward the end of 1955, however, the orientation of TANU began to change sharply. Instead of playing a role as advocate for the African population and representing its interests before the government, the party became almost totally occupied with increasing its membership and disseminating its propaganda.

After 1955, the party held a mass meeting almost every month in the township. In addition to these, the branch leadership held similar meetings in various major and minor settlements throughout the

district. Generally, the branch leaders spent ten days to two weeks each month in the rural areas. After October 1955 (at least until 1958, when the file ends), all correspondence between TANU and the district office concerns requests for permission to hold mass meetings either in the town or in other settlements in the district. The purpose of these meetings was to get people to join the party and to persuade them that self-determination was both desirable and possible. According to one TANU official, this was not an easy endeavor: "Many inhabitants did not believe that this country was theirs but that of the English."[6] It was partially for this reason that the national leadership of TANU made frequent trips to Bagamoyo. Nyerere made four before the country's independence was won, and others such as John Rupia, Bibi Titi Muhammad, and Oscar Kambona also traveled to the town and throughout the district.

In conjunction with the changes in the activities and orientation of TANU in Bagamoyo, important internal changes occurred. At the beginning of 1957, the party for the first time had a full-time secretary, Mzee Buguzi Shomari, a resident of Bagamoyo, who had been a leading member of the TAA. He was succeeded by another resident of the town and active member of the TAA, Mzee Kitwana Mbaruku, who served in the post until shortly after independence in 1961. Another important internal change was in the process used in selecting the party officials. Whereas in the TAA officers were usually selected by cooptation through consensus of the "strong members," in TANU selection was based on voting by the entire membership. Related to this change was the elimination of the committee of "strong members."

One of the most significant effects of these alterations was that the Shomvi-Shirazi community was not able to exercise influence in TANU to the degree it had in the TAA. Aside from the district secretary, the only other leadership positions were chairman, vice-chairman, and treasurer; after 1955, it does not appear that the Shomvi-Shirazi held any of these posts. A possible explanation for this change is that with the institution of more democratic selection procedures in TANU (voting open to every member) in contrast to the more oligarchic arrangements in the TAA (selection by the strong members), the Shomvi-Shirazi, because of their limited numbers, were not able to garner enough support to maintain their hold on the party posts.

Shaykh Muhammad offered another explanation for their loss of power in TANU: "The reason for [their] not having much influence is that they were very timid people; they were not steadfast and

courageous. They could talk but were afraid to act and therefore their influence was not very strong."

Though by itself this does not explain why the Shomvi-Shirazi's influence lessened with the establishment of TANU, when coupled with the change that occurred in the selection procedures in TANU, it does appear to account for the change in their fortunes. Such an explanation is given some credibility in view of the new alliances and orientations that the Shomvi-Shirazi made during the decade preceding independence. In 1951, the recognized head of the Shomvi-Shirazi, Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, was appointed by the district commissioner to be president of the African Ward Council, the body that the government established that year to advise the Township Authority on African affairs in the town. As president of the council, Mzee Ramadhani was also given a seat on the Township Authority. What is interesting about his selection as head of the council is that it was Liwali Gulamrasul, the official with whom the Shomvi-Shirazi had been in bitter conflict a few years earlier, who recommended to the district officer that Mzee Ramadhani be given the post.[7]

The reason for the recommendation, according to an informant, was that the liwali and Mzee Ramadhani had reconciled their differences and so Gulamrasul was assured that the Shomvi-Shirazi leader could be counted on as a new ally.[8] About half the members of the council, until its abolishment in 1961, were Shomvi-Shirazi; this fact suggests that the council was the institution, and not TANU, to which they had tied their fortunes.[9] The orientation of the council was similar to that of the TAA; to act as an advocate for African interests before the government. However, it was only an advisory body and, more important, a creation and an instrument of the government. This explains why the leadership of TANU, whose overriding goal was the elimination of colonial rule, did not hold the African Ward Council in high regard.

During the last decade of the colonial period, then, the Shomvi-Shirazi turned away somewhat from nationalist politics, feeling that their interests could best be served by the colonial government. In the broader African community, this feeling was not widely shared. The annual report of the provincial commissioner for 1959, for instance, noted that "little interest was shown by townsmen in the work of the township authorities."[10] As a community that had long wanted to regain its traditional role of rulership in the town, its leadership in the council and its position on the Township Authority provided the Shomvi-Shirazi with some semblance of rulership. Their reorientation is probably what Shaykh Muhammad's comment on

their commitment to TANU's aims referred to—that their allegiance was questionable—and, along with the new selection procedures in the party, explains the loss of influence of the Shomvi-Shirazi in TANU.

Though it was the aim of TANU to build a national movement and to deemphasize the parochial perspective that had characterized the TAA, this did not mean that the party completely ignored local interests. In Bagamoyo, the party took a position on an issue that had been of particular concern to the African community, the question of direct versus indirect rule for the town. Although Bagamoyo, like other townships, was administered by the district officer in a form of direct rule, the question arose because of a governmental reorganizational scheme that was implemented in 1940.

The decision was that the liwali would be made a native authority (the indigenous ruler in the colonial system of indirect rule) of the entire coastal belt of the district.[11] Since the liwali was the headman of Bagamoyo and since the town was considered to be under direct rule, there was much discussion by the government as to the town's future position in the reorganization. The question does not appear ever to have been completely resolved because, in terms of financial arrangements, the town maintained its status of being directly ruled while, in other matters (such as the liwali's jurisdiction vis-a-vis the Africans), it appears that it was indirectly ruled.

The liwali pushed vigorously for the reorganization that gave him far greater authority than he had ever had, while the African community was never consulted or formally notified of the change.[12] Many of the complaints that the TAA and later TANU, during its first year in the town, took before the government concerned the ambiguity of the town's and, therefore, the African community's status in the colonial system. It is not surprising, then, that the African community in the town was displeased with the uncertainty of the arrangement and preferred to return to strict direct rule.

The Bagamoyo branch of TANU took a position on the issue that represented the views of most Africans. This was formalized in 1960 in a document entitled *Utawala wa Kienyeji* (*Native Administration in Bagamoyo District*). Regarding the coastal area, the document addressed itself to the dual role of the liwali as headman of the town and the coast of Mwambao: "The current arrangement concerning the duties of the Liwali deprives the subjects of Mwambao together with the subjects of the town the right to have their [own] rulers."[13] It went on to say that the arrangement also deprived the subjects of both places the right to choose their own leaders. At the end, it

recommended that "the coastal administration should be separated from the town's administration." The wide appeal of this position was one of the reasons why TANU won the support of Bagamoyo's African population and became the ruling party at independence.

Another reason for TANU's success in Bagamoyo was the active participation of Shaykh Muhammad, who was the second person in the district to buy a TANU membership card (the first was Mzee Mtumwa b. Maksudi). As one of the officials and "strong members" of the TAA, Shaykh Muhammad participated in the decision to bring the Bagamoyo branch of the association into TANU in 1954 after its birth that year in Dar es Salaam. In his words, the Bagamoyo branch "felt it was an advantage also to change and become TANU; also, in former days the strength of the African Association was limited. But when TANU came it appeared that it would push for many things."

Though the Shomvi-Shirazi lost influence as a result of changes in the new organization, Shaykh Muhammad's position was elevated in TANU. Throughout the entire preindependence period of the party, he held one of its four offices, as district secretary until March 1957 and later as vice-chairman. As district secretary, he was responsible for registering new members and securing permission from the government to hold mass meetings, permission that was always granted during his tenure in the post.[14] Were it not for the fact that the district secretary after 1957 had to be a full-time employee of the party and that Shaykh Muhammad had other commitments as the town's religious leader, he would probably have continued to serve in this role.

The transformation of the TAA, an "advocate organization," into TANU, a "mass party," accounted perhaps more than any other factor for the increase in Shaykh Muhammad's influence in nationalist politics. For a party whose energies were virtually all devoted to obtaining independence by means of mass mobilization, there was probably no better asset it could have had than the active participation of Shaykh Muhammad, who could claim the allegiance of more people in Bagamoyo town and district than any other individual. A longtime leader of TANU in Bagamoyo and one of Shaykh Muhammad's murshids explained the shaykh's political role this way:

> As you know, to bring people together is no small matter; and we are very pleased to have him in charge of such matters so that they can be done correctly—and truly things have gone well for us. Particularly, at first when it was very difficult to persuade people to come into the party, he made an enormous effort and thus devoted his attention. And whenever that happens, we are facilitated and successful in our affairs. Also, he made an effort to

put aside different religious views by saying politics concerns the religious person of any denomination; because it is incumbent on everyone who is an inhabitant of the country to fight for independence.[15]

Another resident of Bagamoyo explained Shaykh Muhammad's political importance in a similar manner:

We know very well at that time [around 1954] that the masses were still asleep and it needed someone really influential and convincing to wake them up. Chiefs were very good at this as long as they were convinced; so were the wealthy men, and a religious leader was no exception.[16]

Most of Shaykh muhammad's murids, not surprisingly, became affiliated with TANU just as many had with the African Association. In reply to the question about whether most people supported the shaykh in his political work, one murid said, "Yes, the murids entered TANU—all of the murids were in TANU." Another murid replied to this question in the following manner:

Yes, because of the manner in which they accepted him in his position as a shaykh and in the tariqa, the leaders at Dar es Salaam [of TANU] placed him at the front [of the party in Bagamoyo] because he was listened to by many people. . . . They [the murids] were happy; it was then that their support for him increased, and he got the power to take matters forward.[17]

The suggestion here is that Shaykh Muhammad's elevation in the party was due to the recognition by the party heads in Dar es Salaam of his influence in the town. This recognition, in a feedback effect, also enhanced his position in the town.

In addition to his murids, some of his murshids became active in TANU, and one of them, Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi, continues to hold a leading position in the party branch. Those murshids who did not actively participate in TANU helped Shaykh Muhammad by assuming some of his religious responsibilities and thereby freeing him to attend to party affairs.

Shaykh Muhammad's influence as the head of the Qadiriyya and shaykh of 'ilm proved to be extremely valuable to TANU in its drive to mobilize support in the small settlements and villages throughout the district. Shaykh Muhammad and his father had many khalifas with branches of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo District as well as other towns in Tanzania. Unlike Bagamoyo town, whose relatively large size and heterogeneous population resulted in the existence of alternative social institutions (such as the Ahmadiyya tariqa), in the smaller settlements, the Qadiriyya was likely to be the only village-wide institution of importance.[18] Also, the murids in these places

did not have access to Shaykh Muhammad as did those in the town; this tended to enhance their reverence for him. Thus, in his visits to such places while campaigning for TANU, Shaykh Muhammad had an advantage that was probably unequaled by anyone else in the district, a quality the party recognized when it chose him to make tours.

The reason he was selected to visit the small settlements, as he saw it, was "because the people believed me very much and they always accepted what I told them." Furthermore, as he said, "My reputation was better known and [also] because of the way people believed in my father." One of the reasons why the provincial commissioner for the Eastern Province was able to write the following in 1957 was that Shaykh Muhammad visited the small settlements throughout the Bagamoyo District: "TANU has appreciably increased its following and influence in Dar es Salaam and the two neighboring districts of Kissarawe and Bagamoyo, where recruiting of new members has been extensive."[19]

At no other time, perhaps, was Shaykh Muhammad's assistance to the party better illustrated than in the case of the Legislative Council elections of 1960. In 1958 and 1959, the first parliamentary elections for Tanganyika were held in which TANU emerged victorious. However, because of the stiff qualifications that the colonial government imposed, the franchise was limited to an extremely small percentage of the African majority. In Bagamoyo District, where the elections took place in September, 1958, only 630 in a population of 89,000 were registered.[20] In the Legislative Council, TANU representatives were able to press for reforms in the electoral process that resulted in a far broader electorate for the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1960.

Shortly before the 1958 elections, a small faction of TANU's members led by the former acting organizing secretary of the party, Zuberi Mtemvu, broke away from the pary over the question of participation in the 1958-1959 elections.[21] This group formed a new party, with Mtemvu as its chairman, called the Tanganyika African National Congress (TANC). The new party opposed TANU in the 1959 elections but was badly defeated. For the 1960 parliamentary race, the TANC decided to challenge TANU again in a few locales. One of them was Bagamoyo, where the party chairman himself decided to make a bid against the TANU candidate, Dossa Aziz. The national leadership of TANU considered this to be an extremely important race. An anonymously written newspaper, which claimed shortly before the election that the young people of the town and district had rejected TANU, made it appear that there was some

support for Mtemvu in Bagamoyo. This gave further reason for the party to be concerned. Therefore, Nyerere and another party leader, Bibi Titi Muhammad, decided to go to Bagamoyo to assist their party's candidate.

This was not Nyerere's first trip to the town; he had visited there on three earlier occasions. On his first trip, he stayed with the chairman of the TANU branch, Mzee Mtumwa b. Maksudi, and, in his two subsequent visits, he was the guest of Shaykh Muhammad. One long-term resident and Qadiri murid interpreted Nyerere's stay with Shaykh Muhammad as evidence of the shaykh's enormous influence in Bagamoyo: "Even the Honorable [President Nyerere] when he came here it was necessary that he visit Shaykh's home."[22] When Nyerere returned in 1960, he again visited with Shaykh Muhammad, this time to enlist his aid in helping Dossa Aziz defeat Mtemvu.

In order to help the TANU candidate, the party asked Shaykh Muhammad to undertake his most extensive tour of the district. His selection was based on the same reasons he had been enlisted in the earlier efforts to build the party in the district. One of his murshids, Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi, who as the head of the TANU Youth League was also active in the campaign, provided a further explanation for Shaykh Muhammad's selection: "There were difficulties in some areas, and also religious considerations. The District Committee preferred that Shaykh Muhammad should take care of those areas where there were difficulties or problems and religious issues."

In the town, Shaykh Muhammad was also responsible for generating support for Aziz. On the occasion when Nyerere arrived to solicit support for the TANU candidate, the party decided to hold a mass meeting in the town at which Nyerere would speak to encourage support by the townspeople for Aziz. Largely because of Shaykh Muhammad's efforts, the meeting was a success. As well as excellent attendance, the meeting included speeches made by Nyerere and Shaykh Muhammad in support of the party's candidate. According to one person who was present, "[many] people were on the side of Zuberi Mtemvu but after the meeting many were supporting Dossa." This evidently was true; in the election, Aziz completely overwhelmed his opponent by 7,498 to 67 votes.[23]

The history of the drive for independence by TANU in Bagamoyo clearly indicates the significant contribution made by Shaykh Muhammad. The assistance he rendered was varied. In addition to the political contribution, he placed his homestead at the disposal of the party for mass meetings before TANU acquired a permanent headquarters. As the last section of this chapter reveals, the party rewarded

Shaykh Muhammad handsomely for his efforts once independence was achieved.

Aside from the challenge by the TANC, there was little or no opposition to TANU in Bagamoyo. The United Tanganyika party, which was established in 1956 by government sympathizers and supported by the government, apparently did not establish a branch in either the town or the district.[24]

In Bagamoyo town, TANU encountered virtually no opposition from British governmental officials. Among the indigenous government employees, Liwali Gulamrasul opposed TANU during its early days. However, as it became apparent that the party would be successful, he tried to become a member but was prevented by a governmental provision that its employees could not belong to political parties.

The national picture was not very different at the time of the parliamentary elections of 1960, when TANU candidates, unopposed in most places, captured seventy of the seventy-one seats in the Legislative Council. Recognizing that the party was the overwhelming choice of the masses, the British turned over the reins of internal self-government in May 1961 to TANU, under the leadership of its head, Julius Nyerere, who became the prime minister. Seven months later, TANU and Nyerere achieved their long-sought-after goal—independence.

THE REWARDS OF INDEPENDENCE

The structure of authority in Bagamoyo was significantly altered by independence. Under the Local Government Ordinance of 1962, Bagamoyo lost its status as a township and was placed under the administration of the new District Council, which had been established by the same ordinance. In place of the Township Authority, which was also abolished by this bill, a committee of the District Council, known as the Urban Divisional Council, was instituted for overseeing the administration of the town. Though it is not certain who all the members of this committee were, it is known that two of them were the members elected to the District Council from the two wards into which the town had been divided by the 1962 ordinance.[25]

Near the end of 1963, the Urban Divisional Council was discontinued and in its place were established two Village Development Committees (VDCs), which were intended to be local-level divisions of the District Council. Unlike the Urban Divisional Council, which was constitutionally a part of the District Council, the VDCs were

composed mainly of local TANU activists and leaders in addition to the two councilors in the District Council.[26] After independence, a branch of the party was established for Bagamoyo town (which was also the seat of the district headquarters of the party), and the branch chairman became the chairman of both VDCs. As their name suggests, the VDCs are mainly concerned with formulating and implementing development projects, along with serving as liaisons between the District Council and the townspeople. Maintenance functions such as the upkeep of roads, wells, and education are directly under the jurisdiction of the District Council.

In 1964 and 1965, TANU instituted throughout the country the ten-house cell system, which took root in Bagamoyo in 1965.[27] The cell, which is the basic organ of the party, consists in theory of ten households from which a head is elected. The cell mainly serves as a channel to communicate opinion from below to the party and governmental centers and the policies of both of these to the masses. The cell leaders are largely concerned with carrying out these aims, in addition to assisting in the maintenance of security and the collection of party dues. In 1966, the government decided that the VDCs throughout the country would be composed of all cell leaders within their boundaries. This order was implemented in Bagamoyo and, at the time of my stay in the town (1970), the administration of the town was effectively in the hands of the two VDCs, which were composed of cell leaders with the TANU branch chairman as their head.

During the colonial period, the town had been under the direct administration of the district commissioner, who had delegated authority to the liwali. The counterpart of the district commissioner after independence, the area commissioner, had no legal authority over the town, though he could exercie informal influence as the party's top official in the district. The government decided even before independence in 1961 to terminate the executive function of all liwalis and in July 1962 announced that they would be divested of judicial authority and replaced by magistrates (*hakims*).[28] This new post embodied essentially the same judicial authority that the liwali had held.

Coming on the heels of the long struggle for independence, the abolishment of the liwaliate and the establishment of the hakim's office had the greatest immediate meaning for the African masses in the town. The reorganization involved the removal of Gulamrasul who, having served as the liwali for almost thirty years, had ingratiated himself well with his British overlords but not with his African subjects.

There was no better choice the government could have made, as far as the African masses were concerned, when it appointed Shaykh Muhammad to be the first hakim in Bagamoyo. For most Africans in Bagamoyo, this change was *the* substantive and symbolic meaning of independence. The largest procession and celebration ever to take place in Bagamoyo, one even larger than the independence celebrations, were held to celebrate Shaykh Muhammad's selection. When asked who appointed the shaykh to that post and why, Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi, the head of the TANU Youth League then and murshid of Shaykh Muhammad, gave this answer:

> The results of the inhabitants of Bagamoyo as a whole. The people agreed to ask [the government] to make Shaykh Muhammad the Hakim for two or more reasons. The first reason—he is a person who is well versed in religious matters. . . . The second reason—the trust of the people of Bagamoyo. Because of his leadership in the African Association and afterwards in TANU—[up] until we had attained independence; why should he be displaced?—especially since he is wise. Accordingly, the people felt it would be advantageous that he be made their Hakim.

The people made their views known to the government, which readily complied with their wish. As a result of his lobbying on their behalf in the African Association and in the struggle for independence, Shaykh Muhammad was rewarded by the people. To state it in terms of the benefit-exchange model, his investment in the public arena reaped profits for him. (Whether by coincidence or not, it is interesting to note that the government official who made the formal decision, the minister of justice, Chief Abdullah Fundikira, had been a student of Shaykh Muhammad's as an adolescent some twenty years earlier.[29])

The significance and meaning of Shaykh Muhammad's appointment was not lost on the former liwali. Though he had not actively opposed TANU and Shaykh Muhammad at the end of the colonial period, his reaction to the appointment indicated what his feelings probably were: "He was not happy—he was angry. But it had to be that way because the times had changed drastically, and he didn't have any power. Also the government that appointed him was no longer here, thus there was nothing he could do."[30] Instead of living in Bagamoyo, Gulamrasul returned to his neighboring village of Kaule, where he died about a year later.

It was difficult to ascertain the views on Shaykh Muhammad's appointment of the Arabs and the Shomvi-Shirazi, the two communities who had been in opposition to him at one time or another. However, it is revealing that the head of the Shomvi-Shirazi community,

Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, who was familiar with the details of Gulamrasul's departure from the liwaliate and the establishment of the office of the hakim, claimed not to remember who became the occupant of the new post. (This was the same person who avoided answering my question about the reasons for Shaykh Muhammad's selection by the TAA for the Township Authority.[31])

The two elected councilors who represented the two wards of the town in the District Council after July 1962, Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi and Mzee Abdurahamani b. Masud, both were Africans, respectively of Luguru and Zigua ethnicity. Only Mzee Mshindo was active in the Qadiriyya tariqa, though the father of Mzee Abdurahamani was a murid of Shaykh Ramiya's. Both of them became cell leaders, the public officials who in 1966 became the members of the DVCs.

On the basis of the 1967 census date, it is possible to determine the ethnicity and other socioeconomic characteristics of sixty-nine of the eighty-one cell leaders.[32] Though an earlier analysis and report on this data indicated that the cell leaders constituted a social and economic elite,[33] the data in Table 2 make it clear that the socioeconomic characteristics of this group were not based on ethnic identity. Indeed, the ethnicity of cell leaders corresponds for the most part with the residentical distribution of the three largest ethnic groups with Bagamoyo. This is noteworthy in that, except for the Asian community, the other two ethnic groups, Africans and Arabs, are not residentially segregated in relation to one another. (It should be remembered that cells are based on approximately ten contiguous households.)

In tribal groups, a similar correspondence can be seen between the cell leaders and the total population. As the census data indicate, there was no significant correspondence between residency and tribe or between tribe and the constituency of cells. The slight Shomvi-Shirazi overrepresentation—based on an absolute frequency of three—is more apparent than real when it is realized that of the three, one was not born in Bagamoyo and hence the relative frequency would actually be 2.9 percent for indigenous Shomvi-Shirazi—a figure closer to their total proportion in the population. It can be noticed in regard to Africans of slave origin that the three upcountry tribes from which most slaves came—the Manyema, the Nyamwezi, and the Yao—are fairly proportionately represented among the cell leaders.

Information about tariqa affiliation was also available on forty-two of the cell leaders.[34] Of these, thirteen were murids, all of them Qadiriyya (or 31 percent adjusted frequency), and five performed

Table 2. Cell Leaders' Ethnic Origins and Tribes, Bagamoyo, 1967

Ethnic Origin or Tribe	Percentage of Cell Leaders[a]	Percentage of Total Population[a]
African	94.2	92.6
Asian	1.4	3.6
Arab	2.9	3.8
Doe	14.5	17.7
Zaramo	15.9	14.0
Zigua	7.2	7.0
Luguru	10.1	7.1
Kwere	4.3	6.5
Manyema	5.8	4.8
Kami	4.3	3.4
Nyamwezi	2.9	3.1
Shomvi-Shirazi	4.3	2.7
Yao	1.4	1.6
Sagara	2.9	1.4
Ndengereko	1.4	1.3
Khutu	1.4	1.6
Others[b]	22.5	27.8

[a] Fewer than 100 percent of the frequencies have been listed.
[b] The absolute frequencies for each of the other ten tribes were no more than two for any one tribe.

dhikr occasionally with the Qadiri murids. The other twenty-four were definitely not affiliated with any tariqa. Therefore, almost 43 percent (adjusted frequency) of the cell leaders on whom there is information were either formally or informally affiliated with the Qadiriyya tariqa. The branch chairman of TANU who served as the chairman of the VDCs from 1966 to 1967, when the census data were obtained, was the son and khalifa of Shaykh Muhammad, Mzee Yahya.

The most obvious difference between public officials in Bagamoyo before and after independence—especially after the establishment of the cell system—is the predominance of Africans who are office-holders. Although authority cannot be simply equated with power, the feeling of most Africans in 1970 was that independence did indeed bring them not only greater authority but also power. In the words of one, "Now Africans have gotten more influence than formerly [before independence]." In the opinion of Shaykh Muhammad, "Africans [now] have more influence than other people of the town."

It is interesting to note, in view of Shaykh Muhammad's opinion, that the two former antagonists who lost influence after independence, the Arabs and the Shomvi-Shirazis, have now effected a rapprochement.

It is equally significant that the recognized Shomvi-Shirazi head, Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, is said to have recently become a murid of the predominantly Arab tariqa, the Ahmadiyya-Dandarawiyya. These two communities apparently feel that they have more in common with one another than they do with the larger African population—this feeling represents the most recent manifestation of the African versus non-African cleavage.

In 1967, Shaykh Muhammad was appointed by President Julius Nyerere to become one of the three commissioners on the Permanent Commission of Inquiry, Tanzania's equivalent of ombudsmen.[35] The opinion of most people, including Shaykh Muhammad, was that the selection was due to his ties to Nyerere and the high esteem with which he was held by the president. He served in the post until 1969, when he resigned, according to official accounts, for reasons of health.[36]

At the time I collected the data for this study (1970), the opinion of virtually every informant, including leading members of the Shomvi-Shirazi and Arab communities, was that Shaykh Muhammad's prestige and influence in the town and TANU was at an all-time high, a view with which he also concurred. His influence also extended to the religious sphere, where Shaykh Muhammad, like his father, once had to struggle for acceptance by the traditional 'ulama. Unlike any previous period in Bagamoyo's history, today there is only one person referred to as a shaykh—although there are a number who could qualify—Shaykh Muhammad.[37]

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PART IV
Conclusions

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CHAPTER 10

Discussion and Conclusions

Bagamoyo provided setting for a detailed look at the tariqas in East Africa. The facts about Bagamoyo coupled with the data from elsewhere in East Africa, mainly Tanzania, in parts 1 and 2, make it possible to answer the question posed at the outset of this study—why the tariqa can play an important role in political change. As a first step toward this goal, I begin with a number of descriptive propositions about brotherhoods that refer only to their politically relevant attributes. These propositions summarize the information on brotherhoods in Bagamoyo in part 3 as well as that on other locales that was presented in part 2.

The next section attempts to answer the basic question of the study in terms of the Bagamoyo experience. The conflict-exchange model serves as the framework for this endeavor. Again, a number of propositions are formulated, this time explanatory rather than descriptive.

The last section employs the insights gathered from my examination of Bagamoyo for an analysis of the broader Muslim community in Tanzania. This analysis goes beyond Bagamoyo to the tariqa and looks at the political role of Islam in a broader sense and speculates on the future.

MAJOR DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS

Proposition One

Most Muslims in East Africa converted to Islam through the attraction of brotherhoods and became either formal or informal adherents of the tariqas. This generalization held true more consistently in Tanzania than in the rest of East Africa, and it was in Tanzania that Islam made its greatest gains. In coastal communities, Islam had already entrenched itself before the advent of tariqas. However, the Bagamoyo experience indicates that, even in the coastal settlements, brotherhoods provided most African Muslims with a new avenue for involvement in the religious life of their communities. Essentially, the orders helped to deepen the commitment of Africans to Islam. This generalization agrees with findings from other areas of the Muslim world, which indicate that brotherhoods were the major agent for spreading Islam.[1]

The attraction of the tariqas for the masses is due in part to their mystical orientation. In many world religions, mysticism attracts adherents from all classes in a society. As a new religion attracts the masses, it is very likely to incorporate the magical and traditional religious practices from among its ranks. The mystical component of the incorporating religion often represents a kind of protest in religion; it "expresses a desire to break out of established forms of worship and often of ideas."[2] Thus, it is likely to be the wing of a religion that is more tolerant of alien ideas. As a result, mysticism has often proved to be a revitalizing force in a number of world religions. In Tanzania, the brotherhoods were a frequent source of innovations that conflicted with orthodoxy. The tariqas and their often unorthodox practices were much more likely to appeal to the African masses than Sunni Islam without sufism, and Islam in East Africa was given a new lease on life through the attraction of the orders after centuries of relatively little expansion.

Proposition Two

Most tariqa heads were Africans, and Arabs were more likely to be teachers of the traditional Islamic sciences ('ilm). This tendency is partially explained by the first generalization. Because the tariqa had its greatest popularity among the African masses, it was more likely that Africans would be recruited to leadership positions in the tariqas than men from other ethnic groups. At the same time, because Africans took part in the leadership of the brotherhoods, the African

masses were most likely to be attracted to them. Thus, the causal relationship between this and the first generalization is reciprocal.

Access to the top posts in the tariqas for Africans was possible because of the fact that, in the tariqa, piety rather than learning was the primary prerequisite for advancement. The orders gave Africans for the first time an opportunity to become shaykhs. Even in coastal areas, where Africans had been Muslims for some time, it was only with the arrival of the orders that Africans became leaders in the Sunni community. The achievements of Shaykh Ramiya in Bagamoyo provide one of the best examples of this.

Historically, Arab Muslims in East Africa were not affiliated with brotherhoods in large numbers. Rather, they were more likely than Africans to be teachers (shaykhs of 'ilm). Because of the tendency toward nepotism within this class, Arabs had a near monopoly of these posts. An exception to this pattern was their involvement in the 'Alawiyya order. Like all tariqas, it held that learning was not sufficient for advancement. Uniquely, the 'Alawiyya appears to have maintained that descent from the Prophet was of primary importance. Only sharifs, and, therefore, Arabs could rise to the top. As a qualification to the first generalization, the experience of the 'Alawiyya suggests that it was not the tariqa per se that facilitated Islamic proselytization but rather tariqas in which Africans could assume the leading positions. This is why Islamization through the 'Alawiyya, with its base in Lamu, was not extensive in Kenya, when in Tanzania through other orders, notably the Qadiriyya, the opposite was true.

Finally, though it does not invalidate the generalization, it must be recognized that many religious leaders were shaykhs of the tariqa and of 'ilm simultaneously. This generalization is less likely to hold true in the future as more Africans become shaykhs of 'ilm.

Proposition Three

All brotherhoods are organized hierarchically at the local level, with the shaykh or the khalifa in the position of command and the murids at the lowest rank. Both written and oral accounts are virtually unanimous in this description of the organization character of brotherhoods in East Africa. The Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo illustrates in detail their hierarchical nature. This is not dissimilar to the general structure of tariqas elsewhere in the Muslim world. The only difference—actually of a minor nature—is that East African orders (at least the Qadiriyya) have a unique functionary, the *bishawishi* or *shawishi*, the most minor official in the chain of command.

The historical ties of most East African orders, notably the Qadiriyya, with Muslim lands to the north account primarily for their organizational similarity with brotherhoods elsewhere. The constant interaction with Somalia and the Arab world ensured the maintenance of the sufi traditions in East Africa.

Compared to other structures in the Sunni community, the tariqa was the most highly organized institution to which a Muslim could adhere. Because of the tariqa's hierarchical character, tariqa heads, unlike other Muslim officials, were likely to command numerous resources. This partially explains why brotherhood leaders in coastal areas under the British were frequently recruited to posts in the colonial administration. For example, in Bagamoyo, Utete, and possibly Lindi, tariqa shaykhs served as liwalis; in Dar es Salaam, one was considered for the post.[3] The orders on the coast had been established much earlier than those in the interior and thus, with a more entrenched leadership and organizational apparatus, could be utilized by the British, particularly in the very early years when they sorely needed assistance in administration at the local level. Related to the internal organization of the orders is the link between a shaykh and his khalifas in other locales.

Proposition Four

If a shaykh has traveled from his residence to another locale to establish his branch of the tariqa and periodically makes visits, then he is more than likely able to exert effective control over his khalifas in such locales. It follows in part, then, that the next generalization will hold true.

Proposition Five

A shaykh's effective control and influence over the tariqa is much more likely to be regional and local than nationwide. If constant contact through visits is an important factor in explaining a shaykh's effective control, then the exigencies of travel will affect a shaykh's potential influence. In East Africa, and specifically in Tanzania, where distances are relatively great and the cost of travel discourages frequent long trips for religious leaders, most brotherhood heads find it necessary to confine their travels to areas relatively close to their residences. Again, in Bagamoyo, where there is far more detail on this matter, Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad confined virtually all their trips related to the tariqa to the vicinity of the town. Probably the foremost exception to his tendency was Shaykh Husayn b. Mahmud, the late head of the Shadhiliyya, whose travels

throughout East Africa made his the one order that had an effective international as well as national leadership.

Virtually every East African community for which there is some in information about brotherhoods is also a locale in which brotherhoods played a significant political role. Though this does not constitute conclusive evidence, it does suggest that a tariqa can be of political importance. This fact is explained in part by the preceding generalizations. The overwhelmingly African composition of the orders and their organizational character means that they are likely to be a major force in any Muslim community. This is consistent with what is known about orders in other Muslim lands; that is, in places where tariqas are well entrenched, they exercise important political influence.

Proposition Six

The sociopolitical role of a tariqa is most likely to be one of serving as the organizational focus of sectional interests. Even where there is a dearth of data for a locale, this tendency appeared to be the most usual character of an order's influence. Bagamoyo provided the clearest picture of this tendency. On the basis of the Bagamoyo experience, it can be argued that a brotherhood is a means for generalizing or entrenching sectional interests as well as simply serving as their organizational focus.

The role of orders as the institutional vehicle for cleavages was clearly a local phenomenon. However, at the regional level throughout East Africa (certainly on the coast), the historic African-Arab cleavage can be spoken of in terms of tariqa affiliation. The Arab elite is tied to the 'Alawiyya order, and the overwhelming majority of Africans are affiliated with the three Qadiriyya branches. There is some suggestion that the Arab elites throughout the coast, unlike Africans in the Qadiriyya, have a conscious sense of group solidarity, which is expressed through actual or "spiritual" membership in the 'Alawiyya.[4] This feeling is facilitated no doubt by the fact that the Arab sharif clans have members in almost every coastal settlement.

Using information from the Asian subcontinent, Donald Smith argued that organization is one of the factors in explaining religion's political impact: "The more highly organized a religion, the greater its involvement in politics."[5] As one of Islam's most highly structured institutions, a tariqa is likely to be an agent for political involvement in a community. Thus, it is the organizational character of a tariqa that explains in large part the basis of its political influence.

Proposition Seven

Given the sociopolitical role of a tariqa, it and its leadership are very likely to have had major roles in the nationalist movement for independence. Aside from Bagamoyo, a number of Tanzanian locales, most notably Kigoma/Ujiji and Tabora, had brotherhoods involved in the nationalist struggle. The overwhelmingly African composition of the orders and their organizational advantages were key reasons. In addition, the orders had some role in the nascent nationalist sentiment, which was first expressed in the Sunni community—a reflection of the historic African-Arab cleavage. This sentiment foreshadowed and no doubt contributed to the later political nationalism of African Muslims.

Unlike a number of places in the Muslim world where brotherhoods have participated in the nationalist struggle, in Tanzania their involvement was confined almost exclusively to the local level. This was probably due to the more parochial influence of East Africa's tariqa heads.

PROPOSITIONS IN THE MICROANALYSIS

A more complete explanation of the sociopolitical role of brotherhoods requires an analysis of the tariqa in Bagamoyo in terms of the conflict-exchange framework.

According to the theory of group conflict, the superimposition of cleavages intensifies conflict and spreads it to the entire society. Before and during the conolial period, Bagamoyo was a highly polarized community, a society in which cleavages were superimposed. This was particularly true for Africans of slave origin, who were consistently relegated to the lowest echelons in every sphere; the occupants of the dominant positions, however, varied in time. It was in the religious sphere that Africans, under the leadership of Shaykh Ramiya and, later, Shaykh Muhammad, began to challenge the hegemony of the traditional elites, the Shomvi-Shirazi and the Arabs. The Qadiriyya served as the organizational base for this challenge. Under Shaykh Muhammad, the lines of opposition were drawn more sharply in the Sunni community. The establishment of the Tanganyika African Association and the rise of nationalist politics in the town led to an extension of this conflict into the political sphere and the broadening of the opposition to include Europeans.

Proposition Eight

If superimposition exists in a community so that one segment is

invariably in a position of subjection, then any already established organization in that segment is likely to assume the role of an interest group. This generalization recognizes the fact that, because subject groups do not have authority in the political system, they are much more likely to make use of preexisting institutions in other spheres in order to advance their interests. The dominant groups, on the other hand, do possess political authority and, therefore, are likely to employ it rather than nonpolitical organizations such as the tariqa to maintain their position.

Proposition Nine

If superimposition exists and if the tariqa has served as an interest group in the religious system, it is very likely to serve as an interest group in the political system. Of all the postulates of the theory of group conflict, those concerning the phenomenon of superimposition are the most relevant for providing an explanation of the role of the tariqa in group conflict and, thus, political change.

Proposition nine is consistent with a body of knowledge from the sociology of religion about the functions of religion in society. Thomas O'Dea pointed out that in many societies the internal stratification—in terms of status and authority—of the religious system is congruent with that of the secular society. For example, regarding the Middle Ages: "There was in fact a good deal of 'overlap' between the stratification systems of the church and the general society. The upper clergy . . . were largely drawn from the upper classes . . . [and] were also tied together by ties of 'mutual interests.' . . . The lower clergy were drawn from the lower classes.

O'Dea then described how during the eleventh century the lower-middle-class agitation against the upper classes in the secular society coincided with their monasterial protest as members of the laity against the upper clergy in the church: "They tended to see these as two aspects of the same thing." The person most responsible for obtaining mass support in the monasterial protest was Hildebrand, who later became Pope Gregory. O'Dea concluded that religion plays a dual role in such situations: "On the one hand it sacralizes privileged position of the established order and its leaders; on the other *it provides the ideology and the leadership for protest*" [italics mine].

Religious organizations, usually of a sectarian character, are likely to emerge in such struggles and can be an avenue for the introduction of new or alient religious ideas: "The sect can be the expression of social as well as religious protest and opposition."[6] In this regard, the Qadiriyya introduced a number of innovations into the Sunni

community, such as the allowance of women into the tariqa and the use of hand clapping in dhikr; the latter resulted in a conflict with members of the Shomvi-Shirazi community, who had been the traditional religious elites of Bagamoyo.

J. Milton Yinger also noted the importance of what is referred to here as superimposition in explaining the political significance of religion. On the basis of worldwide evidence, Yinger concluded that "the religio-political interaction is affected by the degree to which religion, as a line of division in society, is reinforced by class, ethnic, and lingual lines. Where they all converge, in segmented societies, the basis is laid for a religiously oriented party system or political process."[7] In sum, then, proposition nine is given added credibility on the basis of evidence and conclusions from the sociology of religion.

Though group interests, either dominant or subordinate, are important in understanding interest group behavior, they are not sufficient. It is necessary to look also at the role of individual interests. Exchange theory accounts for the individual factor by analyzing the exchange of benefits between the leadership and the membership of an organization. In turn, it explains the viability of an organization and why one not explicitly organized to serve the interests of the dominants or the subordinates can on occasion play such a role.

The popularity of the Qadiriyya in Bagamoyo and, therefore, its strength were due to the benefits received by Shaykh Ramiya and his son, on the one hand, and their murids on the other. In terms of what they actually received, for both leaders the Qadiriyya was a profitable as well as a viable enterprise. The continuous flow of benefits to both members and leaders since the institution of the order in the town accounts for its ongoing attractiveness.

With a profit (that is, a surplus of benefits), a leader can lobby in the public arena. The exchange model does not assume, however, that the leadership of a group that is not specifically organized for lobbying is of one mind with its members on public policy issues; as long as the leader maintains the flow of benefits to his followers, their support is ensured. Though his political activities were clearly in the objective group interest of Shaykh Muhammad's murids, his actions were not based on a mandate from them. To understand why he tried to affect public policy and was successful, a closer look at his activities in terms of the exchange model is necessary.

Shaykh Muhammad's political activities before the advent of mass-oriented nationalist politics were most instructive. The TAA selected him to be its president and to serve on the Township Authority because of his influence and prestige among the African population,

which were useful in dealing with the colonial government. He could command this resource largely because of the exchange between him and his murids, not because the latter were necessarily in agreement with his activities in the public arena. He had greater access to this resource than any other African, which explains why he was successful in his lobbying at this stage—in the sense that he became one of the most influential leaders, if not the most powerful one, in the nationalist struggle in Bagamoyo. This suggests two further propositions.

Proposition Ten

A shaykh of a tariqa can have a role in the political process to the extent that he can command resources that have value in that process.

Proposition Eleven

If a shaykh of a tariqa commands a disproportionate amount of resources that have high exchange value in the political process, he will likely have a major role in that process, should he become involved.

If the exchange model is taken a step farther, it is possible to explain why a shaykh of a tariqa would become involved in the political process. Since it is the tendency of an entrepreneur to seek profitable investment opportunities with his surplus, organizational leaders who have profitable enterprises are likely to engage in lobbying activities. A leader will do this if the flow of selective benefits to and from his followers is threatened and only action by the government can eliminate this threat. Both Shaykh Ramiya and Shaykh Muhammad began public lobbying for such reasons. From the logic of the model comes the next conclusion.

Proposition Twelve

If a shaykh of a tariqa has a disproportionate amount of resources with high political value, he is likely to become involved in the political process. This is consistent with findings from the study of community power structure and decision making. For example: "*The larger the number of resources available to a particular section of a community, the more actors from that sector are likely to become involved in decision-making, and the more decisional outcomes are likely to reflect their values and interests*" (italics in original).[8] Also, and even more to the point: "*The higher the exchange value of resources available to a particular sector in a community, the more actors from that sector are likely to become involved in decision-*

making, and the more decisional outcomes are likely to reflect the values and interests" (itals in original).[9]

These findings, along with proposition twelve, suggest an explanation for the diminution of the Shomvi-Shirazi's influence in nationalist politics and the rise of Shaykh Muhammad's political influence. The one resource the Shomvi-Shirazi probably had —prestige in the African community—was devalued in relation to the resource of numbers—control of the masses—as mass mobilization became the goal of TANU. As head of the Qadiriyya, the largest organization in Bagamoyo, Shaykh Muhammad was in command of the very resource that the party most needed, mass support. To explain his ability to mobilize the masses for the nationalist movement when it changed from an advocate to a mass-based organization requires a closer analysis of the profits he received from his murids.

The surplus benefits a leader receives from his followers do not obligate him to abide by their values when he is engaged in lobbying. However, in the case of benefits from the members to the leader that members control, such as their votes to support the public policies of the leader, the leader is not completely free to do as he pleases. Shaykh Muhammad was in this position when he sought the support of his followers for TANU and especially for the TANU candidate in the 1960 election, Dossa Aziz. To understand better Shaykh Muhammad's role, it would be useful to look at an exchange-benefit analysis of a similar situation. This is James Q. Wilson's attempt to explain the difference between the political influence of two black United States congressmen, Adam Clayton Powell and William Dawson.[10]

Wilson's analysis of Powell's influence and his relationship to his supporters is relevant here. One of the most important differences between Powell and Dawson, Wilson argued, is that the benefits supplied by Powell to his followers were largely nonmaterial or ideal while those of Dawson were primarily material. This was due basically to Powell's position as minister of the largest church in Harlem, whose membership furnished the work force for Powell's political activities. Concerning the incentives of these workers, Wilson observed, "The appeals to these supporters are almost entirely intangible. The appeals are even larger than simply the exploitation of established race issues. They are centered around Powell as the personal embodiment, the projective personality, of the Negroes in his congregation."[11]

The immense return to Powell from his membership, in both tangible and nonmaterial form, came because of his personal appeal and not necessarily because of his public policy preferences. As Wilson

pointed out, the benefits to Powell's followers were general and indivisible, and their support of him was of his total being rather than distinct role. Because of who he was in their sight, Powell the politician, as well as Powell the minister, was able to obtain the aid of his church people in his political activities.

The parallels with Shaykh Muhammad's relationship to his supporters are striking. The reasons that informants gave for Shaykh Muhammad's success in mobilizing support in the town and district for TANU and its 1960 electoral candidate—essentially because he was Shaykh Muhammad and the son of Shaykh Ramiya—indicate the similarity between his and Powerll's source of influence.

This was also the case with Shaykh Ramiya, who, because of his religious position, was always successful in gaining compliance from the African community with various orders he issued as liwali, whereas his successor, Gulamrasul, had to rely on the government. Perhaps nowhere was the idea of the indivisibility of a shaykh's influence over his murids better conveyed than in the popular tariqa manual *Zimam al-salikin*. Wilson's analysis and the evidence from Bagamoyo suggest the following point.

Proposition Thirteen

If a shaykh of a tariqa becomes involved in the political process, he is likely to be able to mobilize his followers to support his political position. Implicit in this proposition is the fact that support for a leader based largely on ideal or nonmaterial benefits is given because of his personal characteristics rather than his public policy positions.

In conclusion, the Qadiriyya became an instrument for serving African interests for two reasons. The benefits it provided were especially attractive to a population that had been consistently subordinated in the social system. Because this subordination entailed the religious as well as the political sphere and affected both the leaders and the members, once the tariqa became an African interest group in the Sunni community, the probability was high that it would play a similar role in the political arena.

BEYOND BAGAMOYO

Though I cannot generalize from Bagamoyo to the rest of East Africa, its example suggests how Islam came to play a major role in the nationalist struggle in other locales. This is particularly true regarding the analysis of the social structure of a community, particularly, the degree of superimposition. Bagamoyo's social structure is not unlike

that of other Swahili settlements, especially the towns along what had been the central caravan route. The fact that Bagamoyo had been linked to these towns through the slave trade for more than a century explains in part their similarities.

Like Bagamoyo, Tabora is a town where the Qadiriyya (under the leadership of Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji) played a major role in the independence movement. Except for the absence of the Shomvi-Shirazi community, its social composition closely resembled that of Bagamoyo.

The white-black cleavage permeated social relations, and many of the same ethnic groups and, in some cases, the same individuals who were part of the Bagamoyo picture were key actors in Tabora. One of these was Shaykh Zahur b. Muhammad, the brother of the infamous Shaykh Sufi, whose difficulties in 1908 exposed the depths of the cleavage that pitted Africans of slave origin, primarily Manyema, against Omani and Hadrami Arabs. The 1934 mosque dispute between the Left Hand and Right Hand factions was apparently another manifestation of this schism. Both disputes were basically in expression of African opposition to Arab hegemony in the Sunni community. In both cases, the Qadiriyya either directly or indirectly was the vehicle for the African challenge. The employment of the same institution in the nationalist struggle some years later suggests that, as in Bagamoyo, the tariqa in Tabora was particularly suited to serve the interest of a community that had been subordinate in the political sphere as well as the religious sphere.

Ujiji was the other important mainland town on the old central caravan route. The white-black cleavage was also deeply entrenched there, as the 1935 dispute between the Watanganyika, primarily Manyema, and Arabiani parties indicated. This conflict, which again concerned religious observances, suggests that African Muslims were beginning to defy Arab dominance in the Sunni community. The fact that the Qadiriyya, apparently then and certainly later, was associated with the African faction further suggests that it had a role in this challenge. Finally, as in Bagamoyo and Tabora, the Qadiriyya in Ujiji—especially the branch headed by Shaykh Abdul Muhsin Kitumba—helped to mobilize support for TANU during the nationalist period.

Zanzibar, which was also linked to the old central route and only twenty-four miles from Bagamoyo, shared even more similarities with the town. It was probably the place where the white-black cleavage was most sharply expressed, as is testified to by the 1964 revolution. As was true with the mainland towns, it had a large

population of Africans of slave origin who came from the mainland interior. It also had the largest and most representative Arab community of all these settlements.

Less is known about the role of the tariqas in the Sunni community of Zanzibar. It is clear, however, that the Hadrami Arab religious elite did tend to deprecate the brotherhoods, except for the one with which they were associated, the 'Alawiyya. Because the overwhelming majority of African Muslims on the island affiliated with the Qadiriyya, there were tensions between the Arab elite and the African tariqa leadership in the religious sphere that probably erupted into open conflict occasionally.

Again, it is unfortunate that little is known about the tariqas in Zanzibar politics, especially in the revolution and the events leading to the Arab fall from power. One fact of significance, nonetheless, is the presence of Shaykh Muhyiddin b. 'Ali, the head of one of the three leading Qadiriyya branches, on the Revolutionary Council (Zanzibar's ruling body). This suggests that he at least backed the revolution and possily helped to mobilize support for it, which he no doubt continues to do at the present time. His stature among the African masses allows him to play such a role. Along with the fact that the revolution placed Africans for the first time in the dominant position, it is interesting to note that one of them, Shaykh Abeid Karume, the person who eventually emerged as the strong man of the revolution, was a Manyema.

In summary, all these locales shared highly stratified social structures in which Africans, particularly those of slave origin, were consistently in a subordinate position while Arabs and other whites were always dominant. The conversion of Africans to Islam did not lessen the social distance between the two groups but, rather, aggravated the situation by multiplying cleavages and increasing superimposition. The adoption of a religion that in theory recognized no differences between believers may have been another reason for African disenchantment. It is not coincidental that Manyema, uprooted urbanized Africans of slave origin who became early converts to Islam, were often in the vanguard of African opposition to Arab dominance. The tariqa, specifically, the Qadiriyya, had been the agent for the conversion, and its leadership was overwhelmingly African. This provided the subordinate Africans with an instrument independent of the Arab elite, with which they could then challenge the Arabs' historial hegemony. Having achieved some status among African Muslims, it was probable also that the leaders of the tariqa increasingly found intolerable a situation in which they were denied full access

and status in the broader orthodox community. Africans often made their challenge by attempting to make innovations—usually of traditional African origin—in religious observances. By questioning their long-established prerogative to decide on the appropriateness of religious practices, Africans were essentially opposing the authority of the Arab 'ulama. Because the tariqa was frequently the source of these innovations, given its largely African composition, it generally became the organizational base for Africans in the ensuing disputes.

Under colonialism, Arabs had privileges that further distinguished them from the African population. Since they, along with Indians and other non-African peoples of color, had more access than Africans to political authority, (to the European rulers)—Zanzibar being the extreme case—Africans began to identify them with the white community. Once the nationalist struggle commenced and TANU adopted the strategy of mobilization to end white rule (in Zanzibar, it was ended by the revolution), tariqa leaders were in a particularly advantageous position. Their influence among the Muslim masses made them most attractive to the nationalist leaders. In addition, and more important in explaining their role, the tariqa heads had experience in opposing whites, or at least one component of this group—Arabs. Since the religious and political cleavages were superimposed—they also coincided with the economic and social status cleavages, that is, Africans were consistently subordinate while whites were dominant in every sphere—it was likely that the tariqa that had served Africans in challenges to relations of authority in the religious sphere would play a similar role in the political arena.

This mode of analysis deepens an understanding of the larger picture, in time and space, of politics in the Muslim community and Islam's role in the political process. This is especially true for Tanzania, if not for the rest of East Africa. Islam became a major political force in the region because it became a mass movement around the turn of the century by attracting the African masses to its fold, primarily through the tariqas. Before that time, this had not occurred, in part because of the elitist and near exclusionist attitude of the coastal elites (notably the Arabs) toward Africans beyond the coastal and inland Swahili enclaves. No doubt their role in the slave trade reinforced such attitudes. As long as it remained the religion of the coastal elites and their inland counterparts, Islam's political influence in the context of an encroaching European imperialism was relatively insignificant. If one accepts the argument that the sultanate in Zanzibar encouraged the spread of the brotherhoods with the hope that mass conversions would serve as a counterweight to the European

intrusion,[12] then the enlargement of the Muslim population was indeed a deliberate process with a political purpose.

It is significant that the Muslims who took the lead in the conversion of Africans were not the coastal Arabs but foreigners—occasionally Arabs—from southern Somalia. Outsiders who did not harbor the attitudes of the coastal Arabs toward Africans were probably the only Muslims who could carry out this task. That the sultanate may have initiated this process does not invalidate the argument; in another sense, Zanzibar's rulers too were outsiders, since they were Ibadi, or non-Sunni, Muslims. The outcome of the mass conversions was the creation of the Arab-African cleavage in the orthodox community, a cleavage whose roots lay in the attitudes that coastal Arabs had about the peoples they had enslaved.

The Maji Maji rebellion may have been the first instance of Islam's involvement in a political event of national importance. It clearly was an African movement in opposition to Europeans; as an armed and African-led struggle against foreign rulers, it was unique in modern mainland history. The rebellion also had anti-Arab overtones since it was against anyone connected with European rule. Though it is not conclusive, there is some evidence that Islam's role, which was only peripheral, may have been carried out through the brotherhoods. Given the popularity of the tariqas among the African masses and their tendency to express African interests within Islam—that is, in opposition to Arab domination—the tariqas, indeed, may have been the vehicle for the Muslim component of the struggle. In the context of an anti-European or, in terms of my analysis, an anti-white movement, the brotherhoods could have been very much at home in the Maji Maji revolt.

The Mecca letter affair, which followed on the heels of Maji Maji, was the first major event that clearly revealed the role of the brotherhoods in the politics of Swahili society. The disseminators of the letter, with its anti-European intimations, were Qadiriyya leaders in various locales. Though many were Somalis from Brava, they identified with Africans, especially Manyema—as was the case with Shaykh Zahur in Tabora—and were often opposed by the Arab political and religious elite. The significance of the event, in John Iliffe's view, is that it reflected "social tensions" in Swahili society that resulted from colonization and that those who felt deprived by this process expressed their discontent through the tariqa.[13] This interpretation is consistent with my analysis. However, I call the "social tensions" that Iliffe discerned a manifestation of the fundamental division in Swahili society, the white-black cleavage—a schism that preceded

colonialism and was the basis of the African Muslim response to the later movement for national independence. Colonialism exacerbated this already-existing tension by superimposing on it other social inequalities.

The Mecca letter affair may have been the only event in which the brotherhoods played a political role on a regional, if not a territorial, basis. This could be expected, given the local character of the orders. However, the basic cleavage in Swahili society continued to underlie Muslim politics at the national level. As was the case later with the nationalist struggle, tariqas probably had a role in the local expressions of these issues.

The circumstances surrounding the formation of the Muslim Association of Tanganyika in 1934 reflected the fundamental schism. This group was formed by African Muslims in reaction to the exclusiveness of Indian Muslims; Arabs seem to have behaved in a manner similar to the Indians. Many of the founders of the MAT were also active in the Tanganyika African Association. Thus, African Muslims who laid the basis for the nationalist struggle of later years were also active in a fight within the Sunni community against the whites, certainly the Indians and probably the Arabs. The superimposition of the religious and political cleavages meant, therefore, that conflict was likely to generalize from religious to political issues. The tariqas were probably participants in the dispute that gave rise to the MAT since it surfaced in a number of locales.

The attainment of independence in 1961 did not end politics within the framework of the historical cleavage among Sunni Muslims. The redistribution of authority in the political sphere in favor of the African population did not mean an automatic redistribution of religious authority in the orthodox community. In fact, a contradiction existed for a time during the postcolonial era in the sense that Africans had achieved hegemony in the political arena but not in the realm of religion. On the mainland, this contradiction came to a head at the end of 1968. This was the historical significance of the demise of the East African Muslim Welfare Society and the creation of the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, the BAKWATA. The society was not an exclusively Indian and Arab organization—it claimed a number of African supporters, especially former members of the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika in the Dar es Salaam area—but many members of the coastal religious elite were its strongest supporters. In addition, Indian Muslims, primarily Isma'ili Khojas, provided most of its financial support. The official reason the government gave for banning the EAMWS concerned this aid;

it claimed that, because a large part of it came from outside the country, it was incompatible with Tanzania's aims of self-reliance. The BAKWATA, the government-supported organization that was formed shortly before the ban, is totally run by African Muslims and now supervises or coordinates most aspects of Sunni affairs throughout the country. Some if its most ardent backers have been the brotherhood heads, particularly outside of Dar es Salaam. The end of the EAMWS and the formation of the BAKWATA, therefore, set in motion the completion of the unfinished tasks of the nationalist struggle for independence as it applied to the religious arena.[14]

In Zanzibar, not surprisingly, steps were taken fairly soon after the revolution to transfer religious authority to African Muslims. Since the Arab religious elite generally had close ties to the old regime, many of its members went into exile in neighboring territories after the revolution. The institutions that they had operated, such as the Muslim Academy and the madrasas in various mosques, fell into disuse. Shaykh Abeid Karume, the strong man on the island, rebuked the traditional 'ulama sometimes individually and sometimes as a group and often on the grounds that they had misled the Muslim masses with their interpretations and writings on Islam.[15] In their place, Karume invited Cairo to send missionaries from al-Azhar University to teach Islamic subjects and Zanzibari students, frequently Africans, also went to study at such institutions in the Middle East.

On the mainland, the government later began to take similar steps. Mainly with the assistance of friendly Muslim countries, an Islamic center was built in Dar es Salaam to teach courses on Islam. Students have also gone to Cairo and elsewhere to study in order to return and take over some of the teaching duties carried out by the traditional shaykhs.

The postcolonial situation in Kenya contrasted sharply that in Tanzania. There appears to have been little redistribution of authority in the Sunni community in favor of Africans. The events in Zanzibar contributed somewhat to this situation because Mombasa was one of the places where those who felt after the revolution settled. The apparent absence of conflict similar to what occurred in Tanzania can be explained in part by the less intense nature of the Arab-African cleavage in Kenya's Swahili community. This was due primarily to the failure of Islam to penetrate significantly into the interior, a fact related to the comparative absence of brotherhood activity in Kenya.

The consolidation of African hegemony in the state and Islamic community will not necessarily bring to an end to politics among

Tanzania's Sunni Muslims. The emergence of new cleavages is a real possibility. A schism is likely between those Africans who have been trained in Cairo and elsewhere overseas or in the new center in Dar es Salaam and the traditional African Muslim elites, especially the tariqa heads. The basis for this possible development is the fact that the training a student acquires in Cairo or through its missionaries is one that regards the sufi orders as relics from Islam's past that are inconsistent with the needs of Islam in a modern world.[16] Furthermore, these students are likely to be much better trained because of the more formal curriculums now followed as opposed to the traditional training that tends to be less consistently of high quality. Adherents of brotherhoods tend to place more value on piety than on learning. As the newly educated students begin to return to Tanzania to teach, it is very likely that they will come into conflict with the traditional African shaykhs.[17] To the extent that this cleavage develops, it could bring into question the long-standing support that brotherhoods have given to the TANU-led government.

Whether or not the rulers in Tanzania wll continue to enjoy the support of the brotherhoods will depend on the larger picture, the broader kinds of changes that occur in Tanzania. Brotherhood support of TANU was originally based on the assumption that an African government would make a meaningful difference in the lives of the African masses. Africans assumed that independence would lead to a redistribution of authority in the economic sphere as well as the political sphere. In part, this meant that an African-led government would use its state power to undermine the historical dominance of the whites, notably the Indians and the Arabs, in the economy. In Zanzibar, this actually happened as a result of the revolution. Only recently on the mainland have similar steps been taken, at least since the government declared it would pursue a socialist path to development in 1967. Two questions—the first is more relevant to the mainland—can be raised, however, about these steps, given the meager improvements in the standard of living for Africans during the postcolonial period. First, can the government avoid a situation in which the traditional economic elite is replaced by a new privileged class to the disadvantage of African Muslims? Could, for example, this new class have disproportionately more Christians among its ranks? If so, it could increase the tensions between Muslim and Christian Africans, a cleavage that had begun to appear during the final decades of the colonial era.

The second question is whether the elimination of Indian and Arab economic hegemony is sufficient to improve the material well-

being of Africans. One could argue that it will be necessary for the Tanzanian government to go beyond the Indians and the Arabs and include all whites. This means the elimination of all vestiges of the economic subordination of Africans that existed under colonial rule, which today takes the form of the Western World's economic hegemony over Tanzania.

These questions are not abstract; they are being raised increasingly by observers of developments in Tanzania.[18] If the leadership of Tanzania is not able to bring about meaningful economic change for Africans—and there is much to suggest that it has not[19]—it is possible that Islam through the tariqas could again carry out its historical role as an agent for social change. But—and this is an important caveat—its ability to do this will depend on the availability and appeal of competing ideologies and instruments for change. The same agent cannot be effective at all times, and Islam and the tariqas may be irrelevant in future struggles. (In the recent revolution in Iran, which overthrew the shah, Islam was able to serve as a vehicle for change precisely because of the absence of a competing ideology and apparatus—more specifically, a revolutionary socialist party.) Therefore, if meaningful change for Africans occurs in Tanzania, the brotherhoods will probably cease to serve as instruments for social change; if the lives of African Muslims do not improve, then the future of the tariqa is in question.

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Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

Ar.	Arabic
NAT	National Archives of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam
Sw.	Swahili
TNR	Tanzania Notes and Records (formerly, *Tanganyika Notes and Records)*

Notes

PREFACE

1. Among the most important are Donald B. O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); B. G. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

2. Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 182.

3. Robert A. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," in Robert A. Salisbury, ed., *Interest Group Politics in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 42-43.

4. Donald Smith, *Religion and Political Development: An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 144-45.

CHAPTER 1

1. For the most current and authoritative overview of early coastal history, see Philip Curtin et al., *African History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 139-46. For more detailed history, see J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 3; and Neville Chittick, "The 'Shirazi' Colonization of East Africa," *Journal of African History*, 6 (1965), pp. 277-94.

2. Randall L. Pouwels, "Tenth Century Settlement of the East African Coast: The Case for Qarmatia/Isma'ili Connections," *Azania*, 9 (1974), pp. 67-69.

3. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, pp. 9-10; Chittick, p. 292.

4. Norman R. Bennett, "The Arab Impact," in B. A. Ogot and J. A. Kiernan, eds.,

Zamani: A Survey of East African History, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House and Longmans, Green, 1968), p. 216.

5. Edward A. Alpers, "The Coast and the Development of the Caravan Trade," in I. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu, eds., *A History of Tanzania*, (Nairobi:East African Publishing House, 1969), p. 56.

6. See George Shepperson, "The Jumbe of Kota Kota and Some Aspects of the History of Islam in British Central Africa," in I. M. Lewis, ed., *Islam in Tropical Africa: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Fifth International African Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, January, 1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 193-207.

7. Much of what follows on the Yao is from Edward A. Alpers, "Towards a History of the Expansion of Islam in East Africa: The Matrilineal Peoples of the Southern Interior," in T. D. Ranger and I. N. Kimambo, eds., *The Historical Study of Religion: With Special Reference to East and Central Africa* (London: Heineman, 1972).

8. The two missionaries were 'Mfaume son of Kaligambe and Mfaume son of Tono," according to Canon Lamburn, The Yaos of Tunduru: An Essay in Missionary Anthropology (unpublished manuscript, n.d. [Circa 1950], Makerere University, College Library). See particularly "The Coming of the Arabs and Islams," pp. 169-95.

9. Bennett, p. 221.

10. Although I have not seen it, the best source on the early history of Arab traders in Tabora and the Islamization of the area is reported to be W. Hutley, Mohommedanism in Central Africa and Its Influence, A Report Written at Urambo in August 1881 (London Missionary Society Archives, file D2.4).

11. As to who these Ibadi Arabs were, see W. H. Whitely, trans., *Maisha ya Hamed bin Muhammad el-Murjebi, yaani Tippu Tip* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1966), p. 43. On the passive character of the Ibadis in East Africa, see Alfred Imbert, *Le Droit abadhite chez les musulmans de Zanzibar et de l'Afrique Orientale* (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1903), pp. 19-20.

12. Interview with Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, Tabora, August 2, 1970.

13. Bennett, p. 227.

14. Shunya Hino, "Social Stratification of a Swahili Town," *Kyoto University African Studies*, 2 (1968), p. 60.

15. P. Ceulemans, "Introduction de l'influence de l'Islam au Congo," in I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, pp. 174-76.

16. Armand Abel, *Les Musulmans noirs du Maniema* (Brussels: Centre pour l'Etude des Problemes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, 1960), pp. 9-10; C. Young, "L'Islam au Congo," *Etudes Congolaises*, 10 (September-October, 1967), pp. 14-31.

17. The following draws heavily on Ayre Oded, *Islam in Uganda: Islamization through a Centralized State in Pre-colonial Africa* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974). On the debate regarding when the Arabs first arrived, see pp. 39-44.

18. Ibid., p. 35.

19. On the Doe in particular, see Mtoro bin Mwenyi Bakari, "Safari yangu ya Udoe hatta Uzigua na Khabari za Wadoe no Mila Yao," in Carl Velten, ed., *Safari za Wasuaheli* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1901), p. 145. See also Martin Klamroth, *Der Islam in Deutschostafrika* (Berlin: Berliner Evangelischen Missionsgesellschaft, 1912), p. 12.

20. Peter Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of Lamu and Its Social Background," *TNR*, 53 (1959), p. 228.

21. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 27.

22. Interview with Shaykh Muhsin b. Muhammad b. Waligane, Mbwewe, December 16, 1969.

23. Interview with Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, Tabora, August 2, 1970.

24. The reports for the various districts from the survey can be found in the National Archives of Tanzania (hereafter NAT), Allgemeine Religiose Bewungen: Islam, Band III, 1912-1915, G9/48.

25. See Marcia Wright, "Local Roots of Policy in German East Africa," *Journal of African History*, 9 (1968), pp. 625-26.

26. For example, see C. H. Becker, "Materials for the Understanding of Islam in German East Africa," ed. and trans. B. G. Martin, *TNR*, 68 (1968), p. 38; Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 27; A. R. W. Crosse-Upcott, The Social Structure of the KiNgindo-speaking Peoples (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Capetown, 1956), p. 311.

27. John Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Crosse-Upcott, p. 404.

28. Another factor may have been the Mecca letter affair. See chapter 5, pp. 73-75.

29. F. S. Joelson, *The Tanganyika Territory: Characteristics and Potentialities* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920), p. 108; Francis E. Pearse, *Africa on the Hilltops* (London: Universities' Mission to Central Africa, 1926), p. 28.

30. Joelson, pp. 110-11; "A German Appeal to Mohammedans in Africa," *Moslem World*, 9 (April, 1919), p. 188.

31. As a symbol of the new-found friendship the Germans flew their flag alongside the sultan of Turkey's in Muslim areas of the country.

32. Great Britain, Admiralty, War Staff, Intelligence Division, *A Handbook of German East Africa* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), p. 26.

33. Wilhelm Arning, *Deutsch-Ostafrika: Gestern und Heute* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, Andrews and Steiner, 1936), pp. 145-46; Julius Richter, *Tanganyika and Its Future* (London: World Dominion Press, 1934), pp. 50-56.

34. *African Census Report, 1957* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Government Printer, 1963), pp. 1, 61.

35. Joelson, p. 110; Pearse, pp. 28-29.

36. A. B. Hellier, "Korogwe: Its Hopes and Difficulties," *Central Africa*, 28, no. 335 (November, 1910), p. 272; H. W. W., "Islam in Korogwe Archdeaconry," *Central Africa*, 31, no. 304 (April, 1913), pp. 105-8.

37. Frank Zanzibar, "In Zigualand," *Central Africa*, 39, no. 466 (October, 1921), p. 196.

38. Moravian Church, International Mission Board, Extracts from Periodical Accounts, 1896-1925 (unpublished manuscript, University of Dar es Salaam).

39. Saidi Rupia, Islamu Katika Mchi ya Songea (Research Paper 1, Historial Association of Tanzania, Ruvuma Branch, n.d. [Circa 1968]), p. 1.

40. Kaiserliches Bezirksamt, Songea, January 23, 1913, to Daressalam, NAT G9/48.

41. Kaiserliches Bezirksamt, Dodoma, August 10, 1913, to Daressalam, NAT G9/48.

42. Robert L. Bunger, Jr., *Islamization among the Upper Pokomo* (Eastern African Studies XI, The Program of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, April, 1973), p. 71; Oded, p. 83.

43. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 27.

CHAPTER 2

1. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. 1, part 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 81-81 and chapter 2, *passim*.

2. Ibid., p. 81.

3. Ibid., p. 159.

4. H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers, eds., *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1953), p. 59.

5. Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 188.

6. Gibb and Bowen, p. 159.

7. For an account on this class and its leading figures during the nineteenth century, see B. G. Martin, "Notes on Some Members of the Learned Classes of Zanzibar and East Africa in the Nineteenth Century," *African Historical Studies*, 4, no. 3 (1971). The best information on the 'ulama from the last century is in Shaykh Abdulla Salih Farsy's two works, *Seyyid Said bin Sultan* (Zanzibar: Mwongozi Press, 1942) and *Tarehe ya Iman Shafi na Wanavyuoni Wakubwa wa Afrika Mashariki* (Zanzibar: Mwongozi Press, 1944).

8. See, for example, the two specimen letters in C. G. Büttner, *Suaheli-Schriftstucke in arabischer Schrift* (Stuttgart: W. Speman, 1892), pp. 41-45, to Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumayt, qadi of Zanzibar (1886-1925) from a magistrate (*hakimu*) on the Mrima coast in 1888 that sought his aid on a legal question.

9. Martin, "Notes," pp. 526-27.

10. Ibid., p. 530.

11. J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), p. 122.

12. Ibid., p. 123. Under the British, and more than likely the Germans also, there was never a specific ordinance that allowed for the application of Islamic law nor an overall statement of what constituted Islamic law. The result, as Anderson noted, was a number of inconsistencies throughout the British period in the application of the shari'a.

13. Shaykh 'Ali also wrote two manuals on inheritance and marriage laws to assist local officials in applying Islamic law. See respectively P. E. Mitchell, trans., *Mirathi*, (Nairobi: Kenya Government Printer, 1923) and J. W. T. Allen, trans., *Nikahi* (originally *Kitabu cha Nikahi*) (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Government Printer, 1959). For a commentary on another work of Shaykh 'Ali, *Mafundisho ya Dini Islamu*, see Ernst Dammann, "Ein schafiitisher Traktat in Suaheli," *Der Islam*, 23, no. 3 (April, 1936), pp. 189-91.

14. The most extensive biographical information on both scholars and their most famous students can be found in Farsy, *Tarehe*, pp. 39-102. Further information on Shaykh Ahmad is found in Martin, "Notes," pp. 541-95; Sayyid 'Umar b. Sumayt, *al-Ibtihaj fi Bayan Istilah al-Minhaj* (Cairo, A.H. 1353/1935), pp. 27-44, cited in Martin, "Notes"; an obituary in *Mambo Leo* (Dar es Salaam), August, 1925, pp. 175-76. For Shaykh Abd Allah, see his *Rihlat al-Ashwaq al-Qawiyat ila Mawatin al-Sadat al-Alawiyat* (Zanzibar; Matba,'at al-Alum A.H. 1358/1938-1939), pp. i-iv; and Martin, "Notes," pp. 538-71.

15. Sayyid Omar Abdulla, "A Commentary on Muslim Education in East Africa," in East Africa High Commission, *Proceedings of the Conference on Muslim Education Held in Dar es Salaam on 20th-22nd November, 1958* (Nairobi: Kenya Government Printer, 1959), p. 27.

16. Farsy, *Tarehe*, pp. 36-37.

17. Joseph Schacht, "Notes on Islam in East Africa," *Studia Islamica*, 33 (1965), p. 109.

18. For the most part, fees that might be charged by a scholar were minimal, and often charitable trusts (*awqaf*, singular: *waqf*) provided for the education and board of poorer students.

19. James S. Coleman et al., *Equality of Education Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1968).

20. Abdulla, "A Commentary," p. 26.

21. The point being made here about family background and educational success extends beyond religious education to secular studies at the same time. Thus, some of the most successful individuals in terms of secular education are the offspring of the most

important religious families in East Africa. For example, there are the following: Sayyid Omar Abdulla, who, as mentioned above, received a bachelor of philosophy from Oxford; the renowned political scientist Professor Ali A. Mazrui (now at the University of Michigan), a son of Shaykh al-Amin b. 'Ali; various children at Shaykh Abdulla Saleh Farsy, who have taken higher degrees abroad; the son of Shaykh Ali Hemedi, Shaykh Muhammad, who has recently completed work on a law degree at the University of Dar es Salaam; and Dr. Zami b. Sulayman, formerly the chief medical officer at the Nordic Experimental Center near Dar es Salaam and the son of the late Shaykh Sulayman b. Muhammad al-Alawi, one of Zanzibar's most respected scholars in recent years. (It is interesting to note that in the last case the father was an expert practitioner of traditional Islamic medicine.)

22. Farsy, *Tarehe*, p. 94; "Marehemu Seyyid Ahmed bin Abubaker Sumeit," *Mambo Leo* (Dar Es Salaam), August, 1925, p. 175.

23. Carl Becker, "Materialen zur Kenntnis des Islam in Deutsch-Ostafrika," *Der Islam*, 2 (1911), p. 5n.

24. Kaiserliches Bezirksamt, Bagamoyo, to government, December 17, 1911, NAT G9/47.

25. J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 136.

26. Farsy, *Tarehe, passim*.

CHAPTER 3

1. Edward Batson, *Report on Proposals for a Social Survey of Zanzibar* (Zanzibar: Zanzibar Government Printer, 1948), pp. 18-19.

2. A. C. Hollis, "Notes on the History of Vumba, East Africa," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 30 (1900), pp. 278-79.

3. The 1957 census indicates that there was almost a 50 percent decrease in the number who identified themselves as Shirazi from the number who did so in the 1948 census. *African Census Report, 1957*, p. 53.

4. This practice was not followed in the village of Mambrui on the Kenya coast, at least in the late 1950s. Interestingly, however, one of the mosques was called *KiArabu*, that is, "Arabic." G. E. T. Wijeyewardene, "Mambrui: Status and Social Relations in a Multiracial community," East African Institute for Social Research Conference, December, 1959, p. 12.

5. Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 235.

6. The revolt on the Mrima coast was known as the Abushiri uprising, named after the Arab leader who had been recruited by Shirazi chieftains. The southern coast rebellion was led by Hasan Omari Makunganya.

7. Batson, p. 20. On Pemba, the percentage of mainlanders was significantly smaller.

8. As native speakers of the language of the Quran, Arabs no doubt had another advantage over non-Arab Muslims.

9. Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 61-62.

10. In Ujiji, the Manyema, who arrived originally in the town as slaves, were the earliest African converts to Islam even though they were relatively close to their lands of origin. Hino, p. 60.

11. Sir Phillip Mitchell, governor of Kenya, to the Aga Khan, November 28, 1947, NAT 36952.

12. Ahmed I. Salim, "Native or Non-native? The Problem of Identity and the Social Stratification of the Arab-Swahili of Kenya," in B. A. Ogot, ed., *History and Social Change in East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1976).

13. Wijeyewardene, "Mambrui," p. 5, comments on how Arabs, in the case of this village, were opposed to African nationalism and were as conservative in this regard as the European settler population in the highlands of Kenya.

14. See Lofchie, pp. 257-81, for the details of African participation in the revolution.

15. In some places on the mainland, the Zanzibar revolution created consternation in the Arab community (see, for instance, Hino, p. 70, on the situation in Ujiji). It was an indication of the relatively amicable relations between Africans and Arabs that the Arabs' fears proved to be unfounded.

16. Dernburg to Gotzen, January 7, 1910, quoted in Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, p. 115.

17. P. E. Mitchell, secretary for native affairs, to F. W. Brett, Dar es Salaam, July 16, 1929, NAT 13723.

18. Memorandum by the Government of Tanganyika Territory, Native Policy: Detribalised Natives and Natives in Towns, Conference of Governors of British East Africa Territories, February, 1933, NAT 11601.

19. The most authoritative source on coastal slavery is Frederick Cooper, *Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).

20. Batson, p. 8.

21. Cooper, p. 52.

22. Schacht, *Islamic Law*, p. 130.

23. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 146.

24. A. H. J. Prins, *The Swahili-speaking Peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast* (London: International African Institute, 1967), p. 69.

25. C. S. Nichols. *The Swahili Coast: Politics, Diplomacy and Trade on the East African Littoral, 1798-1856* (New York: Africana, 1971), p. 289. See also Cooper, p. 120. I have not seen reference in available works to any other revolt during this period. Historically, in the Muslim world, slave revolts have almost always occurred in large-scale agricultural and mining enterprises.

26. Wijeyewardene, "Mambrui," p. 14.

27. Lofchie, pp. 60-62.

28. Prins, p. 63.

29. Sir John Gray, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-84," in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathews, eds., *History of East Africa*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 218.

30. G. E. T. Wijeyewardene, Some Aspects of Village Solidarity in Ki-Swahili Speaking Communities of Kenya and Tanganyika (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1961), p. 84.

31. Von Rechenberg to Colonial Office, Berlin, July 15, 1907, from a translation by Keeper of German Records, Dar es Salaam, February 2, 1932, NAT 11601.

32. Batson, p. 36.

33. Lofchie, p. 73.

34. Bernard Lewis, *Race and Color in Islam* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 94.

35. Lofchie, p. 93.

CHAPTER 4

1. For the history of Sufism and the rise of the brotherhoods, see J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), pp. 987-95; and A. J. Arbery, *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963).

2. Gibb and Kramers, p. 573.

3. Hans J. Kissling, "The Sociological and Educational Role of the Dervish Orders in the Ottoman Empire," in G. D. Von Grunebaum, ed., *Studies in Islamic Cultural History* (American Anthropologist Memoir, no. 76, 1954), pp. 28-29.

4. E. E. Evans-Pritchard's *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) provides a full account of this process.

5. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic Factor in African Politics," *Orbis*, 8 (summer, 1964), p. 433.

6. This is contrary to Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 99, who says that it was brought by Shaykh 'Umar al-Qullatayn from Brava. On the life of Shaykh Uways, see the following biographies: 'Abd al-Rahman b. Shaykh 'Umar al-'Ali al-Qadiri, *Jala' al-'Aynayn fi manaqib al Shaykh al-Wali Hajj Uways al-Qadiri wa'l-Shaykh al-Kamil . . . 'Abd al-Rahman al-Zayla'i* (Cairo: Mashhad al-Husayni Press, n.d. [Circ 1954]); and *al-Jawhar al-Nafis fi Khawass al-Shaykh Uways* (Cairo: Mashhad al-Husayni Press, A.H. 1383/1964), by the same author. According to both, respectively p. 22 and p. 18, Shaykh 'Umar was a khalifa of Shaykh Uways.

7. C. H. Becker to Dr. Stuhlman, Hamburg, March 24, 1909, Dar es Salaam NAT G9/46.

8. al-Rahman, *al-Jawhar al-Nafis*, p. 24.

9. There is reported to be another biography of Shaykh 'Umar, but I was unable to locate it. A grandson of Shaykh 'Umar now serves on the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council.

10. Sir Ali B. Sultan, Mombasa, to P. E. Mitchell, Secretariat, Dar es Salaam, October 20, 1933, NAT 21447.

11. Biographical information on Shaykh Hassan can be found in Farsy, *Tarehe*, p. 89; Mzee b. Ali Muhammad, *Umuri Swalat al-Kubra* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam Printers, 1968), pp. ii-v.

12. Interview with Shaykh Hassan b. 'Amayr, Raha Leo, Zanzibar, June 9, 1970.

13. The date of Shaykh 'Ali's death can be found in Saleh b. Ali and 'Abdul-Hassan b. Ahmad, *Kitabul-Tahara* (Zanzibar: Imprimerie Alsaada, 1927), p. 3. This is an important source for dates of the deaths of famous East African shaykhs.

14. Interview with Shaykh Muhyi al-Din b. 'Ali b. Hassan, Dar es Salaam, May 24, 1969.

15. Abel, p. 117.

16. The official biography of Sayyid Muhammad is *Manaqib . . . al-Sayyid Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Bakr al-Shadhili al-Yashruti*(Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi and Sons Press, 1934), written by his relative Sayyid Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Rahman. An abridged edition of this appears in French as Paul Guy, trans., *La Vie et l'oeuvre du grand marabout des Comores, Said Mohamed ben Ahmad al-Ma'arouf (1852-1905)* (Tananarive: 1949).

17. On the history of this branch of the Shadhiliyya and its dispersion in East Africa see Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, *Rihlat ila al-Haqq* (Beirut: 1960), pp. 257-58n.

18. "Sheik Hussein's School at Kilwa Kisiwani," *Kilwa District Book*, vol. 1, n.d. [Circa 1938], NAT; Peter Lienhardt, ed., *The Medicine Man: Swifa ya Nguvumali* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968, p. 48.

19. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, April 28, 1969. An example of Shaykh Husayn's control of the tariqa was the case of a khalifa in Dar es Salaam whom he dismissed in about 1968 for disobeying his orders.

20. Ibid.

21. Interview with Shaykh Mahmud b. 'Abd Allah, Dar es Salaam, June 1, 1969.

22. E. R. Turton, "The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East African Protectorate," *Journal of African History*, 10, no. 4 (1969), p. 647.

23. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, June 19, 1969.

24. I. M. Lewis, "Conformity and Contrast in Somali Islam," in I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, p. 264.

25. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 102; Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of Lamu," p. 236, gives 'Ali b. 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad al-Muharjir as the founder.

26. R. B. Serjeant, "Muslim Sects and Their Relationship to Each Other," in East Africa High Commission, *Proceedings*, p. 38.

27. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, pp. 101-2; see also Sperling, Dodoma, to government, Dar es Salaam, July 6, 1914, NAT G9/48.

28. See, for example, Richter, *Tanganyika and Its Future*, p. 55; and Norman Leys, *Kenya* (London: Hogarth Press, 1924), p. 265.

29. C. H. Becker, "Materials," p. 50. Given somewhat contradictory comments made the same year—1910 (see Julius Richter, "The German National Conference and Islam," *The Moslem World*, 1 [January, 1911], p. 56)—it is possible that Becker wrote his article a year or two earlier.

30. See chapter 5, pp. 73-75.

31. Klamroth, p. 53.

32. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 97.

33. J. C. Froelich, "Essai sur L'islamisation de l'Afrique noire," *L'Afrique islamique—Le Monde religieux*, 30 (1966), p. 221.

34. Cannon Edward Sell, "Islam in Africa," *The Moslem World*, 1 (January, 1911), p. 136.

35. K. G. "Mitteilungen: Ostafrika," *Die Welt des Islams*, 2, no. 1 (December, 1914), p. 72.

36. Richter, "The German National Conference and Islam," p. 56.

37. Richter, *Tanganyika and Its Future*, p. 55. See chapter 4, p. 62, for my comments on the brotherhoods he claims for Tanganyika.

38. F. Schildknecht, Islam in East Africa: Report in Answer to the Questionnaire of Rome (unpublished report, July, 1963, Tanganyika Episcopal Conference Catholic Secretariat), p. 21.

39. F. Schildknecht, "Review of *L'Islam noir* by Vincent Monteil and *Islam in East Africa* by J. Spencer Trimingham," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, no. 1 (May, 1965), p. 149.

40. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, April 28, 1969.

41. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Hemedi, Dar es Salaam, April 9, 1969.

42. See, for example, Farsy's *Tarehe*, which is the most complete account of the leading shaykhs of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in East Africa. One of the few comments about the tariqa, pp. 35-36, is disparaging.

43. Pouwels, p. 70.

44. P. E. Mitchell, Secretariat to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, January 5, 1927, NAT 13632.

45. "Marehemu Abdallah bin Hassani, Late Liwali Utete," *Mambo Leo* (Dar es Salaam), July, 1924.

46. Joelson, p. 109.

47. Crosse-Upcott, p. 311.

48. Ibid., p. 321.

49. H. W. W., p. 105.

50. *Report on Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1921, cmd. 1732* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922) p. 12.

51. "John Saidi," *Central Africa*, 40, no. 492 (December, 1923), p. 246.

52. Rev. Cyril Whitworth, "The Influence of Islam at Mkuzi," *Central Africa* 41, no. 493 (January, 1924), p. 7.

53. Interview with Shaykh Muhsin b. Muhammad Waligane, Mbwewe, December 16, 1969.

54. Becker, "Materials," p. 43.

55. Sperling, Dodoma, to government, Dar es Salaam, July 6, 1914, NAT G9/48.

56. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, April 27, 1969.

57. Moravian Missionary Society, Extracts from Periodical Accounts, University of Dar es Salaam Library, September, 1911, p. 4.

58. Ibid., p. 5.

59. Interview with Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, Tabora, August 3, 1970.

60. Shaykh Mwinyigogo was a Shirazi who, along with others from near Dar es Salaam, settled in Sikonge near the end of the nineteenth century; they were called Walungwana.

61. Interview with Shaykh Muhyi al-Din b. 'Ali b. Hassan, Dar es Salaam, June 15, 1969. See also Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, p. 189, about a coastal Muslim teacher who lived for a period with Sultan Makwaya.

62. The reported presence of a Qadiri flag outside the former residence of Sultan Makwaya (interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, April 27, 1969), suggests that he may have been a member of the tariqa.

63. Interview with Shaykh 'Abdul Muhsin Kitumba, Dar es Salaam, May 26, 1969.

64. Abel, p. 116.

65. See, for example, Abel, p. 117, and the articles by F. Schildknecht, and Crawford Young on, respectively, Tanzania and the Congo, in J. Kritzeck and W. Lewis, eds., *Islam in Africa*, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969).

66. Interview with Shaykh Hassan b. Amir, Raha Leo, Zanzibar, June 19, 1970.

67. Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of Lamu," p. 228. For more details on this order in Lamu, see Abdul Hamid el-Zein, *The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of Religious Symbolism in an East African Town* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

68. Bunger, p. 158.

69. See Chapter 4, pp. 61-62.

70. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, Dar es Salaam, April 27, 1969.

71. Serjeant, p. 38; interview with Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Hemedi, Dar es Salaam, April 9, 1969.

72. Kissling, p. 28.

73. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

1. al-Rahman, *al-Jawhar al-Nafis*, p. 24.

2. For example, Sultan Barghash jailed Shaykh 'Ali b. Khamis b. Salim al-Barwan for forsaking the Ibadi sect and becoming a Sunni; Farsy, *Tarehe*, pp. 25-26.

3. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods*, pp. 165-68.

4. B. G. Martin, "Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonical Rule: Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad al-Barawi and the Qadiriyya Brotherhood in East Africa," *Journal of African History*, 10, no. 3 (1969), p. 476.

5. Martin's thesis, unfortunately, is weakened by his contention that a khalifa of Shaykh Uways was involved in the Muslim coup in Buganda of 1888—the major piece of evidence upon which his argument rests. The individual who did play a role in the coup, according to Roland Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London: Longmans,

Green, 1967), pp. 107-8, was a trader from Tabora named Suliman bin Zeher, whose name Martin spells as Sulayman b. Zahir al-Jabri al-Barawi. Informants in Tabora—Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji Mjubwa and Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji Mdogo, interviewed in Tabora, August, 1970—say that the person referred to by Oliver was neither a Qadiri nor a member of the Jabri clan nor from Brava, as Martin's spelling suggests.

6. The full text can be found in Becker, "Materials," p. 59.

7. Von Rechenberg, *Runderlass*, J. No. 2799, Dar es Salaam, February 15, 1909, NAT G9/46.

8. C. H. Becker to Dr. Stuhlman, Hamburg, March 24, 1909, NAT G9/46.

9. Sperling, Dodoma, to government, July 6, 1914, NAT G9/48.

10. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods*, p. 174, claims Shaykh Abu Bakr was a Qadiri khalifa. However, Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, the present head of the order in Bagamoyo, and three other informants said he was not; he was only a murid and practiced dhikr. The list of khalifas of Shaykh Uways in his biography, al-Rahman, *al-Jawhar al-Nafis*, pp. 18-24, does not list him, though his relative Shaykh Zahur is included. Two other leading figures in the incident, Shaykh 'Isa b. Ahmad and Rumaliza, Martin claims were also Qadiri khalifas, but he presents no evidence to support this contention.

11. Although the exact date is uncertain, it is clear the ritual has been banned, for a notice in 1911 declared it no longer to be prohibited (Decree no. 1, Ngoma Regulations, April 19, 1911, NAT G9/47.

12. Wright, p. 627.

13. Richter, "The German National Conference and Islam," p. 56.

14. Quoted in J. du Plessis, "Government and Islam in Africa," *The Moslem World*, 2, no. 1 (1912), p. 22.

15. Joelson, p. 108.

16. Becker, "Materials," p. 43.

17. Conversation with Dr. Gilbert Gwassa, Dar es Salaam, June, 1970.

18. Crosse-Upcott, p. 404.

19. For example, Sperling, Dodoma, to government, July 6, 1914, NAT G9/48.

20. District administration, Bagamoyo, to government, August 6, 1913, NAT G9/48.

21. District administration, Bagamoyo, to government, December 17, 1911, NAT G9/47.

22. See Joelson, pp. 110-11, for the complete text of the sultan's fatwa.

23. See "Germany and Islam in East Africa," *The Moslem World* 8 (October, 1918), pp. 424-25, regarding flags on posts in southern regions. Flags were placed on the Gongoni mosque minaret in Bagamoyo.

24. "A German Appeal to Mohammedans in Africa," *The Moslem World*, 9 (April, 1919), p. 188, mentions a letter from a Captain Falkenstein to Chief Isa in the Lake Nyasa area.

25. Sperling, Dodoma, to government, July 6, 1914, NAT G9/48.

26. For example, see G. D., "Mohammedan Propaganda in East Africa," *Central Africa*, 37, no. 440 (1919), pp. 99-100; and "Notes and Comments," *Central Africa* 39, no. 460 (1921), p. 65.

27. Except where an intensive look at a locale has been undertaken—as is the case in part 3 of this study—the available data on particular communities are suggestive at best.

28. The details on his stay in Tabora are contained in a letter he wrote to Governor von Rechenberg, Dar es Salaam, August 17, 1912, NAT G9/48.

29. Interview with Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji Mdogo, Tabora, August 2, 1910. See chapter 3, pp. 39-44, for a discussion of the customary status relations between Arabs and Africans of slave origin.

30. Herman, Tabora, Entwurf eines Berichtes betr. Zunahme des Islam in Innern, to Zache, Dar es Salaam, December 5, 1908, NAT G9/46.

31. Superintendent of police, Tabora, to chief of police, Dar es Salaam, February 8, 1934, NAT 26105.

32. See chapter 8, pp. 137-38, for a discussion of an incident in Bagamoyo.

33. Interview with Shaykh Mzee b. Fereji, Tabora, August 2, 1970.

34. The complete account of the dispute is in NAT 21447.

35. T. O. Ranger, "The Movement of Ideas, 1850-1939," in Kimambo and Temu, p. 184.

36. Annual Report, 1934, Lindi Province, NAT 11679/19.

37. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, pp. 195-96.

38. In his introductory essay to *The Medicine Man* by Hasani bin Ismail, Peter Lienhardt writes, "In Lindi . . . in 1959 there were two rival mosques . . . at one . . . it was held permissible to play the tambourine . . . at the other it was not." (p. 19). This suggests that the controversy continued until recently.

39. The participation of women in dhikr rituals was an issue at one time in Tanga. H. M. N. to Maguire, March 22, 1933, NAT 21447).

40. Webster, Tabora, to chief secretary, Dar es Salaam, June 25, 1935, NAT 61/55/I.

41. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, p. 198.

42. Shaykh Husayn later became president of the Congo Association, a welfare group mainly for Manyemas, in Dar es Salaam (NAT 32891).

43. See chapter 8, p. xxx, for details.

44. The complete account of the incident is in NAT 21715.

45. Confidential Circular no. 2 of 1933, Secretariat Minute Paper 15363/32, the Secretariat, Dar es Salaam, December 18, 1933. A copy can be found in NAT 21715.

46. Brett, Dar es Salaam, to Secretariat, September 25, 1933, NAT 21715.

47. Ibid.

48. Monthly Report of Rufiji District, August, 1925, NAT 7794/2.

49. *Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners on Native Administration for the Year 1934* (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Government Printer, 1935), p. 8.

50. See chapter 4, p. xxx, regarding this branch of the Qadiriyya. The complete story of the dispute is in the *Rufiji District Book*, NAT.

51. Shaykh Idris b. Sa'ad to government, November 12, 1934, NAT 61/55/I.

52. Monthly Report, April 1, 1941, Mahenge Division (Ulanga District) NAT 61/3/XVI/-8. (I am indebted to Dr. Lorne Larson for bringing this report to my attention.)

53. Ann Patricia Caplan, *Choice and Constraint in a Swahili Community* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). This monograph draws on her dissertation, Nonunilieal Kinship on Mafia Island, Tanzania (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1968). I will refer to the dissertation, since it is somewhat more explicit for purposes here.

54. The term *Africans* refers to the Mbwera people, the majority population in the village, who have historically seen themselves as the local affiliates of the Shirazi.

55. Caplan, Nonunilineal Kinship, pp. 135-36.

56. See A. D. Sykes, The Life of Kleist Sykes (Research Paper, Ref. no. Jan/-Hist/143/15, Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam), p. 11; and Pan-Islamic Movement, NAT 26035, for some details on this development.

57. Tanga was one of these places.

58. See, for example, the speech of the Indian Muslim leader at the 1930 Mawlid ceremonies in Dar es Salaam, M. O. Abbasi, "An Islamic Rally," *The Shields Daily Gazette and Shipping Telegraph* (Dar es Salaam), September 23, 1930.

59. Sykes, p. 11.

60. On the origins of the TAA see John Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation," in Kimambo and Temu, pp. 156-60.

61. Interview with Shaykh Kassim b. Juma, April 27, 1969, Dar es Salaam.

62. Whether it was specifically Shaykh Muhyi al-Din's leadership of the Qadiriyya that earned him these positions is uncertain.

63. This was why the British undertook an investigation of the issue and then held a conference on it in 1958. See East Africa High Commission, *Report by the Fact-Finding Mission to Study Muslim Education in East Africa* (Nairobi: Kenya Government Printer, 1958) and East Africa High Commission, *Proceedings*.

64. An exception to this was Kilwa, where the Muslim elites were more likely to send the children of their slaves than their own (Lienhardt, *The Medicine Man*, pp. 9-10).

65. Bukoba was a good example of how Muslims were more active than Christians in nationalist politics; see Goran Hyden, *TANU Yajenga Nchi: Political Development in Rural Tanzania* (Lund: Uniskol Bokforlaget Universitet och Skola, 1968), p. 134.

66. Ulotu Abubakar Ulotu, *Historia ya TANU* (Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1971), p. 177. A similar response to impending independence in Zanzibar was registered by the Afro-Shirazi party up until two or three years before colonialism ended (see Lofchie, p. 157 and *passim*).

67. M. S. Haule, district secretary of the TANU, Kondoa, to secretary general, Dar es Salaam, January 6, 1960. (I am indebted to Dr. John Iliffe, from whose files this correspondence was obtained.)

68. R. M. Plantan, general secretary of the AMNUT to general secretary of the TANU, Dar es Salaam, August 30, 1960 (Iliffe's files).

69. Ibid.

70. Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 69.

71. "E. A. Muslim Society Banned," *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), December 20, 1968, p. 1.

72. I was personally made aware of this in that my initial work in Dar es Salaam coincided with these events and many potential informants were reluctant to be cooperative for fear of government harassment.

73. This could be seen in the BAKWATA-organized Mawlid celebration in Dar es Salaam in 1973. A couple of the earlier opponents of the new organization were included in the ceremonies—indicative of a rapprochement.

74. See chapter 4, p. 69.

75. See, for instance, Karume's speech in *The Nationalist*, December 20, 1968.

CHAPTER 6

1. From the poem "Bagamoyo" by the Afro-American poet Lebert Bethune, in LeRoi Jones and Larry Neal, eds., *Black Fire: An Anthology of Afro-American Writing* (New York: Morrow, 1968), p. 658.

2. *African Census Report, 1957*, p. 16.

3. See, for example Walter T. Brown, A Pre-colonial History of Bagamoyo: Aspects of the Growth of an East African Coastal Town (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1971); Hans Wedell, "Das Sachen- und Vertragsrecht und die politische Organisation der Suaheli," *Zeitschrift für Vergleichene Rechtswissenschaft* 18 (1905); Charles Sacleux, *Dictionnaire Swahili-Francais* (Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie, 1939), p. 843; E. C. Baker, "A Note on the WaShomvi of Dar es Salaam," *TNR*, 23 (1947); and interviews with

Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani Mwinchuguuni, Bagamoyo, April 18 and April 16, 1970.

4. 'Aydarus b. al-'Aydarus, *Hadha Kitab bughyat al-amal fi tarikh al-Sumal* (Mogadishu: Matba' at al-Idarat al'Italiyyat al'Qu'mat, 1954), p. 61; Arthur Robinson, "The Shirazi Colonizations of East Africa," *TNR*, 3 (1937), p. 51; "Habari kidogo za Wazaramo na asili yao," *Mambo Leo* (Dar es Salaam), December, 1926, p. 527.

5. Ramadhani Mwaruka, *Masimulizi juu ya Uzaramo* (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 1.

6. Wedell, pp. 181-82n. For an analysis of similar groups in Mombasa, see Margaret Strobel, "From Lelemama to Lobbying: Women's Associations in Mombasa, Kenya," in Ogot.

7. District Officer Bampfylde to provincial commissioner, August 28, 1936, NAT 61/55/I.

8. Interviews with Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya and Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Bagamoyo, respectively April 23 and July 23, 1970.

9. Conversation with Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Bagamoyo, July 10, 1970.

10. This estimate is based on the German census in 1893 (*Deutsches Kolonialblatt* 5 [1894], p. 107). The stipulation of patrilineage is important since slave status in Islam was not usually inherited through the mother.

11. Interview with Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Bagamoyo, July 22, 1970. See also Carl Velten, *Desturi za Wasuaheli* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1903), pp. 252-65.

12. "Bagamoyo Flood Disaster," *Tanganyika Standard*, April 16, 1930, p. 1.

13. Interviews with Mzee Idi Marjani and Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, Bagamoyo, respectively, June 12 and June 17, 1970.

14. Most of the following information on the traditional political organizations comes from Mtoro b. Mwenyi Bakari, a one-time resident of Bagamoyo who served as a Swahili teacher in Hamburg around the turn of the century and as an informant on Swahili culture to German scholars, such as Carl Velten and Hans Wedell. As a Shirazi, a member of Bagamoyo's ruling class, and a teacher of Islam, Mtoro was in an excellent position to serve as an informant on Bagamoyo's political structure. His writings and comments on the subject were collected and edited by Velten in his *Desturi*. This important source, which is almost exclusively about Bagamoyo, has been translated in part by Lyndon Harries in his *Swahili Prose Texts: A Selection from the Material Collected by Carl Velten from 1893 to 1896* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). See also "Safari yangu ya Udoe . . . " and "Khabari ya inchi ya Wazaramu na dasturi za Wazaramu," in Velten, *Safari*; and Wedell, which does not always distinguish one Swahili town from another but is employed here on the assumption that information attributed to Mtoro refers to conditions as they existed in Bagamoyo.

15. Farsy, *Sayyid Said bin Sultan*, provides a list of Sa'id's liwalis and jamadars in East Africa.

16. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, pp. 143-44.

17. Gordon to chief secretary, September 11, 1924, NAT 3763, quoting a report of 1909, the original and the translation of which have been lost. I am indebted to Dr. John Iliffe for being allowed to copy his notes. The report is a reply to a questionnaire on political organization that the government in Dar es Salaam sent to each district. The questions were about the pre-German policies in the district, current policies, the sources of political change, the powers of the indigenous administrators, and the degree of satisfaction with the arrangement.

18. Nimmo to chief secretary, November 28, 1931, NAT (unclassified files).

19. Darrell Bates, *A Fly-Switch from the Sultan* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961), pp. 17-18.

20. Draft on Local Government: East Province Report (1956), NAT, p. 4.

21. In 1953 the question arose concerning the appointment of Arabs or Africans as liwalis in various towns. Communications from the central government indicate there was no policy, although the member for local government favored one that would place Africans as opportunities arose (NAT 20906).

22. Minutes of the Bagamoyo Township Authority, NAT and the Tanganyika *Gazette*, 1938-1961.

23. Local Government: Eastern Province Report on Development Showing Position in Each District in 1956, NAT 7/L.5/20.

24. Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani was the leading Shomvi-Shirazi in the town. By this stage in the colonial era, the Shomvi-Shirazi had come to tolerate if not accept their status as Africans.

25. For a summary of Islam in precolonial Bagamoyo, see Velten, *Desturi*, pp. 39-51.

26. This is indicated by a picture of the qadi and liwali of Bagamoyo in Fritz Bley, *Deutsche Pionierarbeit in Ost-Afrika* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1891), p. 58.

27. Büttner, pp. 41-42.

28. Dinckelacker, Bagamoyo, August 21, 1908, to government, Dar es Salaam, NAT G9/46.

29. At times the British referred to Liwali Ramiya as the qadi, but after 1924 the distinction was no longer made, because the office was abolished, as was the case throughout most of Tanganyika.

30. See Velten, *Desturi*, pp. 226-27, on the powers of the diwani to control the distribution of land.

31. Report on German portion of documents relating to claims to land in Bagamoyo Township, submitted by land officer under his no. D6/7987, January 27, 1931, NAT (unclassified land documents).

32. Wedell, p. 178.

33. Brown, pp. 218-19.

34. This was Shaykh Ramiya; see chapter 7, pp. 119-201.

35. Tanganyika Territory, Bagamoyo: District Officer's Reports, 1925-1930, NAT.

36. The main clerk who made entrances into the Estate Book during these years was Mzee Idi Marijani, who was still alive some forty years later during my stay in Bagamoyo. Mzee Idi verified the authenticity of the Estate Book and the accuracy of its contents. The Estate Book presents a number of difficulties in calculating individual land holdings due to changes in recording procedures over the years. To overcome this problem, the monetary amount of an estate was used to infer landownership during the early years when this mode of recording was used. In the later years, when the number of farms and the number of coconut trees on them were recorded, the amount of both was used to estimate the size of the holdings.

37. This estimate is based on municipal house tax returns for the years 1939 and 1954, respecitvely, NAT 27245 and NAT 7/19/16. The owners are indicated in the second file.

38. See Velten, *Desturi, passim*.

39. Conversation with Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, Bagamoyo, April 20, 1970.

40. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, p. 155, points out that the status of Arabs was also ambiguous with regard to land laws: "Under certain ordinances anyone with Arab blood is regarded as a 'non-native', whereas under the Laws of Property and Conveyancing (cap. 67, Laws, Section II, 8), an Arab is a 'native'. Consequently African Arabs often changed their status to evade the Law."

41. "Habari za Miji: Bagamoyo," *Mambo Leo* (Dar es Salaam), February, 1925, pp. 37-18.

42. Ceremonial Parades, Bagamoyo, 1952-1959, NAT 7/35/7.

CHAPTER 7

1. District office, Bagamoyo, to administrator general, Dar es Salaam, August 12, 1931, Land Department, Bagamoyo File. See also Freehold Titles, Bagamoyo Town Residents, NAT 61/63/E.

2. For this discussion, see Proposed Mortgage between Mohammad bin Ramia bin Abdallah to Abdallah Mohammed Dhanji (Non-Native), Lands Office, file no. 13894/II and NAT 13894/II.

3. A German report of 1913 on the state of Islam in the Bagamoyo District notes that there were at least twenty-six walimu in the town; Kaiserliches Bezirksamt, Bagamoyo, August 6, 1913, to Dar es Salaam, NAT 69/48. On Mu'allim Ramiya as an influential teacher (*einflussreiche Lehrer*) of 'ilm, see Kaiserliches Bezirksamt, Bagamoyo, to Dar es Salaam, August 27, 1908, and March 9, 1909, NAT 69/46.

4. For an analysis of the social importance of the Mawlid in other East AFrican locales, see Wijeyewardene, Some Aspects of Village Solidarity; and el-Zein.

5. Muhammad b. Nur al-Marki, *Zimam al-salikin fi adab al-tariqa* (Bombay: M. Tahir Ali, A.H. 1378/1958-1959).

6. See also Esmail Choka, A Biography of Sheikh Yahya bin Abdallah L-Qadiriyya, known as Sheikh Ramiya (Research Seminar Paper, Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1969), p. 20.

7. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 21, 1970.

8. Most of my information on the Ahmadiyya was obtained from Mzee Su'ud b. 'Umar, the present head of the tariqa, on July 22, 1970.

9. This conclusion is based on an array of often-conflicting information. See chapter 5, n. 10.

10. There are about four residents in Bagamoyo who have received the ijaza of the Shadhiliyya but do not function as a group.

11. In terms of Salisbury's model, a strictly religious benefit does not resemble any of the three benefits he conceptualizes, that is, material, solidary, and purposive. Since his model draws on much of what Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), has formulated and since Olson's theory allows, in one sense, for the use of religious or moral benefits (p. 160n)—the sense in which it is used in this analysis—then this difference presents no fundamental problems for the analysis.

12. al-Marki, p. 10.

13. Interview with Mu'allim Juma b. Khamis, Bagamoyo, July 23, 1970.

14. Interview with Mzee Mshindo Sudi, Bagamoyo, July 23, 1970.

15. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 20, 1970.

16. Interview with Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, June 16, 1970.

17. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya, Bagamoyo, June 19, 1970.

18. Choka, p. 9, 12.

19. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 12, 1970.

20. This date is an estimate based on an oral account saying that Sayyid Muhammad arrived during the tenure of Liwali Amur b. Nassur—between 1902 and 1916 (interview with Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, April 11, 1970), and a German district officer's letter of March 9, 1909, which states that Shaykh Ramiya was conducting dhikr at that time (NAT G9/46).

21. Choka, p. 10. Informal conversations with non-native residents of Bagamoyo repeatedly emphasized this point about the town.

22. The head of the Qadiriyya in the nearby hinterland town of Mbwewe, Shaykh Muhsin Waligane, gave this as the same reason for the tariqa's success there (interview, Mbwewe, December 7, 1969).

23. The two exceptions were Shaykh 'Umar b. 'Abd Allah, A Shihiri Arab from Lamu, and Sayyid 'Abd Allah b. 'Alawi, a sharif of the Jamal al-Layl clan. Shaykh Ramiya had another non-African khalifa, Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman Jalal Khan, A Baluchi, but he resided in Kaule.

24. Interview with Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, July 20, 1970.

25. "Summary of Report on Alien Africans in the Tanga Region of Dr. P. H. Gulliver, Government Sociologist," in M. J. B. Molohan, *Detribalization* (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Government Printer, 1959), p. 93.

26. This restriction does not appear to exist for the Ahmadiyya in Somalia, according to I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 222.

27. al-Marki, p. 10.

28. Ibid., p. 12.

29. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad, Bagamoyo, July 2, 1970.

30. Interview with Mzee Mshindo Sudi, Bagamoyo, July 23, 1970.

31. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 20, 1970.

32. Choka, p. 17.

33. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 20, 1970.

34. This absence of such responsibility on the part of the Ahmadiyya murids in Bagamoyo is again quite different from the duties of their counterparts in Somalia, whose farm settlements there entail obligations of murids to the shaykh. See I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy*, pp. 95-100.

CHAPTER 8

1. Unlike others, Shomvi-Shirazi informants readily pointed out this fact (interview with Mzee Ramadhani Diwani, Bagamoyo, April 6, 1970, and Choka, p. 13.

2. Interview with Mzee Lila Rajabu, Bagamoyo, July 8, 1970.

3. Richards to administrative officer-in-charge, Pangani, November 7, 1922, NAT 31/173.

4. Interview with Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, May 11, 1970.

5. J. V. Lewis to provincial commissioner, Dar es Salaam, December 13, 1938, NAT 61/SS/I.

6. Interview with Mzee Lila Rajabu, Bagamoyo, July 9, 1970.

7. Shekh Ramiya bin Abdalla to chief secretary, Dar es Salaam, April 2, 1930, NAT 62/1E. This quote is from the official English translation of the original Swahili version, which can also be found in this file. According to Shaykh Muhammad, his father made the request at the suggestion of a friend, not because he needed the pension but because, the friend argued, it was rightfully his.

8. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, June 12, 1970.

9. Choka, p. 12. It was only in 1956 that bars were permitted in the town, and then the stipulation was that they be on the outskirts.

10. For the official documents, see the correspondence between Woodhouse, the provincial commissioner, and the chief secretary, from July 17, 1929, to August 7, 1929, NAT 11880.

11. Woodhouse to provincial commissioner, October 24, 1928, NAT 61/52/E.

12. Woodhouse to provincial commissioner, October 18, 1928, NAT 61/52/E.

13. Confidential Circular no. 2 of 1933, Secretariat Minute Paper 15353/32, The Secretariat, Dar es Salaam, December 18, 1933, NAT 21715 and NAT 26105. See chapter 5, pp. 81-83, on the events surrounding this circular.

14. Interview with Mzee Mtumwa Maksudi, Dar es Salaam, July 30, 1970. The party from Dar es Salaam consisted of sixteen people and was headed by John Rupia. See also

Secretary Chambo of the African Association, Dar es Salaam, to provincial commissioner, Eastern Province, August 6, 1939, and Bampfylde to president, African Association, Bagamoyo, August 4, 1939, NAT 7/3/2.

15. A copy of the membership list was sent to the district office on August 21, 1944, NAT 7/3/2. The census data is taken from the 1948 census material and is thus an approximation of the ethnic distribution in 1944.

16. M. D. Kurandi to district commissioner, Bagamoyo, August 9, 1943, NAT 7/3/2.

17. Gulamrasul Sherdel to district commissioner, Bagamoyo, August 24, 1943, NAT 7/3/2.

18. M. D. Kurandi to district commissioner, Bagamoyo, September 20, 1943, NAT 7/3/2.

19. Coleman to chief secretary, Dar es Salaam, November 6, 1925, NAT 3455, vol. II.

20. See their petition against his appointment in Woodhouse to provincial commissioner, Dar es Salaam, April 9, 1930, NAT 61/52/E.

21. Territorial Conference of the African Association, April 1946, NAT 19325.

22. F. W. Bampfylde to provincial commissioner, Dar es Salaam, March 1, 1940, NAT 61/52/E.

23. Extract from Proceedings of the Conference of Provincial Commissioners, Dar es Salaam, April 1940, NAT 28650.

24. The details of this incident can be found in M. D. Kurandi to district commissioner, February 26, 1946, NAT 7/3/2.

25. Interview with Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, July 8, 1970.

26. M. D. Kurandi to district commissioner, August 21, 1944, NAT 7/3/2. Tariqa affiliation of the officers and strong members was determined through interviews with Shaykh Muhammad, July 21, and Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, July 17, 1970.

27. Shaykh 'Isa died in 1968 at Bagamoyo.

28. Their noncooperation is important in itself and is indicative of changes occurring in Bagamoyo that are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 9

1. Secretary of TANU to district commissioner, January 1, 1955, NAT 7/3/2.

2. *TANU Katika UNO* (Dar es Salaam, n.d.), pp. 30-31, quoted in A. J. Temu, "The Rise and Triumph of Nationalism," in Kimambo and Temu p. 202. For a history of the party, see Ulotu.

3. Bienen, pp. 29-30.

4. Lionel Cliffe, "The Political System," in Lionel Cliffe, ed., *One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Elections* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 8.

5. File on TANU, from October 1954, to September, 1955, NAT 7/3/2.

6. Habari za TANU, Questionnaire: Bagamoyo District, The Tanganyika African National Headquarters—Publicity and Research Section, P.O. Box 9151, Dar es Salaam, February 23, 1964. (I am indebted to Dr. John Iliffe for letting me see the questionnaire and answers for Bagamoyo of this national survey undertaken by TANU in 1964.)

7. Tanganyika *Gazette*, June 15, 1951.

8. Interview with Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Bagamoyo, July 22, 1970.

9. Information on the ethnic composition of the council is based on the minutes of the meetings from 1951 to 1959 from the personal file of Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani, to whom I am indebted for having been allowed to see these records.

10. *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for 1959* (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Government Printer, 1960), p. 25.

11. E. C. Baker, acting provincial commissioner, to chief secretary, June 6, 1940, NAT

61/1/E/1. The complete correspondence on the reorganization can be found in this file. The scheme was based on a reorganization plan for the coastal areas of the Southern Province implemented a few years earlier. See the Minute by Governor MacMichael, NAT 128-00, vol. II, on this plan; and J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 114-20.

12. Interviews at Bagamoyo with Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, July 22, 1970, and Shaykh Muhammad, July 17, 1970.

13. Joseph Nyerere to the district officer, Bagamoyo, January 10, 1960, NAT 7/L.5/20.

14. It appears that during the tenures of Shaykh Muhammad's successors permission to hold meetings was denied in only one instance, and the reason, according to the district commissioner, was that the branch had not complied with a regulation requiring requests for meetings to be in his office fourteen days prior to the event (district commissioner to district secretary of TANU, July 15, 1957, NAT 7/3/2).

15. Interview with Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi, Bagamoyo, July 23, 1970.

16. Choka, p. 7.

17. Interview with Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, July 20, 1970.

18. This was emphasized in an interview December 4, 1969, with the Qadiri head, Shaykh Muhsin Waligane, and elders of the settlement of Mbwewe, which is located about forty miles west of Bagamoyo town.

19. *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for 1957* (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Government Printer, 1958), p. 22.

20. Hucks, supervisor of elections, Dar es Salaam, to provincial commissioner, June 20, 1958, NAT 7/p.4/42.

21. This was the precipitating issue for the break, but a more fundamental problem concerned the question of Africanization, on which Mtemvu's faction took a more radical position (Liebenow, p. 264).

22. In his article "A Controversy over Islamic Custom in Kilwa Kivinje, Tanzania," in I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, p. 378, Peter Lienhardt writes the following concerning the head of the Qadiriyya in Kilwa: "At the time of the 1959 elections, when there was a slight doubt about the relations of Muslims and Christians in Tanganyika, the now President made his first visit during his election tour to Kilwa to this remarkable man."

23. William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania: A Collection of Essays Covering the Period from September 1960 to July 1966* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 193n. Aziz ran again in 1965, but without the support of TANU, and lost; TANU denied support to him because it was claimed that "he had not kept in touch" with his constituents (Cliffe, *One Party Democracy*, p. 363).

24. Although the Habari za TANU, Questionnaire, p. 6, and an informant (Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, Bagamoyo, July 22, 1970) said that this party had no branch in Bagamoyo, Shaykh Muhammad said the opposite, Bagamoyo, July 17, 1970. Significantly, he alleged that this was the party that claimed the membership of most Arabs.

25. Tanganyika *Gazette*, Government Notice no. 262, June 29, 1962. Information was unavailable from the local government officials or informants on many of the details of the town's administration in the immediate period after independence.

26. Stanley Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 122.

27. Wilbert Klerruu, "Whys and Wherefores of the TANU Cell System," *Mbioni* (Dar es Salaam), 3 (June, 1966), pp. 3-4.

28. Liebenow, pp. 280-81.

29. The father of Abdullah, Sultan Saidi Fundikira of Tabora, had been exiled to Bagamoyo by the British in about 1935 and while there became a close friend to Shaykh Mu-

hammad, to whom he sent his children for quranic instruction. None of them, however, became affiliated with the tariqa (interview with Shaykh Muhammad, Bagamoyo, April 23, 1970); see also Bates.

30. Interview with Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi, Bagamoyo, July 23, 1970. Similar views were expressed by Mu'allim Masudi Mrega, Bagamoyo, July 20, 1970.

31. See chapter 8, p. 152.

32. The names of the eighty-one cell leaders were obtained from a former branch chairman of TANU, Mzee Yahya b. Muhammad (son of Shaykh Muhammad). Information on sixty-nine of them was available because they were heads of households, the individuals the census takers questioned. It could not be determined whether the remaining twelve were not household heads or whether the information was simply missing. However, because these twelve persons were listed in the census data as cell leaders, it is possible to know something about them. From the names it appears that eleven of them were Muslims and one was a Christian. Ethnically, also from their names, eleven seemed to be Africans and one—because of the title sharif—was an Arab. None of the names seems to be that of a woman. As is seen below, these three characteristics of this group are statistically similar to some extent to those of the other sixty-nine cell leaders.

33. August H. Nimtz, Jr., "Political Change and Cell Leaders: The Case of Bagamoyo," in J. Samoff and J. O'Barr, eds., *Ten Cell Leaders in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1978).

34. This was obtained from a cell leader and long-time murid of the Qadiriyya, who recently became affiliated with the Ahmadiyya, Mzee Idi Marjani, Bagamoyo, July 27, 1970.

35. On the background of this institution and its functions, see Erasto A. Mang'enya, *Tume ya Kudumu* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam Printers, 1968).

36. *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), October 3, 1969, p. 8. When I asked Shaykh Muhammad about this, his only response was an enigmatic smile (whose meaning I decided, out of discretion, not to pursue).

37. A discussion with Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga, June 16, 1970, who has all the credentials for being termed a shaykh, revealed that it was probably Shaykh Muhammad's status as head of the Qadiriyya that earns him the appellation. However, in view of the fact that other learned people had in the past been called shaykhs when they were not leaders of brotherhoods, this explanation proved unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER 10

1. See, for example, I. M. Lewis, "Introduction," in I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*; J. S. Trimingham, "The Expansion of Islam;" and Vincent Monteil, "Marabouts," in Kritzeck and Lewis.

2. Thomas O'Dea, *The Sociology of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 71.

3. Shaykh Idris b. Sa'ad of the 'Askariyya was under consideration (district officer to provincial commissoner, Dar es Salaam, April 28, 1930, NAT 13632).

4. The one instance in which I discerned a similar attitude among Africans was a comment made by Bibi Titi Muhammad, former governmental minister. She mentioned—in the context of a discussion about national politics—that "the Qadiriyya was the African Muslim organization" (I am indebted to Maxime L. Nimtz for this bit of information.)

5. Donald E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 19.

6. O'Dea, p. 75.

7. J. Milton Yinger, *The Scientific Study of Religion* (London: Collier-MacMillian, 1970), p. 430.

8. Terry Clark, ed., *Community Structure and Decision-Making* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), pp. 94-95.

9. Ibid.

10. James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4, no. 4 (1960), pp. 346-69.

11. Ibid., p. 351.

12. See chapter 5, p. 73.

13. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule*, p. 196.

14. For a brief note on this and other recent aspects of Muslim politics in contemporary Tanzania, see Nancy Gallagher, "Muslims in Tanzanian Politics," *Ufahamu* 4, no. 2 (fall, 1973).

15. "E. A. Muslim Society Banned," *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), December 20, 1968, p. 1.

16. This was certainly the opinion of a missionary from Cairo whom I met in Zanzibar in 1970.

17. I became aware of this problem in 1969 during conversations in Cairo with Tanzanian students who were studying at al-Azhar.

18. Probably the best critique of Tanzania from this perspective is Issa G. Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

19. Ibid. See Shivji's data on Tanzania's economic performance since 1967.

Map of East Africa

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
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Bagamoyo
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Mzee Lila b. Rajabu
Mu'allim Masudi Mrega
Mzee Mshindo b. Sudi
Mzee Mtumwa b. Diwani Kurandi
Mzee Mtumwa b. Maksudi
Shaykh Muhammad b. Ramiya
Mzee Ramadhani b. Diwani Mchuguuni
Mu'allim Shani Kissawaga
Mzee Su'ud b. 'Umar
Mzee Tamin b. Salim
Mzee Yahya b. Muhammad b. Ramiya

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